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“Revenge is wicked, and unchristian and in every way unbecoming, and I am not the 
man to countenance it or show it any favor. But it is powerful sweet, anyway.” 
Mark Twain (1897) 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
On Friday morning, April 4th,
 
2014, the two Associated Press journalists, Anja 
Niedringhaus and Kathy Gannon, waited outside a government compound in the eastern city 
of Khost to cover the then upcoming elections in Afghanistan. Suddenly, Naqibullah, an 
Afghan police officer, walked up to their car and immediately opened fire on both women. 
Gannon survived heavily wounded, while Niedringhaus died instantly. After the attack, the 
shooter dropped his weapon and surrendered himself to the police. He later confessed that his 
attack was revenge for NATO air raids on his village (Crilly & Babakarkhail, 2014). Neither 
Anja Niedringhaus, nor Kathy Gannon, were responsible for or involved in these air raids that 
sparked the vengeful desire in Naqibullah. In that sense, his revenge
1
 was displaced because it 
was not taken at those who actually carried out or commanded the air raids, but against those 
who were merely associated with this group. Sadly, this horrifying act of revenge is just one 
example among many. A glance at the newspapers suffices to become aware of the 
pervasiveness of this phenomenon. Consider, for example, the demolition of Palestinian 
homes by Israeli forces in November 2014, the beheading of James Foley by the radical 
Islamist terror group Islamic State in August 2014, or the brutal murder of Lee Rigby by 
Islamic extremists in May 2013. We encounter displaced revenge in various guises—violent 
conflicts, acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism, fights between rival street gangs (Vasquez, 
Wenborne, Peers, Alleyne, & Ellis, 2015), or even disputes between co-workers (Mitchell & 
Ambrose, 2007). The notion that revenge is sometimes directed toward innocent people can 
also be traced back to the Bible. Most poignantly it is demonstrated in the example of Achan: 
for taking some of the forbidden property after the destruction of Jericho, not only Achan was 
executed, but also his whole family and livestock (Joshua 7:16-26).   
                                                 
1
 The terms retribution, vengeance, revenge, retaliation, and punishment will be used interchangeably in 
this Dissertation as they cannot be meaningfully distinguished (e.g., Gollwitzer, 2009, Vidmar, 2001). 
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Tragically, such acts of displaced revenge can carry devastating consequences. Attacks 
against innocent members of one’s own group are likely to be seen as excessive, amoral, and 
by no means justified (Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008). Displaced revenge, 
therefore, is likely to provoke counter-revenge and fuel the spread of conflict beyond the 
actual disputants to a multitude of others unfolding vicious cycles of mutual violence. 
However, despite its ubiquity, we still understand relatively little about the psychological 
dynamics and emotional consequences of displaced revenge. For example, can displaced 
revenge actually have hedonic benefits for avengers? Or more precisely, can such morally 
questionable behavior be satisfying? And if so, when exactly are avengers satisfied with 
displaced revenge? An exploration to these questions is not only important and interesting in 
and of itself, it may moreover tell us something meaningful about what avengers hope to 
achieve when taking displaced revenge. Seen from this angle, one may argue that avengers’ 
satisfaction after revenge can perhaps be interpreted as an indicator that a certain goal 
underlying revenge has been fulfilled. For example, do avengers simply seek to impose “just 
deserts” upon the target of their revenge? Or is there more about displaced revenge, do 
avengers perhaps want to deliver a message, such as “don’t mess with me!,” to the actual 
offender and other members of his or her group? 
The main goal of this Dissertation is to provide answers to the questions above. For 
this endeavor, the present work will look at the phenomenon of displaced revenge through the 
lens of justice psychology. This perspective is based on the premise that revenge is not 
irrational or immoral, but rather a functional and goal-driven response to injustice. Identifying 
the conditions under which displaced revenge can be satisfying for victims
2
 and achieve a 
sense of restored justice, may therefore eventually contribute to a more refined understanding 
of vengeful desires and their driving forces. More broadly, it can give insight into the 
development, escalation, and perpetuation of violent group conflicts. 
                                                 
2
 In this Dissertation, the term “victim” refers to the later avenger (if not otherwise specified). 
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In the following sections, I will review the theoretical perspectives and empirical work 
that guide the present research. First, I provide an overview of how psychological justice 
research addressed the phenomenon of interpersonal (i.e., direct) revenge and what we know 
about the goals and functional features of revenge (Section 1.1). Next, I will delineate the 
previous theoretical and empirical work on displaced revenge or group-based retribution 
which is largely rooted in research on intergroup aggression (Section 1.2). In this context, I 
will introduce the concept of entitativity, which is indispensable for understanding how 
retribution can spread from the original offender to other members of the same group (Section 
1.2.1). These sections set the stage for the novel predictions of the present research. In the 
concluding section of the Introduction, I will carve out how findings from both streams of 
research (i.e., research on direct revenge and research on group-based retribution) together 
may contribute to answer the questions raised above and discuss how entitativity may relate to 
the question on whether and when displaced revenge can be satisfying (Section 1.3).  
1.1 Revenge as a Goal-Directed Response to Injustice 
In the psychological literature, revenge is commonly defined as an action toward 
perceived harm or wrongdoing, which is intended to inflict damage, injury, discomfort, or 
punishment in return (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). The desire 
for revenge is a potent driving force behind various forms of violence and human 
destructiveness (e.g., Carlson & Miller, 1988; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Flynn, & Graham, 2010; 
Waldmann, 2001). Given the close link between revenge and violence it is not surprising that 
revenge has long been portrayed as an irrational behavior (Barreca, 1995; Jacoby, 1983; 
Nozick, 1981) or even as a psychological dysfunction (Hornsey, 1948; Summerfield, 2002). 
In fact, there are individual as well as collective negative consequences associated with 
revenge (see Schumann & Ross, 2010 for an overview). For example, taking revenge can 
increase victims’ rumination about the offender and elicit negative affect (Carlsmith, Wilson, 
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& Gilbert, 2008). But revenge can also have positive consequences and provide hedonic 
benefits for avengers (e.g., Tripp & Bies, 1997). A neuro-imaging study, for example, found 
that taking revenge activates reward-related areas in the brain (de Quervain et al., 2004), 
thereby suggesting that revenge apparently can be satisfying or “sweet” as the popular saying 
goes. Such findings and the proverbial sweetness of revenge could easily lead to the 
assumption that it is the anticipated satisfaction that actually motivates people to seek 
revenge. However, empirical evidence speaks against such an “affect regulation hypothesis.” 
For example, participants who were led to believe that their mood is frozen and will not 
improve for a certain period of time, nevertheless, took revenge against a deviant partner in a 
public goods game. If revenge was motivated by affect regulation, the mood-freezing 
manipulation should have affected the propensity to take revenge (Gollwitzer & Bushman, 
2012). Thus, people’s desire for revenge is not solely fueled by the mere expectation of 
hedonic benefits presumably gained from it. But what is it, then, that avengers strive for when 
taking revenge?  
Several theorists argue that revenge is a reaction in response to perceived injustice 
(e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). In that perspective, vengeful actions may be directed toward 
various subordinate goals and serve multiple individual and social functions, such as deterring 
future harm, rebalancing status and power, restoration of self-worth, or escaping negative 
affect (Gollwitzer, 2009; Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in press; Vidmar, 2001; see also Frijda, 
1994). The ultimate goal underlying vengeful actions, however, is to achieve subjective 
justice (e.g., Adams, 1963; Bies & Tripp, 1996; Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003, 
Solomon, 1999). Thus, as mentioned above, feelings of satisfaction are not the reason why 
people take revenge, but rather a consequence of the perception that justice has been 
achieved. If revenge aims at restoring subjective justice, the question arises: what gives 
avengers the feeling that justice eventually has been restored? 
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One answer could be that a sense of subjective justice requires an equilibration of 
harm, that is, payback in an ultimate sense: The offender has made the victim suffer, and now 
the offender has to suffer in return. Thus, revenge may simply be motivated by a desire to 
even the “score of suffering” between the offender and the victim (see Frijda, 1994). In fact, if 
it is only the amount of suffering that needs to be balanced, then it should make no difference 
whether the offender’s suffering has been caused by the harmed victim or by fate. The 
empirical evidence, however, speaks against this notion. In one study (Gollwitzer, 2005), 
participants were asked to assume the role of a victim of injustice. Depending on experimental 
conditions, they should imagine (a) taking successful revenge, (b) that revenge failed, (c) that 
the offender suffered through fate, or (d) that nothing happened. Results demonstrate that 
satisfaction measured afterwards was lower in the fate, control, and revenge failed condition. 
Therefore, findings suggest that merely seeing the offender suffer through fate is not as 
satisfying as taking effective revenge. 
An alternative answer to the question of what gives victims a sense of restored justice 
could be that revenge is only satisfying to the extent that it effectively delivers a message 
(“don’t mess with me!”) to the offender. In other words, the offender needs to know why 
revenge has been imposed on him or her (Miller, 2001). Philosopher Peter French (2001) 
likewise argued that “[r]evenge is a very personal matter, and when it is inflicted, it is 
important that the target grasps the reason why” (p. 12). Hence, revenge can only achieve its 
goal and be satisfying if the associated message is properly understood by the offender. One 
recent line of research tested this hypothesis experimentally (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; 
Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011). In one of the experiments, participants were confronted 
with a bogus partner who proposed a selfishly unfair distribution of resources in a cooperative 
task. Afterwards, they had the opportunity to take revenge against this person. Results show 
that taking revenge is more satisfying when offenders signal that they understood that revenge 
was a response to their prior unfair behavior. If no such connection was made, the potential 
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goal behind revenge remained unfulfilled and taking revenge was less satisfying (Gollwitzer 
et al., 2011, Study 2). These findings could also be replicated with a more unobtrusive 
measure of goal fulfillment. Gollwitzer and Denzler (2009) used a lexical decision task to 
measure the relative accessibility of goal-related concepts after revenge (i.e., words associated 
with aggression). Results show that a lower accessibility of aggression-related words was only 
observable when participants took revenge and received a message conveying the offender’s 
understanding. More recently, the question what understanding signaled by the offender 
exactly implies was addressed in more detail. Results show that revenge evokes justice-related 
satisfaction when it leads to a moral change in the offender’s attitudes toward the wrongdoing 
(Funk, McGeer, & Gollwitzer, 2014). Interestingly, there is even initial evidence for the 
validity of these dynamics in real-life instances beyond classical revenge dyads: U.S. 
Americans experienced higher levels of satisfaction, psychological closure, and a sense of 
restored justice to the extent that they believed that the assassination of former Al-Qaeda 
leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 sent a strong message to the Taliban not to mess with 
the U.S. (Gollwitzer et al., 2014). Altogether, these findings are in line with the notion that 
revenge is satisfying when it effectively delivers a message like “don’t mess with me!” Only 
when this message is understood, revenge elicits feelings of satisfaction and a subjective 
sense of justice. In line with communicative theories on punishment, one can therefore 
conceptualize revenge as an act of communication between the victim and the offender (see, 
e.g., Duff, 2001). More generally, the previous theoretical and empirical work suggests that 
revenge is a goal-driven response to injustice: the ultimate goal of revenge actions is to re-
establish a subjective sense of justice. The present Dissertation seeks to expand this line of 
research to the domain of group-based retribution.  
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1.2 Displaced Revenge as a Facet of Group-Based Retribution 
Group-based (or vicarious) retribution are acts of retribution, which are committed by 
or on behalf of a group and which, in turn, are directed toward a group or an individual as 
member of a group (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006; Lickel, 2012). 
Such acts of group-based retribution are a core element in violent group conflicts, as they 
facilitate the spread of the conflict beyond the principal agents (i.e., victim and offender). 
Displaced revenge constitutes one facet of group-based retribution, which refers to revenge 
not taken against the initial offender, but against other members of his or her group. In recent 
years, such acts of displaced revenge have been investigated within the context of real-world 
conflicts. For example, reminding U.S. Americans of the 9/11 terrorist attacks triggered a 
desire for revenge, which lead to increased support for military interventions in Syria in 2013 
(Washburn & Skitka, 2014). This finding suggests that vengeful desires can—even after a 
long period of time—translate into displaced vengeful actions. Relatedly, research conducted 
in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict demonstrates that following the reminder of a 
defeat, tendencies to seek displaced revenge can even be greater than direct revenge (Ein-Dor 
& Hirschberger, 2012). Thus, displaced revenge seems to be a viable behavioral response in 
intergroup conflicts, sometimes even if revenge against the actual offender is possible. These 
findings lead to the question: when or under which circumstances displaced revenge is more 
likely? 
The study of the factors that influence the likelihood or magnitude of displaced 
revenge is rooted in aggression research. In 1939, Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears 
introduced the concept of “displaced aggression” to refer to situations in which provoked 
individuals tend to aggress against innocent third-parties, when the original source of 
provocation is not available for direct retaliation. Such acts of displaced aggression have been 
thoroughly investigated throughout the years. Moreover, they were conceptually advanced by 
adding the notion that the target is not entirely innocent, but provided a mild, ambiguous form 
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of provocation (a so-called “trigger”), which in consequence leads to an escalation of 
aggression (Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003). Notably, research on displaced 
or triggered displaced aggression is largely concerned with instances of interpersonal 
aggression. Whereas these instances have been mainly explained in terms of residual arousal 
and post-provocation rumination (Miller et al., 2003), this explanation may not suffice to 
understand more complex vengeful actions between groups or against individuals as members 
of a group (McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2010). Social categories or group memberships 
have initially received less attention in the social-psychological literature on displaced 
aggression (but see, e.g., Pedersen, Bushman, Vasquez, & Miller, 2008). However, recently 
the analysis of displaced aggression has been extended to the intergroup level to investigate 
more closely the factors that determine when people engage in group-based retribution. In 
particular, the substantial work of Lickel et al. (2006; see also Lickel, 2012) fueled the 
systematic investigation of the contextual factors that influence the likelihood of revenge 
against other individuals than the original offender (i.e., displaced revenge). These authors 
argued that the spread of retribution beyond the offender to other members of his or her group 
is more likely, when this group is perceived as highly entitative, that is, when members of a 
group are perceived to form a unified and coherent whole (Campbell, 1958). To receive a 
more detailed picture of the role of entitativity in displaced revenge, I will render the concept 
of entitativity more precisely in the following sections, delineate its perceptual antecedents 
and then outline how it exactly relates to displaced revenge.     
1.2.1 Perceived Entitativity: Definition and Perceptual Roots 
1.2.1.1 Definition and Clarification 
In our daily lives, we encounter a wide variety of groups (e.g., families, working units, 
sport teams). Notably, all these groups widely differ in the extent to which they are seen to 
actually possess the quality of a “group” (Lickel et al., 2000). The term entitativity describes 
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this quality, or in Campbell’s (1958) words “The degree of having the nature of an entity, of 
having real existence” (p. 17). Consider, for example, a group of people standing in line at a 
bank counter. In some sense, these people form a group, but members are diverse and the 
group is arbitrary in its composition and easily dissolvable. Therefore, this loose collection of 
individuals is prototypical for a low entitative group. Now think of a soccer team. Members of 
this group appear homogenous (i.e., they all wear the same jerseys) and are characterized by 
mutual interaction. They share common goals and are dependent on each other in order to 
achieve these group goals. A group like this would certainly be regarded as a highly entitative 
group. According to Hamilton (2007), the meaning of entitativity can be twofold: First, it can 
refer to the actual properties of a group (which corresponds to the cohesion of a group) or, 
second, to the perception of a group as a real entity rather than a mere collection of single 
individuals. Therefore, entitativity is also influenced by features of the individual perceiver 
(e.g., need for closure; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).  
Entitativity is a key variable in group perception that has strong impact on how we see 
groups in our social environment. Information about highly and low entitative groups are 
processed in different ways (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Crawford, Sherman, & 
Hamilton, 2002; Rydell & McConnell, 2005). More precisely, highly entitative groups evoke 
integrative processing (Hamilton, Sherman, & Castelli, 2002). For example, perceivers of 
highly entitative groups (compared to low entitative groups) recall more information about the 
respective group (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997), engage in more on-line (vs. 
memory based) processing (McConnell et al., 1997), make more polarized judgments 
(Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003), and store group information in a different form (Johnson & 
Queller, 2003). Moreover, observers of highly entitative groups tend to spontaneously transfer 
attributes of one member to other members of that group (Crawford et al., 2002). Taken 
together, information about highly entitative groups are processed in ways that mimic the 
perception of individual targets (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; see also Malle, 2010).  
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Given that entitativity is a central aspect of group perception, it may also be important 
for understanding displaced revenge. Therefore, we have to ask how exactly impressions of 
entitativity are formed or, put differently, from which features we eventually infer a sense of 
entitativity. 
1.2.1.2 Similarity and Interaction: The Perceptual Foundations of Entitativity  
Entitativity is a complex and multidimensional construct (e.g., Hamilton, 2007; 
Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004). Consequently, previous research has stressed a wide 
range of variables that lead to perceptions of entitativity. Among these variables are 
interaction or interconnectedness (e.g., Gaertner & Shopler, 1998; Lickel, Rutchick, 
Hamilton, & Sherman, 2006), common fate and common goals (Lickel et al., 2000; 
Welbourne, 1999), synchronicity in movement (Lakens, 2010), importance of the group to its 
members (Lickel et al., 2000), and similarity (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Yzerbyt, 
Corneille, & Estrada, 2001). In attempts to integrate these findings, Ip, Chiu, and Wan (2006) 
proposed two different sets of variables that lead to perceptions of entitativity via distinct 
inferential routes—similarity and interaction3 (see also Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004; Rutchick, 
Hamilton, & Sack, 2008).    
First, perceptions of entitativity can arise from similarity or the degree to which 
individuals share the same characteristics (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004). In a strict sense, 
similarity can refer to certain perceptual features that all group members share (e.g., shirt 
colour). These similarities, in turn, can be an indicator of underlying psychological properties 
or characteristics which are shared by all members of a group (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). For 
example, Ip et al. (2006) showed that physical similarity (i.e., skin tone of an artificial group) 
leads to greater entitativity via perceptions of common traits. Thus, physical properties (e.g., 
                                                 
3
 In Manuscript #1 the variable “interaction” was labeled “interconnectedness” on the recommendation 
of the editor. However, throughout this Dissertation, “interaction” (instead of “interconnectedness”) shall denote 
the degree of interaction among members of a group.  
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perceptual superficial similarity) give rise to perceptions of psychological similarities among 
individuals (see also Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999). 
Second, entitativity can also be rooted in perceptions of mutual interaction and 
interdependence between individuals (e.g., Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 2006; Igarashi & 
Kashima, 2011; Lickel et al., 2000). For example, agentic and highly interactive groups are 
perceived to share and act on common goals (cf. Kashima et al., 2005). Ip et al. (2006) could 
also provide evidence for that perceptual route: engaging in collective behavior (i.e., moving 
in the same direction) leads to greater entitativity via perceptions of shared goals among 
members.  
This dual model of group perceptions roughly parallels earlier distinctions between 
categorical and dynamic groups as proposed by Wilder and Simon (1986). According to these 
authors, groups may be perceived categorically, that is based on similarities between members 
or, alternatively, perceived dynamically, that is based on interaction and relations among 
members. However, one should note that perceptions of similarity and interaction are not 
mutually exclusive. People may infer interaction from similarity between members and vice 
versa (see, e.g., Wilder, 1978).  
1.2.2 Beyond the Offender: Perceived Entitativity and Collective Responsibility 
Entitativity has not only been extensively studied as a key aspect of group perception, 
but also more specifically in the context of intergroup conflict. Whereas high entitativity is a 
positive property in one’s own group (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), it is 
perceived as a negative property in other groups. Highly entitative (vs. low entitative) groups 
are perceived to be more threatening and capable to engage in harmful actions against others 
(see Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Castano et al., 2003; Dasgupta et al., 1999), 
they are attributed more intentionality (Malle, 2010; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002), and elicit 
more moral suspicion (Newheiser, Sawaoka, & Dovidio, 2012). Crucially, high entitativity is 
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also associated with high levels of collective responsibility and blame. That is, individual 
members of highly entitative groups are seen as more responsible for negative acts committed 
by other members of their group. For example, Lickel, Schmader, and Hamilton (2003) 
investigated responsibility attributions in the context of the Columbine High school massacre 
on April 20, 1999. These authors show that perceptions of entitativity predicted the extent of 
responsibility which is attributed to several groups that were associated with the two 
perpetrators of the shootings—Harris and Klebold (e.g., teachers, counselors, the Trenchcoat 
Mafia
4
). Subsequent research substantiated the finding that individuals are seen as being (at 
least partially) responsible for the actions of their fellow group members when groups are 
highly entitative (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Waytz & Young, 2012; 
see also Sherman & Percy, 2011). The question whether and how innocent individuals are 
held accountable concerned psychologists, legal scholars, and philosophers alike (e.g., 
Feinberg, 1970; Levinson, 2003; May, 1987; Sheehy, 2006; Tännsjö, 2007). In fact, at a first 
glance, it seems totally aberrational and morally questionable to ascribe responsibility to 
people who had no direct involvement in the offender’s action. However, at a second glance 
this belief may change if we take the implications of group entitativity into account. Consider, 
for example, that one person out of a clique of friends suddenly starts a brawl in a pub. One 
might easily be inclined to think that his friends encouraged him to start the fight or at least 
missed to withhold him from doing so. In that sense, each member of this clique can be 
considered as individually responsible for the brawl due to his or her involvement in what was 
actually the action of one single person (see Hamilton et al., 2002).  
This example clearly illustrates that people—when judging responsibility—often refer 
to the indirect causal role other group members may have played in facilitating an offense. 
Lickel et al. (2003) distinguish two different explanations that influence judgments about 
                                                 
4
 A small group of self-appointed outcasts at Columbine High School to which Harris and Klebold 
belonged. 
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other members’ causal role in the single offender’s action, (1) responsibility by omission and 
(2) responsibility by commission (see also Lickel, 2012). The first inference is rooted in the 
belief that members of the same group could and should have prevented the offender’s action 
(e.g., they failed to prevent their friend from starting the brawl in the pub). The second 
inference is based on the belief that members of the same group even encouraged the action 
(e.g., they encouraged their friend to start a brawl in the pub).  
Besides causal inferences about an offense, responsibility and blame judgments, in 
general, are also influenced by dispositional information about individual offenders (e.g., 
Alicke, 2000). It is quite conceivable that the same holds true for collective blame. After an 
offense committed by one member of a highly entitative group, observers may judge other 
members of that group to possess the same blameworthy characteristics that define the 
offender (Liberman, 2006; Lickel et al., 2006; see also Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et 
al., 2001; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998). Indeed, research shows that in highly entitative 
groups, attributes of a single group member are likely transferred to other members (Crawford 
et al., 2002). The perception of an “evil” or blameworthy character of other group members, 
in turn, might strengthen inferences about their approval of and perhaps support for the 
offense. Therefore, attributions of negative dispositional qualities of each group member 
likely amplify responsibility judgments about individuals beyond the offender (e.g., Lickel, 
2012).  
1.2.3 Displaced Revenge and Entitativity 
Given the extensive evidence on the negative expectations about and evaluations of 
highly entitative (out)groups, it is not surprising that entitativity is associated with an array of 
negative responses toward such groups. For example, entitativity amplifies intergroup 
responses and leads to greater stereotyping (Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007) and stronger out-group discrimination 
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(Gaertner & Shopler, 1998; Moscatelli & Rubini, 2013). Importantly, given that entitativity 
increases perceptions of collective responsibility (see Section 1.2.2), entitativity can provide a 
true or strategic justification for revenge against other individuals than the original offender 
and therefore promotes displaced revenge (Lickel et al., 2006).  
Consistent with this notion, recent empirical evidence shows that entitativity leads to 
increased retributive judgments directed at an entire group in response to a misdeed by a few 
members (Pereira, Berent, Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, & Butera, 2015). In the same way, 
people are more willing to target individuals beyond the original offender when the offender’s 
group is perceived as highly entitative (Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008), and 
behave more aggressively toward a high (vs. low) entitative group, after feeling rejected by a 
single member of that group (Gaertner, Iuzzini, & O’Mara, 2008). Likewise, observers favor 
more severe punishments for a group (Newheiser et al., 2012) if the group was manipulated to 
be highly (vs. low) entitative. Survey studies conducted in the U.S. provide further indirect 
support. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, hate crimes in the United States against Arab-
Americans, Muslims, and similar targets that share visual similarity with a stereotypic Al-
Qaeda terrorist increased drastically (Skitka, Saunders, Morgan, & Wisneski, 2009). 
Complementing this evidence, results from qualitative interviews further suggest that 
collectivist cultures—which have a stronger sense of out-group entitativity—are more prone 
to channel their vengeful desires toward targets beyond actual offenders (Gelfand et al., 
2012). Recent research also hints at the complex role of entitativity by demonstrating that 
high entitativity can even result in less severe retributive judgments if counter-retaliation by a 
strong offender group is possible (Newheiser & Dovidio, 2014). Nevertheless, a large body of 
research suggests that entitativity of the offender group increases the likelihood of displaced 
revenge. This finding is, moreover, echoed in earlier meta-analytical results, which show that 
the more similar the target was to the provocateur, the greater the amount of aggression 
displaced onto that target (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000).  
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Taken together, the notion that entitativity increases the likelihood of displaced 
revenge is empirically backed by different independent researchers in different contexts. 
Notably, this previous research only examined under which circumstances displaced revenge 
is more likely, but it can tell us nothing about the emotional or justice-related consequences of 
displaced revenge. For example, does revenge against innocent targets can actually feel good? 
Moreover, this research leaves open what avengers hope to achieve by taking displaced 
revenge. For example, do avengers merely want to bring just deserts to any member of the 
offender’s group? Or is there more about displaced revenge? Do avengers perhaps want to 
send a message to the offender and other members of his or her group? The present 
Dissertation seeks to fill this gap and explore these questions.  
1.3 The Present Research 
This Dissertation investigates a core element of group-based retribution, namely: 
displaced revenge. For this endeavor, the present research draws on previous theoretical and 
empirical work on group-based retribution and ties it with psychological justice research. 
Such an integrative perspective may not only advance our understanding of vengeful desires, 
it can also provide the conceptual and methodological framework to empirically study acts of 
displaced revenge. Altogether, five studies will be presented that explore the conditions under 
which displaced revenge may lead to feelings of satisfaction and a sense of “justice achieved” 
(i.e., justice-related satisfaction). The present analysis, in addition, expands prior research on 
displaced revenge by using a higher “focal length.” In specific, this means that (a) it 
concentrates on situations in which the later avenger was personally harmed (and not 
collectively), and that (b) revenge is targeted at one specific innocent member of the 
offender’s group (and not at the entire group including the original offender). This enables us 
to take a closer look at the mechanism underlying displaced revenge onto other targets apart 
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from desires to punish the original offender. In the following sections, the specific 
assumptions that guided the current work will be developed. 
1.3.1 Can Displaced Revenge be Satisfying? 
A large body of work examined the factors that increase the likelihood of displaced 
revenge, leaving open whether acts of displaced revenge can actually be satisfying and 
capable to elicit a sense of restored justice. The likelihood or magnitude of displaced revenge, 
however, can be totally unrelated to participants’ satisfaction after displaced revenge. Though 
people under certain circumstances (e.g., when direct revenge is prevented) may take revenge 
against other persons than the original offender, it does not necessarily imply that they feel 
satisfied afterwards. Given the basic norm not to harm innocent people, displaced revenge is 
likely perceived to be immoral or unethical (Barton, 1999; Rupp & Bell, 2010; Uniacke, 
2000). For example, people who unjustifiably aggress against an innocent target are evaluated 
more negatively (Lincoln & Levinger, 1972). Likewise, avengers retaliating against innocent 
third-parties may afterwards realize that they have done something wrong and thus feel “bad” 
about themselves (see Donnerstein & Hatfield, 1982). In the same vein, Denzler, Förster, and 
Liberman (2009) found that behaving vengeful against a displaced target (even if similar to 
the actual harm-doer) does not necessarily suffice to induce a sense of aggressive goal 
fulfillment. Taken together, it seems reasonable to assume that displaced revenge cannot 
actually be satisfying for avengers. This Dissertation, however, suggests the novel hypothesis 
that displaced revenge can be satisfying when the group to which the offender and the target 
belong is perceived as highly entitative. It is conceivable that there are at least two ways in 
which entitativity relates to post-revenge satisfaction: First, if an offender’s group is highly 
entitative, perceptions of responsibility are extended to other members than the actual 
offender (see Section 1.2.2). Consequently, individual members of highly entitative groups 
are viewed as responsible for the negative acts committed by the actual offender (e.g., Denson 
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et al., 2006; Waytz & Young, 2012). Revenge against any member of a highly entitative 
offender group may therefore be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the victim and hence 
lead to feelings of satisfaction. Second, based on the notion that displaced revenge might 
serve to deliver a message, the current work suggests a new and broadened perspective on the 
role of entitativity within displaced revenge contexts. High (vs. low) entitativity may not only 
influence perceived collective responsibility, it furthermore can signal whether retaliating 
against any member actually increases the chances that a potential message embedded in 
revenge (“don’t mess with me!”) is also effectively delivered to and understood by the 
original offender and perhaps other members of his or her group. As already mentioned, 
entitativity refers to the extent to which a collection of individuals is perceived to be bonded 
together (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000; Rutchick et al., 2008). Importantly, the stronger these bonds 
are, the more opportunities are available for members to communicate and exchange 
messages, such as news and rumors with each other (Lott & Lott, 1961; see also Weenig & 
Midden, 1991). Therefore, the chances that a potential revenge message is spread within the 
offender group are probably perceived to be higher in highly (vs. low) entitative groups.  
It should be noted that both roles of entitativity discussed here are not mutually 
exclusive. They may rather jointly contribute to satisfaction after displaced revenge. Given 
that fellow group members of the offender are seen as being (at least partially) responsible, it 
is likely considered important that the message is not only delivered to the offender, but to 
other group members as well (see Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in press). Taken together, this 
reasoning leads to the hypothesis that displaced revenge can be satisfying if the offender’s 
group is perceived as high (vs. low) in entitativity. This prediction is tested in Studies 1 to 3 
(Manuscript #1).  
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1.3.2 How Do Perceptions of Similarity and Interaction Relate to Avengers’ 
Satisfaction? 
As mentioned above, research shows that two features of groups can lead to the 
perception of entitativity: similarities between individuals and the extent of interaction among 
individuals. Both features have distinct contributions to group perceptions (e.g., Hamilton, 
Chen, & Way, 2011). Distinguishing between similarity and interaction may therefore provide 
important insights into the mechanism underlying displaced revenge. However, to date, no 
research has investigated the role of similarity and interaction on displaced revenge.  
In general, similarity (vs. interaction) is a weaker predictor of entitativity (e.g., Lickel 
et al., 2000) and may thus not be sufficient to elicit the evaluative, emotional, and behavioral 
responses that are typically associated with perceptions of overall entitativity (see, e.g., 
Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010; Welbourne, 1999). For example, 
manipulating mere similarities between members of a criminal group did not influence the 
magnitude of punishment (Alter & Darley, 2009). By contrast, mutual interaction seems to 
allow more inferences about the group and its members and may therefore be particularly 
informative when judging other group members’ indirect involvement in the offender’s action 
(see Lickel et al., 2003). In addition, and importantly, interaction should be more central to 
displaced revenge given the assumption that avengers hope to deliver a message. It is in 
particular the interaction among group members (but not the mere similarity) that is supposed 
to increase the chances that a message embedded in displaced revenge is spread within the 
offender’s group.  
Taken together, this reasoning suggests that it is rather questionable whether 
superficial similarity alone is sufficient to elicit satisfaction in avengers after displaced 
revenge. Individuals who are similar to the original offender may be perceived to share the 
same blameworthy qualities that define the original offender which, in turn, may deem them 
as appropriate revenge targets (see Section 1.2.2). However, if members do not interact with 
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each other, a potential revenge message cannot be delivered to and eventually understood by 
the offender and perhaps other members. Therefore, mutual interaction as a cue to entitativity 
seems more central to elicit satisfaction after displaced revenge. Study 3 (Manuscript #1) is 
the first research that investigates similarity and interaction orthogonally in order to test 
whether similarity, interaction, or both are necessary to make displaced revenge satisfying for 
avengers. 
1.3.3 Just Deserts or Delivering a Message? 
Prior research suggests that punishment decisions are largely driven by pure 
retributive concerns (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith, 2006; Keller, 
Oswald, Stucki, & Gollwitzer, 2010; for a review, see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Therefore, 
in contrast to the notion that displaced revenge serves to deliver a message, victims’ 
motivation for displaced revenge may simply follow a retributivist (or deservingness) 
perspective (Kant, 1797/1990). According to this perspective, retributive actions are 
backward-oriented and driven by concerns to deliver punishment appropriate to the severity 
and moral wrongfulness of a given harm. This reasoning would suggest that displaced 
revenge is an end in itself and that avengers may simply seek to give “just deserts” to the 
target of revenge. As reviewed in Section 1.2.2, research on group perception and collective 
responsibility points to the conclusion that the more entitative a group is perceived to be, the 
more its members are perceived to be individually accountable for the decisions and actions 
of the offender (see Sherman & Percy, 2011). Therefore, each member of a highly entitative 
group—even if not directly involved—may be seen as a “quasi-offender,” equally deserving 
of punishment. Following this reasoning, displaced revenge would be satisfying because it 
simply serves to give just deserts to the target for an offense s/he contributed to in the eyes of 
the avenger. Thus, high entitativity would be de rigueur for both the “just deserts 
explanation” as well as the “message explanation.”  
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One way to elucidate in the first place whether displaced revenge primarily serves to 
give targets their just deserts or whether it potentially serves to deliver a message which also 
has to be received by the original offender is to look at group permanence. For example, if 
displaced revenge is satisfying because it serves to simply punish a quasi-offender, it should 
make no difference whether the offender’s group dissolved, still exists, or whether the 
offender meanwhile left the group. Each single member has incurred individual responsibility 
for the decisions and action of the offender and therefore deserves punishment. By contrast, if 
displaced revenge serves to send a message also to the offender this would require the group 
to continue to exist in its original form including the offender. Only when the offender’s 
group continues to exist can a potential revenge message be spread and eventually delivered 
to the original offender. The question whether displaced revenge solely serves to impose just 
deserts upon a quasi-offender or whether it potentially serves to deliver a message to the original 
offender is addressed in Study 4 (Manuscript #2). 
Conceptualizing displaced revenge as a message is inevitably related to the question to 
whom exactly such a message should be delivered. In interpersonal contexts, the message 
embedded in revenge is, of course, directed to the offender. However, in displaced revenge 
contexts this question is more complicated to answer. Given the two critical members of an 
offender’s group in displaced revenge contexts (i.e., original offender and the target), the 
question arises whether only the offender, only the target, or maybe both have to understand 
why revenge was taken. In light of the evidence on collective responsibility, one might 
plausibly expect that the target and the offender eventually have to understand why revenge 
was taken. However, two alternative points of view are reasonable: First, one might argue that 
revenge aims at delivering a message particularly to the original offender, the initial cause of 
harm. In that sense, the target would perhaps be seen as a “messenger” on behalf of the 
victim, carrying the message to the actual offender. Whether the target gets the message 
would thus not be relevant. For example, in Stenstrom’s et al. article (2008) still 63% (of 
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those who stated some desire to take revenge at other members of the offender’s group) had a 
stronger motivation to retaliate against the specific offender who caused the harm. Second, 
one may argue that it suffices if any member of the offender’s group gets the message and 
understands why revenge was taken. As the above reviewed evidence suggests, members of 
highly entitative groups are perceived as psychologically interchangeable and substitutable for 
each other (e.g., Crawford et al., 2002; Kashima et al., 2005). In its ultimate sense, 
substitutability of members could imply that one member can be punished vicariously for 
another. Hence, any member of the offender’s group may serve as a viable target instead of 
the actual offender for one’s revenge and for the message it entails. The goal of Study 5 
(Manuscript #2) was to examine more precisely whether displaced revenge serves to deliver a 
message, and if so, to whom exactly this message is addressed. For this purpose, a lab 
experiment was conducted, in which target and offender reactions to revenge were 
manipulated. 
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2 SUMMARY OF MANUSCRIPTS 
This Dissertation includes five studies which are presented in two manuscripts. All 
studies explored the conditions under which displaced revenge may lead to the experience of 
satisfaction and restored justice. In addition, Studies 1 to 3 (Manuscript #1) investigated 
whether acts of displaced revenge can lead to an alleviation of feelings of regret about the 
vengeful action. In Studies 1 and 2, the degree of entitativity displayed by the offender’s 
group (high vs. low) and the type of revenge (direct vs. displaced) was manipulated. Study 1 
was an online vignette study, in which participants (N = 169) were instructed to assume the 
role of the protagonist in a revenge scenario. Results show that taking displaced revenge 
against an uninvolved target alleviates feelings of regret, but did not lead to more justice-
related satisfaction when the offender’s group was high (vs. low) in entitativity. In Study 2, 
participants (N = 89) were asked to recall a particular situation from their own experience in 
which they were personally harmed and felt the desire to take revenge. The described 
situation was then complemented by counterfactual information on the offender’s group 
entitativity. Results show that taking displaced revenge increases justice-related satisfaction, 
but did not alleviate feelings of regret. Study 3 was designed to examine how similarities 
between members and interaction among members contribute to justice-related satisfaction. 
For this purpose, a laboratory study was conducted, in which similarity and interaction were 
manipulated independently from each other. Instead of merely imagining to take revenge, 
participants (N = 72) were given the opportunity to actually exact revenge against a third-
person. Results suggest that avengers experienced the highest level of satisfaction when the 
offender’s group was perceived to be strongly interactive and, at the same time, similar in 
appearance. As in Study 2, no effect on regret could be observed. Findings reported in 
Manuscript #1 were not consistent across the three studies. Specifically, the proposed effect 
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on justice-related satisfaction was significant in Studies 2 and 3, but not in Study 1. 
Conversely, the proposed effect on regret was significant in Study 1, but not in Studies 2 and 
3. To clarify this inconsistency, a fixed effects meta-analysis across the three studies reported 
in Manuscript #1 was conducted. Results speak to the robustness of entitativity on justice-
related satisfaction, but not on regret. Taken together, Manuscript #1 demonstrates that 
avengers experience satisfaction and a sense of restored justice when the target and the 
original offender belong to a highly entitative group; more precisely, a group whose members 
are perceived to be interactive and similar in appearance. 
Having established the effect of entitativity on justice-related satisfaction in Studies 1 
to 3, Studies 4 and 5 (Manuscript #2) aimed at investigating the psychological dynamics 
underlying displaced revenge in more detail. The goal of Study 4 was to examine whether 
displaced revenge primarily serves to give targets their just deserts or whether it potentially 
serves to deliver a message which has to be received by the original offender. For this 
purpose, an online vignette study was conducted in which participants (N = 277) were 
instructed to assume the role of a protagonist in a revenge scenario. In this study, it was 
manipulated, whether the offender’s group continued to exist in its original form, whether the 
offender left the group, or whether the entire group dissolved after the offense (i.e., group 
permanence). Results show that displaced revenge was less satisfying when the group of the 
offender dissolved or when the offender left the group. By contrast, avengers experienced 
more satisfaction when the offender’s group continued to exist. These findings suggest that 
displaced revenge does not serve to solely impose just deserts upon the target. They rather 
lend indirect support to the notion that displaced revenge aims at delivering a message.  
Study 5 investigated to whom exactly a potential revenge message is addressed in 
displaced revenge contexts. Participants of this study (N = 121) took revenge in a laboratory 
paradigm similar to Study 3. As an indicator of the successfully delivery of a message, it was 
manipulated whether the offender and/or the target understood why revenge was taken. 
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Results of Study 5 suggest that displaced revenge serves to deliver a message and that this 
message has to be understood by the original offender and the target of revenge to elicit 
feelings of justice-related satisfaction. 
Taken together, findings reported in Manuscript #2 speak against the notion that 
displaced revenge serves solely to impose just deserts on the target. Rather, findings 
corroborate the notion that displaced revenge aims at delivering a message to the offender and 
the target of displaced revenge. 
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3 MANUSCRIPT #1 
Sjöström, A., & Gollwitzer, M. (2015). Displaced revenge: Can revenge taste “sweet” if it 
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On the afternoon of May 23, 2013, the 25-year old British soldier Lee
Rigby was attacked and brutally killed by two Islamic extremists in
Woolwich, southeast London. Soon after the killing, a video appeared
on the Internet in which one of the murderers proclaimed that “The
only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are
dying daily by British soldiers […] And this British soldier is one. It is
an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” (Rayner & Swinford, 2013).
Lee Rigby was obviously murdered to avenge the killing of Muslims by
the British military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This brutal act exem-
plifies that violence can spreadbeyond the initial agents of a conflict and
that even innocent people are suddenly deemed as appropriate targets
for retaliation. This phenomenon appears in many guises—terrorism,
war, or gang fights. What all of these instances have in common isrg, Department of Psychology,
6421 28 26559.
(A. Sjöström).that they are acts of revenge, and that these vengeful reactions are
targeted against people who were entirely uninvolved in the act that
sparked these vengeful desires. In that sense, the murder of Lee Rigby
was displaced because he was not a perpetrator himself, but merely a
member of the perpetrator group.
Interestingly, these acts of displaced revenge or vicarious retribution1
(Lickel,Miller, Stenstrom,Denson, & Schmader, 2006) have not received
abundant attention in the social–psychological literature so far. Previous
research (Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, &Miller, 2008) investigated which
factors promote acts of displaced revenge, but has not yet considered
whether displaced revenge can actually be satisfying (“sweet”) for
victims. However, the question whether revenge targeted at a different
person than the original provocateur can be satisfying is not only an
interesting question in andof itself, but itmay also be useful in elucidating
underwhich circumstances such acts can possibly be successful in a sense
that they fulfill a need or reach a goal. The present research is the first to1 The terms retribution, vengeance, revenge, punishment, and retaliation will be used
interchangeably in this article.
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victimized and took revenge against another personwhowas uninvolved
in the initial harm-doing. Identifying the conditions under which even
displaced revenge can be satisfying is supposed to contribute to a deeper
and more refined understanding of vengeful desires, their motivational
forces, and their emotional consequences.
The sweetness of revenge
Displaced revenge can be defined as retributive reactions toward a
prior transgression that are not directed against the original transgres-
sor(s), but rather against uninvolved targets. Thus, displaced revenge
represents one facet of “group-based retribution,” which refers to
repeated cycles of vengeful acts committed by members of two
(or more) opposing groups (cf. Lickel, 2012). These cycles are often a
core element of intractable conflicts between groups; they are highly
emotional, often violent, and particularly difficult to stop.
So far, the social psychological literature has focused on the contex-
tual conditions thatmake displaced revenge likely to occur. One of these
conditions is the extent to which the perpetrator group is perceived as
“entitative,” that is, as a coherent and unified entity (Lickel et al.,
2006). The more members of the victimized group perceive the perpe-
trator group as entitative, the more likely displaced revenge occurs,
that is, themore likelywill retaliatory acts be directed against the entire
target group, no matter whether other members were involved in the
original victimization (Stenstrom et al., 2008). Notably, this research il-
luminates under which circumstances acts of displaced revenge are
more likely to occur, but it does not provide an answer to the question
of whether acts of displaced revenge are actually satisfying for victims
and lead to a sense of re-established justice. However, this question is
of considerable importance for understanding the psychological dy-
namics underlying acts of displaced revenge, and especially for the
question whether displaced revenge can be conceptualized as a goal-
directed behavior. If revenge is indeed goal-directed, feelings of satisfac-
tion, a sense re-established justice, and a state of psychological closure
should indicate that the goal\whatever it is\has been achieved. For in-
stance, research on revenge in dyadic interactions (Gollwitzer, Meder, &
Schmitt, 2011) has shown that revenge does not feel good unless the
target of one's vengeful reactions understands why revenge has been
taken against him or her. More recent research shows that revenge
leads to the experience of justice-related satisfaction when it affects a
change in the offender's attitudes (Funk, McGeer, & Gollwitzer, 2014).
These findings were also replicated with a more unobtrusive measure
of goal-attainment (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009): participants who
successfully took revenge showed higher levels of implicit goal fulfill-
ment (i.e., a reduced accessibility of aggression-related words). Taken
together, this research suggests that revenge is indeed goal-directed: it
aims at delivering a message to the offender (“don't mess with me”).
Thus, in intergroup conflicts, it would be plausible to assume that
group-based revenge aims at delivering a message to the perpetrator
group (“don't mess with us;” see Gollwitzer et al., 2014).
The present research aims at elucidating whether even displaced
revenge can be satisfying and lead to perceptions of justice achieved.
This is by no means a trivial issue: some studies suggest that acts of
revenge may lead to feelings of regret, guilt, and shame (Boon, Alibhai,
& Deveau, 2011; Crombag, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2003; Tripp & Bies,
1997), and that avengers tend to overestimate the extent to which
revenge feels sweet (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008). So what
about displaced revenge? It is quite likely to assume that revenge does
not lead to feelings of satisfaction and justice achieved if the target of
one's vengeful reaction is not identical with the original perpetrator.
After all, taking revenge against a target that was not involved in the
initial transgression obviously violates the principles of justice
(Barton, 1999) and may be judged as morally wrong or unethical
(e.g., Rupp & Bell, 2010; Uniacke, 2000). However, we will argue that
even displaced revenge can sometimes taste sweet under certainconditions. The condition we focus on in the present research is the ex-
tent to which the target of one's vengeful act and the original perpetra-
tor belong to a highly entitative group (see Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in
press). The theoretical rationale underlying this hypothesis will be devel-
oped in the following sections.
Displaced revenge and group entitativity
The term “entitativity” describes the extent to which an aggregate of
individuals is perceived as a unified and coherent entity (Campbell,
1958). Consider a group of people waiting at a bus stop: These people
do form a group, but members are heterogeneous in appearance and
only loosely connected to each other. The group is arbitrary in its
composition and easily dissolvable; in other words, it is prototypical
for a low-entitativity group. Now consider two sports teams playing
against each other. Groupmemberswithin each teamare homogeneous
in appearance (they all wear the same jerseys) and strongly dependent
on each other in order to achieve a common goal. Such a group can be
considered high in entitativity.
Entitativity has been investigated in the context of group perceptions
(e.g., McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997) and intergroup conflicts.
For instance, perceptions of entitativity are associated with intergroup
threat (i.e., high-entitativity groups are perceived as more threatening
than low-entitativity groups; Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998),
attributions of collective blame to a group for an individual group
member's actions (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006), and
the likelihood of group-directed aggression (Gaertner & Iuzzini, 2005).
For example, people behaved more aggressively toward an out-group
when they felt rejected (Gaertner, Iuzzini, &O'Mara, 2008) and supported
more severe punishments for transgressor groups (Newheiser, Sawaoka,
& Dovidio, 2012) if these groups were perceived as highly (vs. low)
entitative. In this sense, entitativity may function as a targeting system
indicating who is a suitable substitute for the original transgressor.
While, at first glance, it seems irrational andmorally questionable to
take revenge against an individual who was not personally involved in
the initial transgression, things might be different if both the transgres-
sor and the target belong to a highly entitative group. For example,
empirical evidence suggests that in highly entitative groups the respon-
sibility of a single transgressor dilutes, whereas responsibility of the
entire group increases (Sherman & Percy, 2010; Waytz & Young,
2012). More precisely, people believe that members of such highly
entitative groups could and should have prevented the transgressor's
action, or even actively promoted the initial transgression (Lickel,
Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003; see also Lickel, 2012). In addition, such
responsibility judgments may be influenced by beliefs that the target
and the initial transgressor share the same blameworthy characteristics
thatmake her/him an appropriate target for retaliation (e.g., Lickel et al.,
2006). Thus, revenge against any member of a highly entitative group
can be perceived as legitimate from the victims' perspective and there-
fore leads to feelings of satisfaction.
Interconnectedness and similarity: two facets of entitativity
In the literature on group perception, two different ways of
construing entitativity are distinguished: (1) group membership can
be defined by sharing commonalities and similarities in appearances
(i.e., superficial similarities), or (2) group membership can be defined
by mutual interaction, interdependence and interconnectedness
between group members (Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sack, 2008; Wilder &
Simon, 1998; see also Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004). Adding to a long line
of theorizing on this distinction, recent research shows that perceptions
of entitativity can arise from both superficial similarities and intercon-
nectedness (Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006).
First, entitativity based on superficial similarities (e.g., similar
appearance) evokes inferences about psychological homogeneity
(Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). In this
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attacks, hate crimes against Arab Americans, Muslims, and similar
targets strongly increased in the U.S. (Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka,
2011; Skitka, Saunders, Morgan, & Wisneski, 2009). This finding
suggests that solely superficial similarities deemed innocent Arab
Americans as being appropriate targets for Americans' revenge for the
9/11 terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the amount of retaliatory aggression
displaced onto another target is greater the more superficially similar
the target was to the initial transgressor (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen,
Carlson, & Miller, 2000; Moore, 1964).
Second, entitativity is also derived from perceptions of interconnec-
tedness between individuals (e.g., Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Hamilton,
Sherman, & Lickel, 1998; Igarashi & Kashima, 2011). Following this line
of argumentation, perceivers attend to the dynamic processes that un-
derlie group behavior rather than their mere physical appearance.
Groups engaging in collective behavior are perceived to share common
goals and hence are attributed stronger cohesiveness, which, in turn, is
also related to the degree of intra-group communication (Lott & Lott,
1961). Ip et al. (2006), for example, showed that the synchronicity of
movement displayed by fictitious cartoon creatures leads to attribution
of entitativity mediated via perceptions of common goals. Thus, besides
superficial similarity, frequent interactions and interconnectedness
amongmembers within a group are also strongly connected to percep-
tions of entitativity (e.g., Lickel, Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2006;
Lickel et al., 2000). But how exactly do these two different routes to
the perception of entitativity relate to avengers' feelings of satisfaction?
A fine-grained analysis of entitativity may give us a deeper insight into
the mechanisms underlying displaced revenge. Superficial similarity
may be able to create a sense of shared responsibility among previously
uninvolved members and the transgressor in the eyes of the avenger.
But it is questionable that superficial similarity alone is sufficient to
make displaced revenge a satisfying experience for the avenger.
Building upon the notion that revenge aims at delivering a message
(“don't mess with me;” Gollwitzer et al., 2011), one could expect that
interconnectedness and communication between group members
(but not similarity alone) increase chances that themessage underlying
revenge is spread and eventually understood. Thus, a critical degree of
similarity among members might be necessary; but to make displaced
revenge a satisfying experience it may also be important that members
interact as one collective entity. Taken together, we argue that displaced
revenge has more hedonic benefits (i.e., less regret and more justice-
related satisfaction) when it is directed against a target that belongs to
a highly (vs. low) entitative group togetherwith the actual transgressor.
However, whether similarity, interconnectedness, or both are necessary
to make displaced revenge a satisfying experience for the avenger is an
open question.
The present research
In this article, we test under which conditions displaced revenge
can be satisfying for the avenger and capable of establishing a subjec-
tive sense of justice. We will do so by using different experimental
paradigms and techniques. Based on the theoretical assumptions
and empirical evidence outlined above, we argue that the degree of
group entitativity is crucial in that regard. First, we hypothesize
that displaced revenge leads to feelings of satisfaction and a sense
of justice achieved if the target and the original perpetrator belong
to a highly (vs. low) entitative social category (Studies 1 and 2). In
both studies we manipulate (1) the degree of entitativity of the
group the transgressor belongs to, and (2) whether participants
have the opportunity to take either direct revenge (i.e., addressed
at the original transgressor) or displaced revenge (i.e., addressed at
another member from the transgressor's group). Second, regarding
the two facets of entitativity, we explore whether superficial similar-
ity, interconnectedness, or both are necessary to make displaced re-
venge a satisfying experience for avengers (Study 3). Apart fromjustice-related satisfaction, we measured regret about displaced
revenge in all three studies to examine whether negative feelings
are alleviated when the displaced target and the original perpetrator
are members of a highly entitative group.
Study 1
The goal of Study 1 was to examine whether acts of displaced
revenge can have hedonic benefits for avengers. For this purpose,
we conducted an online vignette study, in which participants were
instructed to imagine themselves as protagonists of a revenge scenario.
The experimental design of Study 1 included an act of revenge, which
was either directly taken against the initial harm-doer or displaced
against a third-person. In addition, we manipulated the degree of
entitativity of the transgressor's group. We expect that participants
experience more justice-related satisfaction and less regret when
the group to which the target and the transgressor belong is highly
(vs. low) entitative.
Method
Procedure
Participants for this vignette study were recruited via various online
forums. In return for participation, respondents were rewarded with a
raffle ticket for an MP3-Player. They were randomly assigned to exper-
imental conditions in a 2 (entitativity: low vs. high) × 2 (revenge: direct
vs. displaced) between-subjects design. Participants read a short vi-
gnette in which a protagonist was treated unfairly by a transgressor.
To make it easier for participants to immerse themselves in the role of
the protagonist of the vignette, they could choose an area of personal
relevance (either “university” or “working life”), which provided the
general setting for the scenarios. Both vignettes contained a situation
in which the protagonist was provoked by a person and took revenge
afterwards, either against the original transgressor or against a different
target (i.e., an innocent person who was related to the transgressor).
The sex of the transgressor and the target of the vignette were matched
with participants' gender. To manipulate perceived entitativity, these
vignettes furthermore included a description of a group the transgressor
belongs to (see below).
The “working life” vignette (M = 313 words) described how the
protagonist was heavily and unjustifiably criticized before the man-
agement board by a colleague (“Christian” or “Christiane”) from a
different department. Participants learned that Christian/Christiane
did so in order to enhance her/his own chances (and to reduce the
protagonist's chances) of becoming promoted, a thing s/he had
already done in the past. Next, participants learned that Christian/
Christiane was awarded with the promotion. The “university”
vignette (M=269 words) described a situation in which the protag-
onist had to prepare an important examination. A fellow student
(“Christian” or “Christiane”) borrowed the only copies of the
relevant books from the library. When the protagonist asked
Christian/Christiane whether s/he would be willing to lend them to
make a copy, Christian/Christiane pretended that s/he did not have
the books, although the protagonist knew that s/he only wanted to
get an advantage out of this situation.
After participants read this first part of the respective scenario, they
were asked to rate the amount of anger they experienced, their percep-
tion of injustice, and their desire to take revenge on a 6-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 to 6. Verbal anchors differed depending on the
wording of the item (e.g., “After this incident I felt angry,” 1 = not at
all, 6 = very much).
Revenge target manipulation
Next, participantswere instructed to imagine that they took revenge—
depending on experimental conditions\either against the original
transgressor (direct revenge condition) or against a different target
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were introduced as members who belonged to the same group as the
original transgressor (i.e., the same department within the company
in the “working life” vignette; the same learning group as the transgres-
sor in the “university” vignette). In the “working life” vignette, partici-
pants took revenge by passing on the target's phone list to the
accounting office for inspection, because they knew that the target
had declared private calls as business calls in the past. Eventually, the
whistleblowing resulted in an official warning from the HRdepartment.
In the “university” vignette, protagonists recognized that the target
forgot her/his library card on a table after a lecture. Participants took
revenge by giving it a little push so that it fell down from the table.
When the target finally realized the missing library card, s/he got
panicky.Entitativity manipulation
The provocateurs (and the targets in the displaced revenge condition)
belonged to a particular group, whichwas—depending on experimental
conditions—described as either high or low in entitativity. Based on
previous manipulations of entitativity (e.g., Crawford, Sherman, &
Hamilton, 2002), high entitativity groups were described as highly
cohesive, consisting of similarmembers that regularly interact and com-
municate with each other. In contrast, low entitativity groups were
portrayed as loosely bound individuals who are not very similar to
each other and do not interact or communicate very often. Descriptions
were adapted to the particular context (“university” or “working life”).
In the university vignette group members were described as fellow
students of the transgressor (i.e., members of the same learning
group), whereas in the working life vignette group members were
described as colleagues working in the same department (i.e., the
support department). For instance, participants in the high entitativity
condition of the university vignette were told:
“Christian (or Christiane) joins a learning group together with Philipp,
Anna, and Daniel (or Daniela). Members of this learning group know
each other from their first semester. They really like each other and
frequently spend their spare time together. They are similar to each other
and talk about all different sort of things. When being asked, they would
definitely call themselves ‘best friends.’”
In the low entitativity condition participants were told:
“Christian (or Christiane) joins a learning group together with Philipp,
Anna, and Daniel (or Daniela). Members of this learning group got to
know each other only recently via the university notice board. They do
not know each other very well yet and they do not engage in any other
joint activities. They are quite different and only meet to prepare for
exams. When being asked, they would rather call their learning group
a ‘partnership of convenience.’”2 The language exclusion criterion was applied in Study 1, since this vignette study was
very text heavy and the sample – compared to the student samples in Studies 2 and 3 –
was heterogeneous (with regard to educational background etc.). In addition, participants
in Study 1 were probably less experienced with completing online surveys. Therefore,
chances that non-native speakers may have experienced difficulties in following the in-
structions andunderstanding themanipulations properlymaybehigher compared to psy-
chology student samples that are typically used to such studies.
3 The completion time exclusion criterion was applied in both online experiments
(Studies 1 and 2) to (a) ensure that manipulations worked properly and (b) to improve
data quality. Long completion times in online experiments usually indicate that respon-
dents were interrupted or concernedwith something else while completing the question-
naire and, for example, did not properly attend to the instructions (see Malhotra, 2008).Dependent measures
Justice-related satisfaction was measured with four items. Partici-
pants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt satisfied, content,
relieved, and the degree towhich justice had been restored on response
scales ranging from 1 to 6 with verbal anchors differing on the wording
of the item (e.g., “I think that justice has been restored,” 1 = strongly
disagree, 6 = strongly agree). Together, these items formed a reliable
scale (Cronbach's α= .89). Regret about revenge was measured with
three items (“I wonder whether I should have reacted differently,”
“I wish it all had turned out differently,” “Now I think I can focus on
other things [reverse coded]”). These items formed a reliable scale
(Cronbach's α = .80). Participants rated their agreement with each
statement on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 6 (strongly agree).Perceived entitativity
Participants were asked to indicate the level of perceived entitativity
of the transgressor's group. Besides two verbal items (“[The transgressor]
and [target] are good friends,” “The group engages in joint activities”),
we used a pictorial measure for group entitativity (see Rutchick et al.,
2008). This item consisted of five pictures showing circles that differ
with regard to their closeness to each other. Participants were asked to
indicate which picture represents the described group best. Responses
on these three items were z-standardized due to different scale ranges.
Together, these items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's α= .86).
Next, participantswere asked to identify the provocateur and the tar-
get of revenge in the given scenario (e.g., “Who criticized you in a joint
business meeting and was promoted afterwards: Christian/Daniel/
I don't know”), and to rate how easy vs. difficult it was for them to pic-
ture themselves in the described situation on a 5-point scale (1 = very
difficult to 5 = very easy). Finally, participants were asked to provide
demographic information and write comments about the experiment
into an open text field.Participants
One hundred and eighty-six participants completed the experiment.
First, the data were inspected for implausible values and cases. Eleven
cases (6%) were omitted because they did not indicate German as
their native language. We supposed that insufficient language skills
may cause comprehension problems and bias our results.2 Next, we
checked for cases with noticeably long or short completion times.3
Three univariate outliers (1.6%) with extreme long completion times
(i.e., N3 standard deviations about the average completion time,
~33 min, Mduration = 10 min) were excluded from the sample. Data
from two further respondents (1.1%) were excluded due to comments
at the end of the study that revealed (a) problems in understanding
the instructions properly or (b) problems in answering the given ques-
tions.Moreover, oneparticipant (0.5%) hadmore than one thirdmissing
values on one of our dependent variables and was therefore excluded.
Thus, our final sample comprised 169 participants (34% female). Ages
ranged between 18 and 56 years (Mage = 28.80 years, SDage = 8.51).Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses
Ninety percent of the participants (n=152) correctly identified the
provocateur in the respective scenario. In the direct revenge condition
83% (n=75) of the participants correctly indicated that the provocateur
was the target, while in the displaced revenge condition 85% (n = 67)
correctly identified that another person was the target of the revenge
reaction. A 2 (entitativity: low vs. high) × 2 (revenge: direct vs.
displaced) ANOVA on perceived entitativity confirmed that participants
in the high entitativity condition perceived the group to bemore entity-
like (M= 0.72, SD= 0.54) than those in the low entitativity condition
(M=−0.77, SD= 0.40), F(1,166)= 416.30, p b .001, ηp2= .72. Neither
the main effect of revenge (p = .16) nor the entitativity × revenge
interaction effect was significant (p= .58), indicating that the effect of
entitativity was equal in both revenge conditions.
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in each scenario, and the two scenarios did not differ in the degree to
which participants could picture themselves in each of them (working
life scenario: M = 3.82, SD = 0.81; university scenario: M = 3.77,
SD= 0.90), t(167) = 0.35, p= .73. Moreover, the respective provoca-
tion was considered equally unjust (working life:M= 5.30, university:
M = 4.98) and equally likely to elicit vengeful desires (working life:
M= 3.83, university:M= 3.61), ts ≤ 1.93, ps ≥ .05. However, partici-
pants in the “working life” vignette felt more anger (M = 5.10) than
participants in the “university” vignette (M = 4.62), t(167) = 3.00,
p b .01. Critically, vignette type did not moderate any of the effects
we will describe in the following; therefore, anger was not used as a
covariate in the subsequent analyses.Entitativity
Fig. 1.Meanvalues on regret about revenge by experimental conditions (Study 1). Vertical
lines denote ±1 standard error of means.Main analysis
First, to test whether participants experience more satisfaction after
displaced revenge, when the transgressor group wasmanipulated to be
highly entitative, we calculated a 2 (entitativity) × 2 (revenge) ANOVA
with justice-related satisfaction as the dependent variable. Results
reveal amain effect of revenge: Participants who imagined taking direct
revenge reported more satisfaction (M= 3.00, SD= 1.24) than partic-
ipants who imagined taking displaced revenge (M= 2.31, SD= 1.37),
F(1,165) = 11.40, p = .001, ηp2 = .07. As expected, no main effect for
entitativity was found, F(1,165) = 1.91, p = .17, ηp2 = .01. However,
contrary to our assumptions, the entitativity × revenge interaction
was not significant, F(1,165)= 0.06, p=.80, ηp2= .00. Next, we entered
regret into a 2 (entitativity) × 2 (revenge) ANOVA. Results revealed a
significantmain effect of revenge: Participants who imagined taking di-
rect revenge felt less regret (M= 4.06, SD= 1.27) than people in the
displaced revenge condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.23), F(1,165) =
11.75, p= .001, ηp2= .07. As expected, nomain effect for entitativity ap-
peared, F(1,165)= 0.48, p= .49, ηp2 = .00. Importantly, we found a sig-
nificant entitativity × revenge interaction effect, F(1,165) = 4.85, p=
.03, ηp2 = .03 (see Fig. 1). The analysis of simple effects using Sidak ad-
justment revealed that participants who took displaced revenge report-
ed lower levels of regret in the high entitativity (M= 4.43, SD= 1.40)
than those in the low entitativity condition (M = 4.98, SD = 0.81),
F(1,165) = 3.95, p = .049, η2 = .02. Among participants who took
direct revenge, no entitativity effect was found (p = .27). Looking at
the results differently, we found that in the high entitativity group,
regret did not differ between displaced (M = 4.43, SD = 1.50) and
direct revenge (M = 4.20, SD = 1.08), F(1,165) = 0.77, p = .38,
η2 = .01, whereas when entitativity was low, displaced avengers
experienced more regret (M = 4.98, SD= 0.81) than direct avengers
(M= 3.91, SD= 1.45), F(1,165) = 15.43, p b .001, η2 = .09.4
To summarize, the results from Study 1 show that taking displaced
revenge against an uninvolved target alleviates negative feelings, such
as regret, when the group to which transgressor and target belong
was described as high in entitativity. However, contrary to our hypoth-
esis, taking displaced revenge against a high- (vs. low-) entitativity
group did not lead to more justice-related satisfaction. One might
argue that our hypothetical vignettes were too weak to elicit strong
vengeful desires (the average score on vengeful desires was 3.72 on a
scale from1 to 6), and, accordingly, strong feelings of justice-related sat-
isfaction (on average, 2.65 on a scale from 1 to 6). Study 2was designed4 When non-native speakers and participants who exceeded the 3-SD completion time
criterion were included in the analyses (N= 183), the main effect of revenge remained
significant for satisfaction scores, F(1,179) = 13.47, p b .001, ηp2 = .07. None of the other
effects were significant, Fs≤ 2.16, ps≥ .14. For regret scores, the entitativity × revenge in-
teraction effect remainsmarginally significant, F(1,179)= 2.99, p= .086, ηp2= .02. Partic-
ipants in the displaced revenge/high entitativity condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.47)
experienced less regret than people in the displaced revenge/low entitativity condition
(M = 4.88, SD = 1.00). However, this conditional effect was not significant,
F(1,179)= 2.33, p= .13, η2= .01. These results may suggest that excluding those partic-
ipants reduces error variance and increases the power to detect the proposed interaction
effect.to test the same hypothesis, but to increase the personal relevance of
the initial provocation incident. Instead of confronting participants
with hypothetical vignettes, we used a technique in which participants
were asked to recall a situation in which they had actually been victim-
ized. As in Study 1, we hypothesized that displaced revenge can taste
“sweet”when the group towhich the target and theoriginal perpetrator
belong is perceived as highly (vs. low) entitative.
Study 2
In Study 2,we used an experimentallymanipulated retrospective re-
ports paradigm (for similar approaches, see Okimoto, Wenzel, &
Hedrick, 2013; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2011; Stenstrom et al.,
2008): Participants were instructed to recall a particular event from
their own experience in which they were personally harmed and
hence felt the desire to take revenge. Building on the reported event,
we provided them with additional (counterfactual) background infor-
mation, asking them to imagine taking direct revenge against the origi-
nal transgressor or displaced revenge against a third person. Compared
to Study 1, this paradigm has the advantage of building upon partici-
pants' personal experience about an event eliciting a desire for revenge.
Method
Procedure
Participantswere randomly assigned to experimental conditions in a
2 (entitativity: low vs. high) × 2 (revenge: direct vs. displaced)
between-subjects design. Upon entering the study, they were asked to
recall a personal experience from the past in which they were angered
and consequently felt the desire to take revenge but actually did not
do so. They were provided with several guiding questions and asked
to write about this particular event (e.g., “When did this incident
happen?”, “How serious was the situation?”). Furthermore, participants
were prompted to report thenameor a pseudonym for the transgressor,
which was automatically pasted into all subsequent texts. After
describing the provocative act, participants were asked to indicate
how angry they felt after this situation happened (1 = not at all,
6= verymuch), andwhether theywanted to take revenge (1= strongly
disagree, 6 = strongly agree).
Entitativity manipulation
Next, they were asked to imagine that the transgressor in the given
situation was a member of a group that was either described as high
or low in entitativity. Participants in the high entitativity condition
were told:
“[The transgressor] joins a group together with Philipp, Anna, David,
Sarah, and Alex. The members of this group have known each other
5 When the covariates were not included, the pattern of results was essentially the
same. The entitativity × revenge interaction effect, F(1,85) = 3.80, p= .05, ηp2 = .04, as
well as the crucial conditional effect, F(1,85) = 4.23, p= .04, η2 = .05, remained signifi-
cant as expected. In thehigh entitativity condition nodifference between displaced anddi-
rect revenge was found, F(1,85) = 1.28, p= .26, η2 = .02.
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‘close friends.’ They frequently meet and communicate via telephone
and internet on a daily basis. Taken together, there is a strong cohesion
between members of this group.”
Participants in the low entitativity condition were told:
“[The transgressor] joins a group together with Philipp, Anna, David,
Sarah, and Alex. Members of this group have not known each other
for a long time. They like each other, but would not consider themselves
‘friends.’ They rarely meet each other and sometimes communicate via
telephone or internet. Taken together, there is a rather loose cohesion
between members of this group.”
Revenge manipulation
Next, depending on experimental conditions, participants were
asked to imagine and write about taking revenge either against the ini-
tial transgressor or against another member of her/his group (“Alex”).
This name was chosen because it is gender-neutral. In the direct
revenge condition, participants were instructed to imagine taking
revenge against the original transgressor. In the displaced revenge
condition, participants received the following prompt:
“Now please imagine that you do not have the chance to meet
[the transgressor] again to take revenge. Instead you take revenge
against Alex, a member of the same group.”
Afterwards, participants had the opportunity to describe their
vengeful reaction in detail, and to rate it with regard to how severe it
was, how angry the target probably felt after revenge was taken on
him or her (1 = not at all, 6 = very much), and how much harm this
vengeful action had caused (1 = little, 6 = a lot).
Dependent measures
Justice-related satisfaction (Cronbach's α= .81) and regret about
revenge (Cronbach's α= .61) were measured with the same items as
in Study 1. Again, response scales ranged from 1 to 6 with higher
numbers indicating more satisfaction or regret.
Perceived entitativity
Next, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they
perceived the transgressor's group as entitative on three items. Besides
a two-item verbal measure (“[The transgressor] and Alex are good
friends,” “The group engages in joint activities”), we used the same
pictorialmeasure as in Study 1. Itemswere z-standardized due to differ-
ent scale ranges. All three items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's
α= .80).
On the last page of the survey, participants were asked to provide
demographic data. With one control item, we assessed whether partic-
ipants were able to immerse themselves into the described situation
(“How difficult vs. easy was it for you to put yourself in the described
situation?” 1 = very difficult, 5 = very easy). Finally, participants were
asked to write comments about the experiment in an open text field.
Participants
Participants were 105 undergraduate students who volunteered for
extra course credit or, alternatively, could take part in a lottery. Five
participants (5%) were excluded because they reported no desire to
take revenge after the provocation (i.e., indicated “strongly disagree”
when asked whether they wanted to take revenge after the incident;
see above) and thus did not meet an important criterion for this study.
Furthermore, ten participants (10%) were excluded due to open com-
ments at the end of the study that suggested (a) that they could not
imagine themselves taking revenge, (b) that they did not understand
the instructions, or (c) that they had problems with the given task(e.g., reported openly that they could not really picture themselves in
the situation). One further participant (1%) was excluded due to an
extremely long completion time (i.e., N3 standard deviations above the
average completion time, ~226 min, Mduration = 40 min). Altogether,
data from 16 participants were excluded. Thus, our final sample
comprised 89 participants (73% female). Participants' ages ranged
between 19 and 36 years (Mage = 22.02 years, SDage = 2.86).
Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses
Self-reported anger and desires to take revenge as a consequence
of the recalled provocation were high among participants (anger:
M = 5.34, SD = 0.93; vengeful desires: M = 4.06, SD = 1.30).
Self-reported anger was higher in the direct revenge condition
(M = 5.68, SD = 0.52) than in the displaced revenge condition
(M = 4.95, SD = 1.13), F(1,85) = 15.88, p b .001, ηp2 = .16, but
only marginally related to satisfaction scores (r= .21, p= .06) and not
related to regret scores (r =− .15, p = .15). Vengeful desires did not
differ as a function of any of the two independent variables (ps ≥ .31).
Direct and displaced revenge reactions differed with regard to
how much harm the vengeful reaction caused (harmfulness rating:
Mdirect = 3.30, Mdisplaced = 2.51), F(1,83) = 5.83, p = .02, ηp2 = .07,
and how angry it made the target (angriness rating: Mdirect = 4.54,
Mdisplaced = 3.41), F(1,83) = 13.15, p b .001, ηp2 = .14. No difference
was found concerning the severity of vengeful reactions (Mdirect = 3.65,
Mdisplaced = 3.22), F(1,83) = 2.19, p = .14, ηp2 = .03. Moreover, for
those three variables neither the entitativity main effects nor the
entitativity × revenge interaction effects were significant, Fs b 1,
ps ≥ .47. Importantly, harmfulness ratings (r= .27, p= .01) and angri-
ness ratings (r = .19, p = .07) were positively related to satisfaction
scores, but not to regret scores (rs ≤ .12, ps ≥ .29). Thus, we decided to
include bothharmfulness and angriness ratings as covariates in the subse-
quent analyses except in our analysis of regret scores.5
Finally, the extent to which participants could imagine themselves
in the respective situation (M = 3.69, SD = 0.89) did not differ as a
function of entitativity, revenge target, or the interaction of the two,
Fs ≤ 1.44, ps ≥ .23.
Perceived entitativity manipulation check
A 2 (entitativity: low vs. high) × 2 (revenge: direct vs. displaced)
ANCOVA with harmfulness (of the vengeful reaction, see above) and
angriness (felt by the revenge target, see above) ratings as covariates
confirmed our manipulation of group entitativity, F(1,81) = 13.57,
p b .001, ηp2 = .14: participants in the high entitativity condition
perceived the group to be more entity-like (Madj = 0.34, M = 0.35,
SD = 0.89) than those in the low entitativity condition (Madj =
− .030, M = −0.31, SD = 0.69). Neither the main effect of revenge
nor the entitativity × revenge interaction effect was significant, Fs b 1,
ps ≥ .90.
Main analyses
A 2 (entitativity) × 2 (revenge) ANCOVA with harmfulness (of the
vengeful reaction) and angriness (felt by the revenge target) ratings
as covariates revealed a significant main effect of revenge, such that
participants imagining taking direct revenge felt more satisfaction
(Madj = 3.64, M = 3.64, SD = 1.16) than people in the displaced re-
venge condition (Madj = 2.78, M= 2.72, SD= 1.22), F(1,81) = 9.97,
p b .01, ηp2 = .11. No main effect for entitativity appeared (p = .35).
More importantly and in line with our hypothesis, we found a
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Fig. 2.Mean values on justice-related satisfaction by experimental conditions (Study 2).
Vertical lines denote±1 standard error ofmeans.Mean values are adjusted for harmfulness
and angriness ratings.
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.04, ηp2 = .05 (see Fig. 2). Simple main effects analyses using Sidak ad-
justment revealed that participants who took displaced revenge report-
ed significantly higher levels of satisfaction in the high entitativity
(Madj = 3.17, M = 3.11, SD= 1.09) compared to the low entitativity
condition (Madj = 2.40, M = 2.36, SD = 1.25), F(1,81) = 4.40,
p= .04, η2 = .05. By contrast, entitativity did not significantly influ-
ence satisfaction in the direct revenge condition, F(1,81) = 0.73,
p = .40, η2 = .01. Looking at the results differently, we found that
in the high entitativity condition, satisfaction did not differ between
displaced (Madj = 3.17) and direct revenge (Madj = 3.49,M= 3.52,
SD = 1.21), F(1,81) = 0.73, p = .40, η2 = .01, whereas when
entitativity was low, direct avengers experienced more satisfaction
(Madj = 3.78, M = 3.75, SD = 1.12) than displaced avengers
(Madj = 2.40), F(1,81)= 14.87, p b .001, η2 = .16.6 Next, we entered
the regret index into a 2 (entitativity) × 2 (revenge) ANOVA. Howev-
er, neither the main effects nor the interaction effect was significant
Fs ≤ 1.83, ps ≥ .18.7
Taken together, Study 2 shows that taking displaced revenge can
increase justice-related satisfaction among avengers when the initial
transgressor and the later target belong to a highly entitative (vs. a
low entitative) group. Notably, we found the hypothesized justice-
related satisfaction effect in Study 2, but not in Study 1. Conversely, we
found an entitativity × revenge interaction effect on regret in Study 1,
but not in Study 2. We will come back to this point in the General
Discussion section. As noted above, Study 2 built on a real experience
of victimization and provided participants with the possibility to choose
their vengeful action for themselves. Nevertheless, it required partici-
pants to recall and imagine a vengeful situation as vividly as possible.
Study 3
In Studies 1 and 2 participants were asked to imagine or recall a sit-
uation inwhich theywere provoked or harmed by a specific perpetrator
and had the opportunity to take revenge either against the same perpe-
trator (i.e., direct revenge) or against a different, uninvolved target
(i.e., displaced revenge). Both studies rely on participants' willingness
and capability to imagine these situations as vividly as possible, and ask-
ing participants afterwards towhat extent they felt regretful or satisfied
requires that people can validly experience these emotions after imag-
ining taking revenge. Importantly, research on affective forecasting
suggests that people sometimes tend to overestimate the extent to
which their (vengeful) actions have hedonic benefits (Carlsmith et al.,
2008, but see Funk et al., 2014, Study 1). Thus, we decided to replicate
our results in a third study in which participants actually took revenge
in a standardized situation. Afterwards, we measured to what extent
they experienced justice-related satisfaction and feelings of regret.
Apart from the fact that Study 3was conducted in the lab, it was also
designed to investigate how different facets of entitativity contribute to
the feeling of satisfaction gained from displaced revenge. We manipu-
lated (1) the degree of (superficial) similarity and (2) the degree of
interconnectedness (or mutual interaction) between group members
orthogonally. This design allowed us to investigate whether similarity,6 Using self-reported angriness as an additional covariate did not change the pattern of
results. The entitativity × revenge interaction effect was still significant for satisfaction
scores (F(1,80) = 4.53, p = .04, ηp2 = .05), as was the crucial conditional effect
(F(1,80) = 4.36, p = .04, η2 = .05). Again, displaced and direct avengers did not differ
in the high entitativity condition (F(1,80) = .38, p= .54, η2 = .01).
7 After including participants who exceeded the 3-SD completion time criterion or re-
portedproblems or expressed doubts (N= 100), the entitativity × revenge interaction ef-
fect was no longer significant, F(1,92)= 2.30, p= .13, ηp2 = .02. However, participants in
the displaced revenge/high entitativity condition (Madj= 3.07,M= 3.05, SD= 1.07) ex-
perienced slightly more satisfaction than people in the displaced revenge/low entitativity
condition (Madj= 2.50,M= 2.47, SD= 1.25). This conditional effectwas onlymarginally
significant (p= .095, η2 = .03). Note that the difference in degrees of freedom is due to
missing values on the covariates. Regarding regret scores, the pattern of result does not
change: none of the effects reached significance, Fs ≤ 2.50, ps ≥ .12.interconnectedness, or both are necessary and/or sufficient to make
displaced revenge satisfying for the avenger. In the following we use
the label similarity to refer to the superficial similarity of group
members and the label interconnectedness to refer to the degree of
interconnectedness and mutual interaction among group members.
Method
Personality measures
Prior to the laboratory experiment we collected data from a conve-
nience sample of students who completed different justice-related
trait scales that were part of a questionnaire administered in a universi-
ty lecture. This was done to account for systematic inter-individual
differences between avengers and non-avengers. The measures includ-
ed justice sensitivity from (1) the observer's, (2) the victim's, and
(3) the beneficiary's perspective (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach,
2005), and (4) attitudes toward revenge (Stuckless & Goranson,
1992). Altogether, 73 students from this sample later took part in the
actual experiment.
Procedure
Participants came into the lab believing that they would participate
in an experiment entitled “Emotional change and reading comprehen-
sion in cooperation situations.” After participants were provided with
an overview of the experiment and a set of general instructions,
informed consent was obtained. Next, the experimenter explained
that the first part of the experiment was about impression formation
of individuals and groups. Participantswere escorted to a second cubicle
equipped with a computer screen on which they watched an ostensibly
live video transmission from a second laboratory room. This transmis-
sion showed three students whowere introduced as participants in an-
other experiment (1man, 2women). The ostensible video transmission
consisted of a pre-recorded clip that was created in order tomanipulate
similarity and interconnectedness among those individuals who would
later serve as targets of retaliation. To further strengthen the credibility
of the “live cam,” video clips were embedded in the interface of a well-
known and commercially available VoIP program. Scripts including
detailed descriptions were written for each condition beforehand to
ensure comparability of the video material. After 2 min the transmission
ended and participants were escorted back to their cubicle.
Interconnectedness and similarity manipulation
In the strong interconnectedness condition, the ostensible partici-
pants frequently turned toward each other while talking. From their
conversation participants learned that they were all members of the
same sports team and engaged in several joint activities. The content
of their conversation was designed to create the impression that they
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regular basis. In theweak interconnectedness condition, the three osten-
sible participants entered the room one after the other. For quite some
time, they sat next to each other without talking. A conversation
between the participants started off rather slowly. From their conversa-
tion, it became clear that the participants did not know each other well,
and that they did not share many interests or characteristics. The situa-
tion was designed to create the impression that these three individuals
did not form an interactive or interconnected group.
Superficial similarity was manipulated via clothing. In the high simi-
larity condition, all three ostensible participants wore red colored shirts
with the imprint “Group A,” whereas in the low similarity condition,
participants were dressed in very different clothes without reference
to a common group. Fig. 3 shows snapshots of the video material.
Entitativity manipulation check
Following the transmission participants were asked to answer
several questions concerning the ostensible participants in the other
room (“How frequently do members of the group in Laboratory Room
2 interact with each other?” 1 = very rarely, 6 = very frequently;
“How similar are the participants in the other room?” 1 = not very
similar, 6 = very similar). Perceived entitativity was measured with
three verbal items (e.g., “When you think about the participants in the
other room, do you think about them as…,” 1= a number of individuals,
6 = a whole) and the pictorial measure from Studies 1 and 2
(Cronbach's α = .85). Again, scores were z-standardized due to
different response scales. Item wordings were adapted and slightly
modified for the present context from Rutchick et al. (2008).
Provocation
Next, participants were informed that they would now play a game
together with one of the participants from the other room. They were
asked to solve asmany anagrams as possible in 1min. For each anagram
correctly solved during this time both players earned two raffle ticketsFig. 3. Snapshot from the video material used in Study 3 to matoward a 50€ (approx. 68 US-$) gift card for a restaurant. They were
informed that the winner would be drawn directly after the game.
Participants solved 6.51 anagrams on average. The number of solved
anagrams of participants' ostensible partners was programmed to be
roughly equal to the number of anagrams solved by themselves. Both
players were asked to make a recommendation for distributing the
raffle tickets between them. The final distribution was obtained by
averaging the two recommendations. On average, participants recom-
mended an equal split (M = 54% for their partner, SD = 11%). The
ostensible partner, however, always recommended 90% for him- or her-
self. Moreover, s/he was drawn as the winner of the gift certificate. This
paradigm has been successfully used in prior research on vengeful
reactions (e.g., Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011). After the
lottery, participants were asked to rate their current mood; these
items included outrage-related emotions such as anger, fury, and dissat-
isfaction (1 = not at all, 6 = very much; 3 items; Cronbach's α= .88).
Furthermore, participants were asked to rate their partner's fairness
(“The behavior of my partner was fair;” 1 = not at all, 6 = very much).
Displaced revenge option
Following the anagram task, participantswere given the opportunity
to take revenge against another participant from the other laboratory
room. Participants were told that the target would have to look at
nine unpleasant images whichwere taken from the International Affec-
tive Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and to create
a description for each of the images. The task was described as very
unpleasant. Additionally, participants were provided with a preview of
the pictures. Participantswere asked to decidewhether or not the target
would have to complete this unpleasant task (see Gollwitzer & Denzler,
2009, for the same paradigm). Eighty-five participants (58%) voted
“yes.” Since we were interested in affective reactions after taking
displaced revenge, only the data from these 85 avengers will be ana-
lyzed. Importantly, avengers were fairly evenly distributed across the
four experimental conditions, χ2(1, 85)= 0.10, p= .75.More precisely,nipulate similarity and interconnectedness independently.
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tedness, n = 24, low similarity/strong interconnectedness, n = 19, high
similarity/weak interconnectedness, n = 22, and high similarity/strong
interconnectedness, n= 20.
Dependent measures
Justice-related satisfaction was measured with four items (cf.
Gollwitzer et al., 2011) that focused on cognitive aspects of justice
achieved and psychological closure (“Now I experience a sense of
closure,” “Everyone got what they deserved,” “Everything turned
out to be satisfactory for me,” “Justice has been restored;” Cronbach's
α= .62). Regret about revenge was assessed with the same 3-item
scale that was used in Studies 1 and 2. Unfortunately, the internal
consistency of this scale turned out to be very low (Cronbach's
α = .50). Ratings for both scales were made on a 6-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Participants
One hundred and forty-six students agreed to take part in the exper-
iment and 85 decided to take revenge (see above). Thirteen cases (15%)
had to be omitted from further analyses because they either doubted
the existence of the other participants or correctly guessed that this
study was designed to investigate vengeful responses. The final sample
consisted of 72 participants (75% female). Ages ranged from 18 to
30 years (Mage = 21.26 years, SDage = 2.91).
Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses
First, we analyzed participants' self-reported anger following the
lottery. On average, anger scores were relatively low (M = 2.61,
SD = 1.20), which is a typical finding in laboratory settings
(e.g., Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). No difference was found
between avengers and non-avengers regarding the amount of anger
reported after the provocation, t(130) = 0.05, p = .96. Moreover,
participants rather disagreed with the statement that the behavior of
their partner was fair (M= 2.40, SD= 1.45; on a 6-point scale). Finally,
we checked whether avengers (n = 38) differed from non-avengers
(n = 35) with regard to the personality traits assessed prior to the
laboratory experiment. In line with previous research (Gollwitzer
et al., 2011), we did not find any differences between avengers and
non-avengers on justice-related personality traits (ps ≥ .38).
Entitativity manipulation check
In order to test whether our experimentalmanipulation of entitativity
was successful in manipulating similarity and interconnectedness
between the members of the target group as intended, we analyzed
participants' ratings of perceived similarity and interconnectedness as
manipulation check criteria (see Table 1). A 2 (similarity: low vs. high)
× 2 (interconnectedness: weak vs. strong) ANOVA on participants' per-
ceived interconnectedness ratings revealed that participants perceived
the other group to be more interconnected in the strong
interconnectedness condition (M= 4.39, SD= 1.08) than in the weak
interconnectedness condition (M= 2.47, SD= 1.18), F(1,68) = 51.32,Table 1
Manipulation check for Study 3: Effect of interconnectedness and similarity manipulations on
Dependent variable Similarity manipulation
We
Perceived interconnectedness ratings Low similarity
High similarity
Mean (SD)
Perceived similarity ratings Low similarity
High similarity
Mean (SD)
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Response scales range from 1 to 6.p b .001, ηp2 = .43. No other effects were significant (ps ≥ .42).
An ANOVA on participants' perceived similarity ratings revealed no
main effect of our similarity manipulation (Mhigh similarity = 3.31,
Mlow similarity = 2.81), F(1,68) = 2.83, p = .10, ηp2 = .04. However,
we found a significant interaction effect, F(1,68) = 7.18, p = .01,
ηp2 = .10. Follow-up simple effects analyses using Sidak adjustment
revealed that participants in the weak interconnectedness condition
perceived the other group as more similar in the high similarity
condition (M = 3.69, SD= 1.45) than in the low similarity condition
(M= 2.40, SD= 1.05), F(1,68) = 9.47, p b .01, η2 = .12. In the strong
interconnectedness condition no difference was found, F(1,68) = 0.50,
p= .48, η2= .01. Thus, perceived similarity ratingswere affected by the
similarity manipulation in absence of strong interconnectedness,
whereas perceived interconnectedness ratings were solely affected by
the interconnectedness (but not the similarity) manipulation.
Finally, we calculated a 2 (similarity) × 2 (interconnectedness)
ANOVA on the perceived entitativity index. The main effect of intercon-
nectedness was significant, F(1,68) = 33.02, p b .001, ηp2 = .33,
whereas the main effect of similarity (p = .45) and the interaction
effect (p= .71) were not. More precisely, perceived entitativity ratings
were higher in the strong interconnectedness condition (M = 0.47,
SD = 0.77) than in the weak interconnectedness condition (M =
−0.47, SD= 0.60). Taken together, these results suggest that the per-
ception of entitativity was primarily inferred from interconnected-
ness between participants (compared to superficial similarity). To
shed more light on the relationship between perceptions of inter-
connectedness and similarity, we calculated a multiple regression
analysis with perceived entitativity as criterion and perceived inter-
connectedness and similarity as predictors. Interestingly, both per-
ceptions of similarity, B = .12, SE = .06, t(71) = 1.99, p = .05, and
interconnectedness, B = .32, SE = .05, t(71) = 6.32, p b .001, were
significant predictors of perceived entitativity.
Main analyses
A 2 (similarity) × 2 (interconnectedness) ANOVA on satisfaction rat-
ings yielded a significant main effect of the similarity manipulation,
F(1,68) = 7.09, p = .01, ηp2 = .09 (see Fig. 4): Participants in the high
similarity condition experienced more satisfaction after taking
displaced revenge (M= 3.14, SD= 0.96) than those in the low similar-
ity condition (M= 2.63, SD= 0.62). However, the similarity main ef-
fect was qualified by a significant similarity × interconnectedness
interaction, F(1,68) = 4.66, p = .03, ηp2 = .06. Simple effects analyses
using Sidak adjustment revealed that participants in the strong inter-
connectedness condition experiencedmore satisfaction in the high sim-
ilarity condition (M= 3.38, SD= 1.07) compared to the low similarity
condition (M= 2.49, SD= 0.65), F(1,68) = 11.68, p= .001, η2 = .15.
No difference was found in the weak interconnectedness condition,
F(1,68) = 0.13, p = .72, η2 = .00. Moreover, participants in the high
similarity condition experiencedmore satisfaction in the strong intercon-
nectedness condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.07) compared to the weak
interconnectedness condition (M = 2.84, SD = .73), F(1,68) = 4.07,
p= .048, η2= .06,whereas no differencewas found in the low similarity
condition, F(1,68)= 1.04, p=.31, η2= .02. Themain effect for intercon-
nectedness was not significant (p= .47). Finally, we entered the regretinterconnectedness and similarity ratings.
Interconnectedness manipulation Mean (SD)
ak interconnectedness Strong interconnectedness
2.50 (1.28) 4.59 (0.80) 3.46 (1.50)
2.44 (1.09) 4.21 (1.27) 3.40 (1.48)
2.47 (1.84) 4.39 (1.08)
2.40 (1.05) 3.29 (1.45) 2.81 (1.27)
3.69 (1.45) 3.00 (1.15) 3.31 (1.32)
2.97 (1.38) 3.14 (1.25)
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Fig. 4.Mean values on justice-related satisfaction by experimental conditions (Study 3).
Vertical lines denote ±1 standard error of means.
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2, no effects were significant, Fs ≤ 0.53, ps ≥ .47.
Taken together, the results from Study 3 highlight the importance of
both strong interconnectedness and high similarity between the origi-
nal transgressor and the displaced target. People experienced the most
satisfaction when the transgressor group was perceived to be strongly
interconnected and, at the same time, similar in appearance. As in
Study 2, no effects were found on feelings of regret. However, this
may be due to the poor reliability of the regret scale in this study.
In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, the strength of Study 3 is that partic-
ipants were free to decide whether they wanted to take revenge or
not, and that participants actually took revenge (instead of merely
imagining doing so). This freedom to take revenge, however, led to a
large reduction in our sample size. Interestingly, while perceptions
of similarity and interconnectedness were both related to overall
entitativity ratings, these ratings only responded to the interconnected-
ness, but not the similarity manipulation. In this context, it should be
emphasized that entitativity is a multi-dimensional construct. As a
consequence, no clear consensus has been reached so far on how it
can be best manipulated and measured (see Hamilton, 2007). We
attempted to capture entitativity perceptions as broadly as possible,
but our measure was possibly not sensitive enough to detect changes
of mere superficial similarity. In addition, and consistent with previous
findings, our results corroborate the notion that mutual interaction
(or interconnectedness) is the primary predictor of entitativity
(e.g., Gaertner, luzzini, Witt, & Orifla, 2006; Lickel et al., 2000).
Internal meta-analysis
Findings are not totally consistent across the three studies reported
in this article. In particular, the proposed effect on justice-related satis-
factionwas significant in Studies 2 and 3, but not in Study 1. Conversely,
the proposed effect on regret was significant in Study 1, but not in Stud-
ies 2 and 3. In order to test the robustness of our findings, we conducted
an internal meta-analysis across the present set of studies (cf. Giner-
Sorolla, 2012). More precisely, we conducted a fixed effects meta-
analysis (see Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010) to deter-
mine the robustness of the effect of our entitativity manipulations on
avengers' satisfaction and regret after displaced revenge. For this
purpose, we calculated Cohen's d for each study, separately. In Studies
1 and 2 we used the crucial comparison between low and high
entitativity in the displaced revenge conditions, whereas in Study 3
weused the test of our high similarity/strong interconnectedness condi-
tion against the remaining three conditions. Across all three studies, we
obtained an effect size of d= 0.51, 95% CI [0.21, 0.82] with homogenous
effects (Q = 2.92, p = .23) for justice-related satisfaction. The overall
effect on justice-related satisfaction still remains significant if the full
samples of Studies 1 and 2 are used (i.e., without excluding participants
due to processing time, language skills, etc.) and without controlling forcovariates in Study 2, d= 0.44, 95% CI [0.15, 0.72]. By contrast, the effect
on feelings of regret was not significant, d = −0.18, 95% CI [−0.47,
0.11]. These findings speak to the robustness of the reported effect of
entitativity on justice-related satisfaction following revenge at a
displaced target of a highly entitative group.
General discussion
The present article reports three studies illuminating the condi-
tions under which revenge targeted at a different person than the
original transgressor (i.e., displaced revenge) has hedonic benefits
for avengers. More precisely, we tested the hypothesis that displaced
revenge can be “sweet” for the avenger when the transgressor and
the target of one's revenge both belong to a highly entitative group.
Across three studies this hypothesis received support for justice-
related satisfaction but not for feelings of regret. Avengers experi-
enced greater satisfaction after taking displaced revenge when the
transgressor's group was high (vs. low) in entitativity. Interestingly,
when the group was highly entitative, there was no difference
between direct and displaced revenge in Study 2. These results
show that revenge that is directed against seemingly innocent
third-party targets can actually have hedonic benefits and achieve
a state of re-established justice in the eyes of victims. This notion is
further corroborated by an internal meta-analysis, which demon-
strates the robustness of this effect across our three studies.
Apart from the fact that we were interested in the hedonic benefits
of displaced revenge, the present research expands the previous litera-
ture on displaced revenge in several important ways. First, in the pres-
ent set of studies, participants were personally victimized and either
should imagine taking revenge (Studies 1 and 2) or actually took
revenge (Study 3). In contrast, participants in prior research were not
personally involved as victims or avengers, but rather took a third-
party perspective (e.g., Newheiser et al., 2012).
Second, we go beyond previous conceptualizations of displaced re-
venge as a form of collective punishment (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2008;
Stenstrom et al., 2008). Importantly, collective sanctions always includ-
ed the actual transgressor whereas in our research the actual transgres-
sor did not receive any punishment. In all three studies revenge was
solely directed at individual targets that were completely uninvolved
in the original transgression.
Third, the present research further illuminates the features of
entitativity that lead to satisfaction in the aftermath of displaced
revenge by manipulating superficial similarity and interconnected-
ness between members of the transgressor's group orthogonally in
Study 3. Both facets are strongly related to peoples' perception of
entitativity (Ip et al., 2006). However, the question of how those
facets exactly relate to displaced revenge has still not been clarified.
Our results point at the important role of both similarity and inter-
connectedness between group members: avengers experienced
more satisfaction and justice when the members of the transgressor
groupwere manipulated to be strongly interconnected and similar in
their appearance.
Limitations and directions for future research
Results of our meta-analysis underscore the assumption that
displaced revenge can be satisfying and lead to a sense of re-established
justice. Interestingly, this effect appears to be specific to satisfaction as
we failed to find consistent evidence regarding feelings of regret in our
experiments. At a first glance, this seems puzzling as one may assume
that an increase in positive outcomes comes along with a decrease of
negative feelings. However, since revenge reactions ultimately aim at
re-establishing a sense of justice (e.g., Adams, 1965; Skarlicki & Folger,
1997), feelings of satisfaction and justice achieved in particular indicate
that a certain revenge goal has been reached. Nevertheless, it may be
interesting andworthwhile to use different conceptualizations of victims'
201A. Sjöström, M. Gollwitzer / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 56 (2015) 191–202post-revenge reactions in order to examine whether different contextual
conditions have differential effects on these outcomes.
A possible limitation concerning the interpretation of Studies 1 and 2
is that our dependent measures may not reflect peoples' true sense of
satisfaction (or feelings of regret), but rather a vague intuition of how
theywould have reacted. For example, research on affective forecasting
has demonstrated that people are sometimes erroneous in predicting
affective states (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). In particular, would-be
avengers tend to falsely believe that their vengeful reaction would
make them feel happy (Carlsmith et al., 2008). In contrast, more recent
research suggests that avengers are indeed able tomake pretty accurate
predictions about how revenge will affect their sense of satisfaction and
justice achieved (Funk et al., 2014; Study 1). Thus, empirical evidence
on affective forecasting in vengeful situations is rathermixed. Neverthe-
less, in Study 3, participants were given the opportunity to actually take
revenge and report their true experience of justice-related satisfaction
and regret.
The percentage of participants whodecide to take displaced revenge
did not vary as a function of our manipulation in Study 3. On the one
hand, this eliminates potential confounding factors; on the other
hand, it seems to speak against earlier findings showing that displaced
revenge is more likely the more entitative the transgressor group is
perceived to be (e.g., Stenstrom et al., 2008). However, one has to
consider that in previous research displaced (or vicarious) revenge
has been conceptualized as the severity of punishment taken against
the entire group and not against one specific member of that group
(see above). In our design, participants were asked to decide whether
revenge should be taken instead of assigning the amount of punishment.
These differences may at least partly explain the divergent findings
between our and others' research. Of course, this speculation requires
further investigation.
Taken together, the present research shows that even displaced
revenge can taste sweet and lead to a sense of re-established justice.
Victims' satisfaction with revenge may be interpreted as an indicator
that a certain goal has been achieved (see e.g., Funk et al., 2014;
Gollwitzer et al., 2011). Therefore, the next important step is to eluci-
date exactly what that goal is: Does displaced revenge against entitative
groups feel good because each member of the group is seen as a perpe-
trator? Does it feel good because it possibly deters future victimization?
Does it feel good because the message underlying vengeful reactions
(“don't mess with me”) is more likely to be spread in highly entitative
groups? In the following, we will elaborate on these explanations and
discuss potential mechanisms that can account for the effect we found.
First, one explanation of our findings would be that displaced re-
venge is simply about righting a wrong, as, for example, a “just deserts”
perspective would suggest (e.g., Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith,
Darley, & Robinson, 2002). According to this perspective, punishment
should be proportional to the severity of the initial transgression or to
the moral wrongfulness of the actor's intentions. Put differently, perpe-
trators ought to receive punishment simply because they deserve it. As
outlined above, perceptions of entitativity amplify attributions of mind
and collective responsibility to a group (see Waytz & Young, 2012).
Thus, the effect of perceived entitativity on satisfaction after displaced
revenge could be explained by perceptions of deservingness: the more
entitative the group is perceived to be, the more does each individual
group member deserve to be punished.
A second possible mechanism can be drawn from deterrence theory
(McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2010, 2013). Deterrence theory as-
sumes that revenge aims at preventing the original transgressor and
other would-be transgressors from committing similar offenses in the
future. Thus, deterrence theory would argue that the effect of perceived
entitativity on satisfaction after displaced revenge implies that other
potential transgressors have been successfully deterred from following
the original perpetrator's example.
Finally, a third possible mechanism builds on the assumption
that revenge aims at delivering a message to the original offender(and no-one else). From that perspective, the uninvolved third-party
target ismerely amessenger, and the ultimate goal of displaced revenge
is to deliver a message to the original offender through this messenger.
In highly entitative groups in which group members are likely to inter-
act and communicatemore frequentlywith each other, transmitting the
message (“don't mess with me”) to the original offender is more likely
than in low entitative groups in which group members do not interact
much (see Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in press). Based on the present data,
we cannot say which of these explanations can sufficiently explain the
results we obtained in our studies. Therefore, it is left to future research
to illuminate the driving forces and the psychological dynamics under-
lying displaced revenge.
On a more general level, our results elucidate the distinct roles of
similarity and interconnectedness as sub-facets of entitativity and
contribute to the ongoing scientific debate about the conceptualiza-
tion of entitativity (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille,
2004). In this context, it is worth discussing the role of group
entitativity in displaced revenge reactions. Across all three studies,
we conceptualized entitativity as an independent variable that influ-
ences satisfaction after retaliation against targets beyond the initial
perpetrator. However, one should keep in mind that perceptions of
entitativity are not really “independent variables.” In real-world
situations, especially in (violent) conflicts, entitativity perceptions
often serve as a justification to retaliate against other individuals
and groups (e.g., Lickel, 2012). Stenstrom et al. (2008) provide
empirical evidence that in-group identification leads to distorted
perceptions of out-group entitativity: highly identified persons are
particularly motivated to see the transgressor group as entitative in
order to justify retaliation against the entire group. This finding
clearly illustrates that perceptions of entitativity in real-world
contexts are shaped by the presence of a conflict and its history.
The design of our studies and the use of rather neutral groups
might have alleviated such justification tendencies; however, one
should consider that entitativity in real-world conflicts is also
construed by avengers to justify their vengeful actions.
Conclusion
The brutalmurder of Lee Rigby is only one case amongmany that ex-
emplifies displaced revenge as a pervasive phenomenon that is not fully
understood yet. The present research sheds light on the circumstances
under which displaced revenge has hedonic benefits for the avenger.
More precisely, we show that displaced revenge is more satisfying
when the group the target and the transgressor belong to is highly
entitative. In this regard, our results also underscore the important
role of both similarity and interconnectedness between group mem-
bers. On a conceptual level, these three studies advance our understand-
ing of displaced revenge by showing that it can actually achieve a sense
of justice. By doing this, they pave the way to directly investigate the
goal underlying vengeful actions in a next step. On a broader level,
this research enriches our understanding of the dynamics underlying
violent and often intractable intergroup conflicts (e.g., Rubin, Pruitt, &
Kim, 1994). By investigating the forces driving displaced revenge we
ultimately gain a better insight into the nature of violent conflicts,
ranging from small-scale conflicts between street gangs to large-scale
conflicts between nations.
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Abstract 
The present paper aims to elucidate what avengers hope to achieve when they take 
displaced revenge: imposing just deserts or delivering a message. For this purpose, we 
examine the contextual conditions under which avengers taking displaced revenge, experience 
satisfaction and a sense of justice achieved. Two studies were conducted. Study 1 (N = 277) 
shows that displaced revenge is satisfying, when the group continued to exist in its original 
form, but not when the offender left the group or when the group dissolves. Study 2 (N = 121) 
shows that displaced revenge leads to the highest levels of satisfaction when both the original 
offender and the target of revenge understood why revenge was taken. Together, both studies 
corroborate the notion that displaced revenge aims at delivering a message and that this 
message has to be understood by the offender and the target of revenge. 
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What Makes Displaced Revenge Taste Sweet: Imposing Displaced Just Deserts or 
Sending a Message? 
On August 19, 2014, the radical Islamist terror group Islamic State (IS) released a 
video on YouTube, which shows the beheading of James Foley, a U.S. photojournalist and 
war reporter. In this video Foley is seen kneeling next to a masked man in a desert landscape. 
Before pulling out the knife to decapitate Foley, his executioner claimed the killing to be 
revenge for U.S. air strikes in Iraq. Without a doubt, James Foley was neither responsible for 
nor involved in these attacks. In that sense, this revenge was displaced because it is not taken 
against those who carried out or authorized the air strikes, but against an innocent person who 
merely shares group membership with them (Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in press). Needless to 
say, such acts of displaced revenge or vicarious retribution
1
 are the hallmark of large-scale 
intergroup conflicts, leading to an escalation of violence (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, 
& Schmader, 2006; Lickel, 2012). And even though there is little doubt about the 
pervasiveness of this phenomenon, we have strikingly little knowledge about the 
psychological dynamics underlying such acts of displaced revenge.  
Previous research on displaced revenge mainly investigated the conditions under 
which acts of displaced revenge are likely to occur (e.g., Gaertner, Iuzzini, & O’Mara, 2008; 
Newheiser, Sawaoka, & Dovidio, 2012; Pereira, Berent, Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, & 
Butera, 2015; Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008). Building on and extending this 
line of research, recent findings show that individuals who engage in displaced revenge 
experience satisfaction and a sense of justice achieved when the target and the original 
offender belong to a group that is perceived to be interactive and, at the same time, similar in 
appearance, that is, a highly entitative group (Sjöström & Gollwitzer, 2015). Avengers’ 
satisfaction after revenge may be interpreted as an indicator that a certain goal – whatever it is 
– has been achieved. Therefore, a next important step would be to elucidate what exactly this 
goal is or, in other words, what avengers hope to achieve when they take displaced revenge. 
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Building upon the notion that direct revenge aims at delivering a message (“don’t mess with 
me!”; Funk, Gollwitzer, & McGeer, 2014; Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011), we argue 
that displaced revenge alike might achieve a sense of justice when it effectively delivers a 
message to the offender (and potentially other members of his or her group). By contrast, a 
rivaling explanation of previous findings on the “sweet taste” of displaced revenge could be 
that avengers simply seek to impose “just deserts” upon the target (cf. Carlsmith, Darley, & 
Robinson, 2002). In order to test these two explanations in the present set of studies, we 
examine under which circumstances revenge actually is satisfying (“sweet”). Knowing when 
avengers are satisfied with revenge might not only be an interesting question for and in itself, 
but it may also provide us with a deeper psychological insight into the goals underlying 
vengeful actions. Not least, a more precise and deeper understanding of these dynamics is 
pivotal for developing strategies to prevent and eventually reconcile vengeful intergroup 
conflicts. 
Two studies will be presented in this article. The theoretical rationale underlying both 
studies will be developed prior to each study as we approach the central question from slightly 
different angles. In Study 1, we manipulated the permanence of the offender’s group after the 
initial offence (i.e., whether the offender’s group continued to exists in its original form, 
whether the offender left the group, or whether the entire group dissolved). This design 
enables us to rule out that displaced revenge primarily serves to achieve “just deserts,” which 
would implicate that revenge should be satisfying even if the group dissolved. Moreover, if 
displaced revenge aims at delivering a message to the offender this requires the group to exist 
in its original form. In Study 2, we manipulated target and offender reactions to the victim’s 
intent to avenge and explore when avengers feel more satisfaction and justice achieved. This 
enables us to explicitly test whether displaced revenge serves to deliver a message, and if so, 
to whom exactly this message is addressed. Together, both studies attempt to elucidate the 
mechanism underlying displaced revenge and examine what avengers hope to achieve when 
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they take displaced revenge – imposing just deserts or delivering a message. 
Study 1 
As mentioned above, one possible mechanism underlying displaced revenge builds on 
the notion that retributive punishment is a communicative act between the punisher and the 
offender (e.g., Duff, 2001; Morris, 1981; Nozick, 1981). In this vein, acts of direct revenge 
aim at delivering a message (“don’t mess with me!”) to the offender (Funk et al., 2014; 
Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2011; see also French, 2001; Vidmar, 2001). 
Recent research even provides evidence for the validity of these dynamics beyond classical 
revenge dyads: U.S. Americans experienced higher levels of satisfaction, psychological 
closure, and a sense of re-gained justice to the extent that they believed that the assassination 
of former Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 sent a strong message to the 
Taliban not to mess with the U.S. (Gollwitzer et al., 2014). Accordingly, one might argue that 
displaced revenge can be satisfying and achieve a sense of justice when it effectively delivers 
a message to the original offender. But how can revenge taken against any member of the 
offender’s group send a message to the actual offender? In highly entitative groups, it is 
indeed conceivable that the message embedded in revenge against one member of a group is 
spread and eventually carried forward to other members including the original offender. 
Entitativity (Campbell, 1958) describes the degree to which a group is perceived to form a 
coherent social unit in which members are connected to each other and frequently interact 
(e.g., Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998; Igarashi & Kashima, 
2011; Lickel et al., 2000; Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sack, 2008). Therefore, members of 
entitative groups are more likely to communicate and exchange messages, such as news and 
rumors, with each other (Lott & Lott, 1964; Weenig & Midden, 1991). Consequently, chances 
that the message reaches the actual offender are higher in highly entitative groups compared 
to lowly entitative groups. In that sense, displaced revenge could be satisfying because it 
sends a message to the original offender. We will refer to this explanation as the message 
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hypothesis. 
By contrast, one might argue that displaced revenge is actually satisfying because each 
member of the offender’s group itself is seen as a “quasi-offender,” and, thus, a viable target 
for one’s punishment. In this way, displaced revenge would simply be about righting a wrong, 
as a “just deserts” (or deservingness) perspective suggests (Kant, 1797; see also Carlsmith et 
al., 2002; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Crockett, Özdemir, & Fehr, 2014). According to the just 
deserts perspective, retributive actions are backward-looking and driven by concerns to 
deliver punishment appropriate to the severity and moral wrongfulness of a given harm. In 
other words, offenders should be punished because they simply deserve it. But how can an 
individual who has not been personally involved in an offense be actually held responsible for 
it? Research has shown that in groups which are highly entitative, responsibility ascriptions 
for transgressions radiate beyond the specific offender (Sherman & Percy, 2011). More 
precisely, observers view all members of highly entitative groups as being more personally 
responsible for negative acts committed by other members of the same group (Lickel, 
Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003). In particular, observers perceive all members of an offender’s 
group as being indirectly involved in the action – either because they failed to prevent or even 
actively promoted the offense (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Lickel et 
al., 2003). Consider, for example, that one person out of a group of friends suddenly starts a 
brawl in a pub. One might easily be inclined to think that his friends encouraged him to fight 
or at least missed to withhold him from doing so. In that sense, each member of the offender’s 
group can be considered as individually responsible for the brawl due to her or his 
involvement in what actually was the action of one single person (e.g., Hamilton, Sherman, & 
Castelli, 2002). Responsibility judgments about individuals beyond the offender are 
potentially even more amplified by attributions of dispositions underlying all group members 
(Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998; Rothbart & Taylor, 
1992). In sum, the evidence on group perception and responsibility points to one conclusion: 
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the more a group is perceived to be entitative, the more its members are perceived as 
interchangeable and individually accountable for the decisions and actions that were taken 
against the victim (see Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002; Hamilton, Sherman, Crump, 
& Spencer-Rodgers, 2009). In particular, the tendency to hold members of highly entitative 
groups accountable for other members’ misdeeds is even amplified in victims (Doosje, Zebel, 
Scheermeijer, & Mathyi, 2007; Stenstrom et al., 2008). Following this reasoning, each 
member can be seen as being individually responsible and equally deserving of punishment. 
Hence, displaced revenge could be satisfying, because it simply serves to give the target her 
or his “(displaced) just deserts” for an offense s/he contributed to in the eyes of the avenger. 
We will refer to this explanation as the displaced just deserts hypothesis.  
The goal of Study 1 is to test whether displaced revenge primarily serves to give 
targets their displaced just deserts or whether it potentially serves to deliver a message to the 
original offender. If the displaced just deserts hypothesis was true, revenge against any 
member of a highly entitative group should be satisfying even if, for example, the group 
dissolved: Each member has incurred individual responsibility for decisions and actions of 
one group member (i.e., the offender), and therefore deserves punishment. Alternatively, 
displaced revenge may serve to deliver a message to the original offender (the “message 
hypothesis”). According to this message hypothesis, revenge should only be satisfying if the 
group (e.g., a rival street gang, a sports team) continued to exist in its original form (i.e., with 
the offender). Otherwise, members cannot communicate and the message cannot be carried 
forward to the actual offender. To rule out that it is the mere existence of the group 
(irrespective of the specific offender) that makes displaced revenge a satisfying experience, 
we included a condition in which the group exists, but without the offender. Both hypotheses 
were tested in an online vignette study in which we manipulated group permanence (i.e., 
group dissolves vs. offender left group vs. group still exists) and whether or not (displaced) 
revenge was exacted by the participant in the role of the protagonist of the vignette. 
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Method 
 Procedure. Participants were recruited via different German online forums on various 
topics (e.g., sports, news, gaming) and a large social networking service. In return for 
participation, respondents were rewarded with a raffle ticket for a MP3-player. They were 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions in a 3 (group dissolves vs. offender left vs. 
group still exists)  2 (no revenge vs. displaced revenge) between-subjects design. After 
informed consent was obtained, demographic variables were assessed. Next, participants were 
asked to read a short vignette. To make it easier for participants to immerse themselves in the 
described situation, they could choose an area of personal relevance (university, working life, 
or leisure activity), which provided the general setting of the vignette. All three settings 
contained a situation in which the protagonist was provoked by a person and – depending on 
experimental conditions – either took displaced revenge (i.e., revenge against an innocent 
person that was related to the offender) or not. Both the offender’s and the displaced target’s 
gender were matched with participants’ gender. Materials were adapted from Sjöström and 
Gollwitzer (2015). 
First, participants were given information about the scenario. For example, in the 
working life vignette they learned that they (as the protagonist of the vignette) had been 
employed for many years in the sales department of a company, doing their work with 
conscientiousness and reliability. Next, the group of the later offender (“Christian” or 
“Christiane”) was introduced. Depending on the scenario, either another department of the 
same company, a student learning group, or a sports club was described in a way that portrays 
a highly entitative group. For example, participants who chose the working life scenario were 
told:  
Christian(e), a colleague of yours, works together with Philipp, Anna, and Daniel(a) 
in the support department. Those four really like each other and regularly spend their 
lunch break together, talking about their professional achievements and sometimes 
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disparagingly about the failures of other departments. Altogether, there is a strong 
cohesion between Christian(e), Philipp, Anna, and Daniel(a). They seem to 
understand each other blindly. 
Provocation. Next, the vignette described an important business meeting that they 
(i.e., the participant) attended together with a colleague from the aforementioned support 
department (“Christian/e”). During the meeting Christian(e) suddenly criticized them very 
harshly before the management board. Later, it turned out that they had been designated for a 
promotion, and that Christian(e) tried to reduce the participant’s chances of receiving the 
promotion by criticizing them in front of the management. Eventually, participants learned 
that they were not promoted with the proposed promotion.  
Following the provocation, participants were asked to rate the amount of anger they 
experienced, their perception of injustice, and their desire to take revenge with single items on 
6-point Likert scales ranging from 1 to 6. Verbal anchors differed depending on the wording 
of the item (e.g., “After this incident I felt angry,” 1 = not at all, 6 = very much). Crucially, 
the perpetrator’s name was never mentioned in these items. 
Group Permanence. Next, we manipulated whether and how the group to which the 
offender belonged continued to exist after the provocation. Participants were informed that the 
group (a) has either dissolved in the meantime (e.g., “members of the support department 
were relocated and distributed across several rooms and buildings; they no longer have 
contact with each other on a regular basis”), that (b) the offender has left the group (e.g., 
“Christian(e) was sent abroad for some time and is thus not contactable for his/her 
colleagues”), or that (c) the group still exists (e.g., “members of the support department have 
a lunch appointment this week as usual”). 
Revenge Manipulation. Depending on experimental conditions, participants were 
instructed to imagine taking (vs. not taking) displaced revenge against another member of the 
offender’s group (this member was introduced as “Daniel” or “Daniela”). Participants were 
DISPLACED REVENGE AND SATISFACTION  10 
 
informed that they received an e-mail from Daniel(a), a colleague of Christian(e) from the 
support department, via a mailing list. In this e-mail, Daniel(a) made some disparaging 
remarks about his or her supervisor. Participants in the displaced revenge condition were then 
told: 
You print out this e-mail and put it into the post box of his/her supervisor. The 
supervisor immediately reacts and asks Daniel(a) for an official personnel 
conversation. 
Participants in the no revenge condition were told: 
You simply delete this mail. 
Dependent Variable: Justice-related Satisfaction. Next, participants were asked to 
rate their agreement with 19 items covering different affective (e.g., satisfaction, joy) as well 
as justice-related responses (e.g., “I feel satisfied with how things worked out”) on 6-point 
Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The full list of items is 
provided in the Appendix A. We performed a principal-axis factor analysis with oblique 
(oblimin) rotation on affective and justice-related items to guide the construction of our 
justice-related satisfaction scale. Three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted, 
accounting for 54% of the total variance. As in previous research on the dynamics of vengeful 
actions, we were primarily interested in differences in experienced satisfaction and a sense of 
re-established justice (Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011). Nevertheless, we included 
measures of different responses for exploratory purposes. Based on the results of the factor 
analysis (see Appendix B for the factor loading matrix) we built a justice-related satisfaction 
scale consisting of seven items (i.e., satisfaction, contentment, relief, joy, “Now I experience a 
sense of closure,” “Everything turned out to be satisfactory for me,” “Justice has been 
restored”). Together, these items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .85).  
 Group Mind, Group Member Mind, and Responsibility. To explore whether the 
group permanence manipulation effects ascriptions of mind (i.e., capacity to make plans, have 
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intentions, and think for itself) and responsibility for actions committed by group members, 
we included five items taken from Waytz and Young (2012). More precisely, participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which (a) the offender group has a mind, the extent to which 
(b) individual group members have a mind, the extent to which (c) the group is responsible for 
group actions, (d) group members are responsible for individual actions, and (e) group 
members are responsible for group actions. In particular, these items were included to explore 
how responsibility attributed to other members for the offender’s misdeed varies depending 
on our group permanence manipulation. Therefore, items will be analyzed separately. Ratings 
were obtained on 6-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much).  
Next, participants were asked to answer three questions about group permanence (e.g., 
“Do members of the group still meet each other?” yes/no) and to rate how easy it was for 
them to picture themselves in the described situation on a 5-point scale (1 = very difficult to 5 
= very easy). Finally, they were asked to write comments about the experiment in an open text 
field. 
Sample. Altogether, two hundred and ninety-seven participants completed the 
experiment. First, we inspected the data for implausible values. Eight cases (3%) were 
omitted due to identical answers on all items or extreme values (e.g., participants who only 
used values of 1 and 6 to answer on a 1–6-point Likert scale) on the dependent variables as 
indicators of a lack of attention. Next, we identified cases with noticeably long or short 
completion times. Six univariate (2%) outliers with extremely long completion times (i.e., z-
values > 3, equals 37 minutes, Mduration = 9 minutes) were excluded from the sample.
2 
Moreover, data from six further respondents (2%) were excluded due to comments at the end 
of the study that suggested suspicion or problems with the given task (e.g., had problems with 
understanding instructions, guessed the purpose of the study).
3
 Thus, our final sample 
comprised 277 participants (51% female). Ages ranged between 18 and 89 years (Mage = 
31.40 years, SDage = 12.22). 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses. Altogether, 72% of the participants correctly remembered 
whether the group still exists, dissolved or whether the offender left the group. Participants 
had no difficulties picturing themselves as protagonists in the vignettes (M = 3.45, SD = 0.94) 
since this item was rated significantly above the response scale’s mid-point, t(276) = 8.04, p < 
.001, d = 0.48. Importantly, no differences in the ability to picture themselves in the vignettes 
were found between scenarios (Mworking life = 3.56, SD = 0.97, Muniversity = 3.34, SD = 0.91, 
Mleisure activitiy = 3.45, SD = 0.94), F(2, 274) = 0.94, p = .39, η
2
 = .01. Across all scenarios, 
participants experienced an equal amount of anger (Mworking life = 4.70, Muniversity = 4.39, Mleisure 
activitiy = 4.38), the provocation was considered as equally unjust (Mworking life = 4.66, Muniversity = 
4.37, Mleisure activitiy = 4.61) and equally likely to elicit vengeful desires (Mworking life = 3.29, 
Muniversity = 3.33, Mleisure activitiy = 2.98), Fs(2, 274) ≤ 1.62, ps  .20, partial η
2
 ≤ .01. Crucially, 
vignette type did not moderate any of the effects that are reported in the following paragraphs 
(ps >.24, partial η2 ≤ .01).  
Justice-Related Satisfaction. A 3 (group permanence)  2 (revenge) ANOVA with 
justice-related satisfaction as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of 
revenge: Participants in the no revenge condition felt more satisfaction (M = 2.74, SD = 0.91) 
than participants in the displaced revenge condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.01), F(1, 271) = 8.58, p 
< .01, partial η2 = .03. This main effect was qualified by a significant group permanence  
revenge interaction effect, F(2, 271) = 4.05, p = .02, partial η2 = .03 (see Figure 1). Post-hoc 
tests using Bonferroni adjustment revealed a simple main effect of the group permanence 
factor within the displaced revenge condition (F(2, 271) = 4.57, p = .01, η2 = .03) but not 
within the no revenge condition (F(2, 271) = 1.21, p = .29, η2 = .01). Follow-up tests revealed 
that participants who imagined taking displaced revenge reported higher levels of satisfaction 
in the group still exists (M = 2.71, SD = 1.04) condition compared to the group dissolves (M = 
2.17, SD = 1.00), p = .003, d = 0.53, and to the offender left condition (M = 2.32, SD = 0.91), 
DISPLACED REVENGE AND SATISFACTION  13 
 
p = .048, d = 0.40. The two latter groups did not reliably differ from each other, p = .40, d = 
0.16. 
When the group dissolves (Mno revenge = 2.72, SD = 0.91 vs. Mdisplaced revenge = 2.17, SD = 
1.00) or the offender left the group (Mno revenge = 2.92, SD = 0.87 vs. Mdisplaced revenge = 2.32, SD 
= 0.91), participants in the no revenge condition experienced more satisfaction than displaced 
avengers (ps < .01, ds ≥ 0.57). However, there was no difference in justice-related satisfaction 
scores between the displaced revenge and no revenge condition when the group still exists (p 
= .52, d = 0.13). No main effect for group permanence was found, F(2, 271) = 1.21, p = .29, 
partial η2 = .01.4 Altogether, taking displaced revenge was satisfying only when the group to 
which the original offender and the displaced target belonged continued to exist in its original 
form. This lends first evidence for the message hypothesis and speaks against the displaced 
just deserts hypothesis.  
Group Mind, Group Member Mind, and Responsibility. Additionally, we 
investigated the effect of group permanence on general attributions of mind and 
responsibility. Results revealed main effects of revenge on the group mind and group member 
mind measure (Fs ≥ 7.62, ps ≤ .03, partial η2 ≥ .03). Participants who imagined taking 
displaced revenge attributed more mind to the group as a whole (Mdisplaced revenge = 4.48, SD = 
1.26 vs. Mno revenge = 4.05, SD = 1.32) and to single group members (Mdisplaced revenge = 4.57, SD 
= 1.28 vs. Mno revenge = 4.07, SD = 1.42) than participants who imagined taking no revenge. 
This result is in line with the notion that avengers are motivated to see the offender group as 
agentic and responsible (Stenstrom et al., 2008). Interestingly, we found a group permanence 
main effect on responsibility judgments of single members for group actions (F(2, 271) = 
4.01, p = .02, partial η2 = .03). Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni adjustment revealed that 
participants attributed more responsibility to group members for group actions in the group 
still exists condition (M = 4.50, SD = 1.13) than in the group dissolves condition (M = 3.96, 
SD = 1.41), p = .02, d = 0.41. However, no difference was found between the group still exists 
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(M = 4.50, SD = 1.13) and the offender left condition (M = 4.17, SD = 1.33), p = .31, d = 0.27. 
This result indicates that the difference in justice-related satisfaction after taking displaced 
revenge between these two conditions cannot be explained by differences in ascribed 
responsibility (or deservingness). More precisely, the fact that displaced avengers were less 
satisfied when the offender left cannot be explained by avengers’ perception that the 
remaining group members (including the displaced revenge target) were seen as less 
responsible and hence less deserving of punishment after the offender left the group. Notably, 
ratings for group members’ responsibility for individual actions (M = 5.25, SD = 1.13), and 
group responsibility for group actions (M = 4.61, SD = 1.41) were high across conditions, but 
did not differ depending on group permanence or revenge (Fs ≤ 2.50, ps ≥.12, partial η2 ≤ 
.01).  
Discussion 
Results of Study 1 show that displaced revenge was less satisfying when the group of 
the offender dissolved or when the offender has left the group. By contrast, avengers 
experienced more satisfaction and a sense of justice achieved when the offender’s group 
continued to exist. Two implications can be derived from these findings: First, there is more 
about displaced revenge than just achieving “just deserts.” If the displaced just deserts 
hypothesis was true, justice-related satisfaction should not differ between the three group 
permanence conditions. Group members other than the original offender still would deserve 
punishment for the misdeed they contributed to in the eyes of the avenger. One might argue 
that members are perceived as less responsible in the group dissolves condition and therefore 
less deserving of punishment (see above). However, if punishment was solely based on 
grounds of responsibility incurred by group members for misdeeds of their fellow member, 
there should be at least no difference in justice-related satisfaction scores between the 
offender left and group exists conditions as responsibility ratings did not differ between those 
two conditions. Notably, responsibility ratings of individual members for group actions were 
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relatively high across conditions (M = 4.21), although items were formulated in a general way 
and not specified to the present case. One might speculate that scores would have been even 
higher had we directly asked about the responsibility of the specific target. 
Second, results obtained in Study 1 hint at the pivotal role of the original offender in 
displaced revenge episodes: Displaced revenge was more satisfying when the actual offender 
remained in the group (regardless of responsibility ascriptions to other group members), 
perhaps because she or he has to get the message embedded in revenge. Indeed, we are aware 
that we did not directly test the assumption that displaced revenge is about sending a message 
to the original offender in this study. However, the fact that the original offender stays in this 
group is a sine qua non that she or he eventually receives a potential message. Interestingly, 
these results further raise the question whether displaced revenge is satisfying because it 
potentially delivers a message solely to the original offender, irrespective of other members, 
or whether it is likely important that other members (e.g., the target) receive the message as 
well (see Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in press).  
In sum, Study 1 refutes the displaced just deserts hypothesis, which assumes that 
displaced revenge feels good because each member of the group (e.g., the target) is seen as an 
equally viable offender deserving punishment. Results may rather be interpreted in a way that 
they lend indirect support to the notion that displaced revenge aims at delivering a message. 
Notably, displaced revenge was only satisfying when a crucial precondition for the message 
being delivered (i.e., the existence of the group in its original form) was met. In Study 2, we 
will explicitly test to whom a revenge message is addressed. 
Study 2 
Previous findings on the dynamics of “sweet revenge” (Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer 
& Denzler, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2011) and results of Study 1 may be considered as a first 
indication that displaced revenge, just like direct revenge, serves to deliver a message. In 
displaced revenge episodes in which the target of revenge is not the actual offender, however, 
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things are more complex. Focusing on the two critical agents in displaced revenge episodes 
(i.e., original offender and displaced target), the question inevitably arises to whom the 
message underlying revenge (“don’t mess with me!”) is actually directed to.  
One answer could be that any member of the offender’s group should receive and 
understand the message (vicarious understanding hypothesis). As the evidence reviewed 
above suggests, members of highly entitative groups are seen as exchangeable and replaceable 
(e.g., Crawford et al., 2002). Therefore, any member of the offender’s group is a viable target 
for one’s displaced revenge and for the message this revenge entails. In other words, revenge 
should lead to feelings of satisfaction as soon as the message is received and understood by 
the displaced target. Notably, our findings from Study 1 speak against this hypothesis. In this 
study, revenge was only satisfying if the group continued to exist in its original form 
including the original offender. Nevertheless, in order to gain more confidence in these 
findings, we tested the vicarious understanding hypothesis more directly in Study 2.  
A second answer could be that displaced revenge primarily serves to deliver a message 
to the original offender (offender understanding hypothesis). After all, the offender is the one 
that personally has made the victim suffer. As mentioned above, the theoretical notion that 
revenge aims at delivering a message to the actual perpetrator has been empirically backed up 
in interpersonal contexts by results showing that avengers only experience satisfaction when 
offenders react to the victim’s intent to punish (e.g., Funk et al., 2014). By contrast, when 
avengers did not receive any feedback from the offender, revenge was not satisfying. In light 
of these findings, revenge in displaced episodes may also be explicitly conceptualized as a 
communicative act between the victim and the original offender. Revisiting results of Study 1 
may lend first evidence to this notion: displaced revenge was only satisfying if the offender 
remained in the group. Thus, according to the offender understanding hypothesis, displaced 
revenge is only satisfying if it effectively delivers a message to the original offender. 
A third answer could be thatespecially in highly entitative groupsthe message is 
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not only addressed at the individual offender; it might also be important that the message is 
effectively delivered to and understood by other group members as well (offender-and-target 
understanding hypothesis). Although the individual offender as the immediate source of 
injustice actually made the victim suffer, other members (including the target) are seen as 
contributing to the offense (e.g., Lickel et al., 2003). Therefore, it may be equally important 
that the message not to “mess” with the victim is sent not only to the original offender, but 
also to other group members. According to the offender-and-target understanding hypothesis, 
displaced revenge should only elicit satisfaction if the message is understood by both the 
original offender and the displaced target.  
The goal of Study 2 was to test these three hypotheses (vicarious understanding, 
offender understanding, and offender-and-target understanding). For this purpose, we 
conducted a lab experiment, in which we manipulated target and offender reactions to revenge 
(“understanding”) as indicators of successfully delivering of a message (e.g., Funk et al., 
2014). To rule out the possibility that displaced revenge is an end in itself (i.e., satisfying 
irrespective of the feedback), we included one control condition in which participants 
received no feedback at all. The setting of Study 2, moreover, enabled participants to actually 
take revenge following an offense and report their true experience of justice-related 
satisfaction, instead of merely imagining so (as in Study 1). 
Method 
Procedure. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were told that the main purpose of the 
experiment was to investigate “reading comprehension in cooperation situations,” whereas a 
second part was concerned with a different topic which would be explained later. Moreover, 
participants were told that the study was conducted at two universities at the same time and 
that they would be paired with three other students to work on a collective task. After 
participants gave informed consent, the experimenter simulated a telephone conversation 
ostensibly with the investigator in charge at the other location. This was done to make the 
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cover story more credible. 
Following these general information, participants had the possibility to exchange short 
messages in order to introduce themselves to each other. The staged self-introduction of the 
bogus participant group at the other university always portrayed a highly entitative group. 
Typing errors in the original text were intentionally added to increase credibility. The text 
read as follows: 
We just decided to write this text together. We are Alex, Luca, and Chris. When we 
were asked after lunch, we thought it would be a good idea to take part in the 
experiment. We know each other since the beginning of our studies and do a lot 
together, especially partying. We can talk about everything. This year we also 
registered for a sport course together. 
Next, participants were virtually paired with one of these ostensible students located at 
the other university and instructed to work together on an anagram task (see also Gollwitzer et 
al., 2011, Study 3). Participants and their ostensible partners were asked to solve individually 
as many anagrams as possible within two minutes. For each anagram correctly solved during 
this time both players earned two raffle ticket toward a 50€ (approx. 68 US-$) gift card for a 
cinema. They were informed that the winner would be drawn directly after the game. 
Participants solved 6.85 anagrams on average. The number of solved anagrams of 
participants’ ostensible partners was programmed to be roughly equal to the number of 
anagrams solved by themselves. Both players were asked to make a recommendation for 
distributing the raffle tickets between them. The final distribution was obtained by averaging 
the two recommendations. On average, participants recommended a fairly equal split (M = 
54% for their partner, SD = 14%). The ostensible partner, however, always recommended 
90% for him- or herself. Moreover, she or he was ostensibly drawn as the winner of the gift 
certificate. This paradigm has been successfully used in prior research on vengeful reactions 
(e.g., Sjöström & Gollwitzer, 2015). After the lottery, participants were asked to rate their 
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current mood. Importantly, this questionnaire included three items related to anger and moral 
outrage (anger, fury, outrage; Cronbach’s α = .90). Moreover, participants were asked to 
evaluate the game and rate their partner’s fairness (“The behavior of my partner was fair”). 
Ratings for all items were obtained on a 6-point Likert-Scale (1= not at all, 6= very much). 
Displaced Revenge. Next, participants were informed that the following part of the 
session was concerned with “punishment” and that a new test for indirect punitive desires 
would be used. Participants were told that this test would assess objective and reliable 
information about the extent to which they harbored vengeful desires. After completing this 
test (which resembled an Implicit Association Test; see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) participants received false feedback about their vengeful desires following the unfair 
distribution of raffle tickets. The procedure was adapted for the present context from 
Karremans, Van Lange, Ouwerkerk and Kluwer (2003), who successfully used a similar 
technique to manipulate participants’ forgiveness after an offense. Information on the detailed 
procedure is given in in Appendix C.  
Instructions stated that on basis of the test results, participants would indeed harbor 
punitive desires, and that, therefore, one of their fellow players would be punished by 
assigning him or her to an unpleasant task. In this task, the punished player would have to 
watch aversive pictures and describe them verbally in detail (see also Gollwitzer & Denzler, 
2009). Following this information, a random selection was staged to determine which 
participant would receive the unpleasant task. The recipient of the task always was Participant 
No. 3 (i.e., a displaced target).  
Feedback Manipulation. After punishment was exerted (i.e., the unpleasant task was 
delivered to and received by Participant No. 3), participants received two messages, one from 
the original perpetrator (“Alex”/Participant No. 2) and one from the target of displaced 
revenge (“Luca”/Participant No. 3). In these messages the offender either signaled that she or 
he understood why his or her fellow group member had been punished (“Hi—here is Alex. I 
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guess Luca got the unpleasant task because I had distributed the lottery tickets unfairly…”) or 
not (“Hi, Alex here. I’ve no idea why you gave Luca this task”). Additionally, the target either 
signaled that she or he understood why s/he received the unpleasant task (“I think you gave 
me the picture task because Alex distributed the tickets so unfairly earlier on. Luca”) or not 
(“I have no idea why you gave me this task. Luca”). In a fifth condition, participants did not 
receive any feedback at all. Taken together, the five experimental conditions were: (a) 
understanding signaled by offender and target, (b) understanding signaled only by offender, 
(c) understanding signaled only by target, (d) no understanding signaled, neither by offender 
nor by target, and (e) no feedback at all. As in the group description, typos were added in the 
messages to increase credibility. 
Dependent Measure: Justice-Related Satisfaction. Following feedback, participants 
completed a questionnaire that assessed their mood and justice-related responses with the 
outcome of the situation (e.g., “I think that everybody got what they deserved,” “I feel 
satisfaction”). They were asked to rate their agreement with 23 items on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 to 6 (see Appendix A for a full list of items). Verbal anchors differed 
according to item wording. To guide the construction of our satisfaction scale we performed a 
principal-axis factor analysis with oblique (oblimin) rotation on affective and justice-related 
items as in Study 1. Six factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted, accounting for 
60% of the total variance (see Appendix B for rotated factor loadings). Based on these results, 
we built a satisfaction scale consisting of four items (“Justice has been served,” “I feel 
satisfaction,” “I think that everybody got what they deserved,” “Justice has been restored”). 
Together, these items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .86).  
Next, we assessed whether participants correctly understood (“According to the result 
of the punishment test, I had a desire to punish”) and accepted the results of the punishment 
test (“I have the feeling that I took revenge,” “I agree with the result of the punishment test,” 
“I think that the result of the punishment test is correct”; Cronbach’s α = .78). To assess the 
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effectiveness of our feedback manipulation, we asked participants (1) whether specifically 
Participant No. 2 understood why Participant No. 3 received this task and (2) whether all 
other participants (i.e., including the target) understood why Participant No. 3 received the 
unpleasant task. Ratings were obtained on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = 
strongly agree). Finally, we checked whether participants correctly identified which 
participant the target of revenge was and assessed demographic variables. 
Sample. In total, 145 students were recruited in classes and on campus for a study 
entitled “reading comprehension in cooperation situations.” Fourteen participants (10%) 
expressed doubts about the existence of the other participants, correctly guessed that this 
study was designed to investigate vengeful responses, or reported language difficulties and 
were hence omitted from further analyses. Moreover, 12 participants (8%) did not indicate the 
correct target of revenge at the end of study and were, therefore, not included in the data 
analysis. Thus, our final sample consisted of 121 participants (63% female). Ages ranged 
from 18 to 39 years (Mage = 22.68 years, SDage = 3.30).  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. First, we analyzed participants’ self-reported anger following 
the lottery. On average, participants’ anger scores were rather low (M = 2.34, SD = 1.38, on a 
1 to 6 point scale), which is a typical finding in lab settings (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2011). 
However, participants rather disagreed with the statement that the behavior of their partner 
was fair (M = 2.26, SD = 1.38), which was rated significantly below the response scale’s mid-
point (3.5), t(120) = -5.95, p < .001, d = -0.89. Participants, by and large, agreed that the result 
of the punishment test suggested a desire for punishment (M = 4.12, SD = 1.92). This value 
was significantly higher than the scale’s mid-point (3.5), t(120) = 6.43, p < .001, d = 0.32. 
However, participants’ agreement with the result of the punishment test was admittedly low 
(M = 2.00, SD = 0.98). Nevertheless, it is important to note that belief in the results of the 
punishment test was positively correlated with our dependent measure of justice-related 
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satisfaction (r = .38, p < .001), indicating that the stronger people believed that the result 
reflected their true vengeful desires, the more satisfaction they experienced after displaced 
revenge was taken. 
Manipulation Check Feedback. To assess the effectiveness of our feedback 
manipulations, planned contrasts were conducted with offender understanding and other 
group members’ understanding as dependent variables, respectively. More precisely, we 
tested the conditions in which (a) the offender or (b) the target signals understanding against 
the remaining three conditions. One should note that understanding ratings were generally 
higher in the no feedback condition compared to the no understanding condition. This 
difference was marginally significant for offenders (Welch’s t(47.68) = -1.88, p = .07, d = 
0.53) and significant for members (Welch’s t(46.22) = -2.98, p < .01, d = 0.84). Given no 
feedback at all, participants possibly assume that offenders and targets understood why 
revenge was taken. As it is supposed to constitute the stricter test, we nevertheless decided to 
include the no feedback condition in the subsequent contrast analyses on perceived 
understanding ratings.  
First, we tested whether understanding signaled by the offender was correctly 
recognized by participants. As expected, contrast analyses revealed that participants agreed 
more strongly that the offender understood why Participant No. 3 received the unpleasant task 
when they received an understanding message from the offender, Welch’s t(70.21) = 2.62, p = 
.01, d = 1.00, compared to the conditions in which no feedback at all was given, no 
understanding by target and offender, or understanding solely by the target was signaled.  
Second, we tested whether understanding signaled by the target was correctly 
identified by participants. Contrast analyses confirmed our expectations: participants agreed 
more strongly that the other group members understood why Participant No. 3 received the 
unpleasant task when the target signaled understanding, Welch’s t(57.17) = 2.68, p = .01, d = 
0.82, compared to the conditions in which no feedback was given, no understanding was 
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signaled or in which solely the offender signaled understanding. Taken together, offender and 
target understanding was manipulated successfully. Mean values are presented in Table 1.  
Justice-Related Satisfaction. Planned contrasts with justice-related satisfaction as the 
dependent variable were conducted to test three hypotheses (the vicarious understanding 
hypothesis, the offender understanding hypothesis, and the offender-and-target understanding 
hypothesis). First of all, we tested the no understanding against the no feedback condition. 
This contrast was not significant, t(116) = 0.83, p = .41, d = 0.25. Thus, justice-related 
satisfaction scores did not reliably differ between participants who received two messages 
signaling no understanding and participants who received no feedback at all.  
Secondly, we tested the vicarious understanding hypothesis, according to which 
satisfaction scores should be higher if any member of the offender’s group signals 
understanding. Therefore, we tested the three conditions in which understanding was signaled 
either by the offender, the target or both against the no understanding and no feedback 
conditions. However, the contrast was not significant, t(116) = 0.77, p = .44, d = 0.14, which 
speaks against the vicarious understanding hypothesis.  
Thirdly, we tested the offender understanding hypothesis, according to which 
satisfaction should be higher if the original offender signals understanding. In a first step, we 
tested the target understanding condition against the no understanding and no feedback 
condition. No difference was found, t(116) = 0.05, p = .96, d = 0.07. Next, we tested the 
offender-and-target understanding condition and offender understanding condition against the 
remaining three conditions. Inconsistent with the offender understanding hypothesis, this 
contrast was not significant, t(116) = 1.47, p = .15, d = 0.27. 
Finally, we tested the offender-and-target understanding hypothesis which states that 
both, the offender and the target have to understand the message embedded in displaced 
revenge. In a first step, we tested the offender understanding condition against the target 
understanding condition, no understanding condition and the no feedback condition. No 
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difference was found, t(116) = 005, p = .96, d = 0.04. Next, we tested the offender-and-target 
understanding condition against the remaining four conditions. In line with the offender-and-
target understanding hypothesis, this contrast was significant, t(116) = 2.27, p = .03, d = 0.57. 
Thus, only avengers who received an understanding message by both the offender and the 
target reported higher levels of satisfaction than avengers who solely received an 
understanding message by the offender, the target, or who received no understanding message 
or no feedback at all. Mean values are depicted in Figure 2.
5 
Discussion 
First, results of Study 2 corroborate the notion that displaced revenge – like direct 
revenge – serves to deliver a message (Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in press). If displaced revenge 
was just about punishing as an end in itself, levels of satisfaction should not be sensitive to the 
feedback conditions. Although we had no condition in which no revenge was taken, the fact 
that justice-related satisfaction scores differ between feedback conditions may be interpreted 
as further evidence against the displaced just deserts hypothesis. Second, the message 
embedded in displaced revenge has to be understood by the original offender as well as by the 
target of revenge. This finding speaks for the offender-and-target understanding hypothesis. 
In order to alleviate recurring problems of low revenge rates in previous laboratory 
studies on revenge (see Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011), we used a false feedback 
procedure on participants’ vengeful desires. Although participants did not openly express 
skepticism toward the validity of this procedure, participants’ agreement with the result of the 
bogus punishment test was relatively low. However, one should note that people often harbor 
vengeful desires, but only rarely admit to and act on this desire (e.g., Crombag, Rassin, & 
Horselenberg, 2003). In this vein, a low agreement might possibly result out of reactance 
(e.g., Brehm, 1966). This does not seem unreasonable since revenge is deemed as a socially 
undesirable behavior people do not want to be associated with and therefore deny the desire 
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for retaliation. Thus, participants’ low agreement with the result of the punishment test may 
not necessarily indicate a lack of credibility of this procedure.  
General Discussion 
The present research attempts to elucidate what avengers expect to achieve when they 
take displaced revenge. For this purpose, we examined the conditions under which victims of 
injustice experience satisfaction and re-established justice after taking displaced revenge. In 
Study 1, we found no difference in justice-related satisfaction scores between conditions in 
which the group dissolves and in which the offender left the group. These results speak 
against the displaced just deserts hypothesis, which predicts that revenge is satisfying as long 
as any person of a highly entitative offender group receives punishment for the injustice 
committed, irrespective of whether the group dissolves or whether the offender has left the 
group. Conversely, results show that displaced revenge led to higher levels of satisfaction 
only when the group to which the offender and the target belong continued to exist with the 
offender. Importantly, this was the only condition in which the original offender was able to 
notice the act of revenge.  
In Study 2, we show that displaced revenge leads to the highest levels of justice-
related satisfaction when both critical agents of a displaced revenge episode – the original 
offender and the displaced target – signal understanding. Avengers who received an 
understanding message either solely by the target or solely by the offender experienced just as 
much satisfaction as participants who received no understanding message or no feedback at 
all. Thus, displaced revenge seemingly aims at sending a message to both the target and the 
original offender. 
As this is the first research that attempts to elucidate the mechanism behind displaced 
revenge reactions, the two studies presented here are insightful in several ways. First, we 
found no support for the assumption that displaced revenge merely serves to impose 
(displaced) just deserts on the target; a notion that has been speculated about in previous 
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research (e.g., Newheiser et al., 2012), but has not been empirically tested before.  
Second, it seems that high entitativity of a group does not automatically lead each 
member to be an adequate “surrogate” for the actual offender. When victims did not have the 
impression that the original offender understood why revenge was taken, displaced revenge 
did not elicit perceptions of satisfaction and justice among avengers. Thus, even if not directly 
targeted, the original offender still possesses a pivotal role in displaced revenge episodes.  
Third, the present findings may also have the potential to diffuse into related domains 
of research and vice versa. For example, knowing what gives victims satisfaction is also 
helpful in tailoring reconciliation procedures to satisfy victims’ needs (cf. Shnabel, Nadler, 
Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; Shnabel & Nadler, 2010). More precisely, even in situations 
in which a transgression was technically committed by an individual (as member of a group), 
it might not always be sufficient if only this specific offender acknowledges the injustice she 
or he has done to the victim. It rather seems to be important that his fellow group members 
also acknowledge the wrong done to the victim to eventually facilitate a successful 
reconciliation process. Interestingly, and on a related note, the question to whom a revenge 
message is primarily directed roughly corresponds to research on apologies in group settings 
and the related question of who is the “right” person to acknowledge a wrong (e.g., Govier & 
Vorwoerd, 2002). In the context of apologies, individuals as representatives of a group can 
apologize for harm done by other members or the entire group. In this vein, it may elicit 
feelings of satisfaction, if one member acknowledges the wrong committed on behalf of the 
entire group (e.g., “we know why you did this”) in displaced revenge context. 
Altogether, one conclusion drawn from our research could be that a central goal 
underlying displaced vengeful desires is to deliver a message (Gollwitzer & Sjöström, in 
press). In this way, the present results add to previous work on intergroup conflicts in general 
(e.g., Bar-Tal, 2011) and intergroup vengeance in particular. For instance, these findings can 
conceptually advance the vicarious retribution model (Lickel et al., 2006), by including the 
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notion that displaced revenge is a goal-directed behavior that aims at sending a message to the 
offender and other members (i.e., the target of revenge) of the group.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Results from Study 1 show that revenge was only satisfying when the offender group 
continues to exist in its original form. In a similar vein, results of Study 2 reveal that displaced 
revenge leads to higher levels of satisfaction when the revenge message is understood by the 
offender and the target. An interesting question that follows from these findings is whether 
literally the entire group (i.e., each single member of that group) needs to receive the message. 
This would imply that as soon as any member leaves the group, satisfaction with revenge 
possibly decreases. This speculation, of course, requires further investigation, for example, 
additional conditions in which other group members – who were not part of the displaced 
revenge triad (victim, target, and offender) – react to revenge. 
Future research may benefit from a more fine-grained analysis of the functional role of 
group entitativity. Apart from shared responsibility, entitativity provides the crucial structure 
for information and messages being exchanged between members of a group (Lott & Lott, 
1964; Weenig & Midden, 1991). In this way, other members could be seen as “multipliers” of 
the message that has to be spread within the group to eventually reach the offender and other 
group members. Thus, revenge against targets of highly entitative groups would be satisfying 
because the chances that the message embedded in revenge is spread within the group are 
higher. However, this is a matter of speculation and needs further investigation. 
Relatedly, it might be interesting to take a closer look at the hierarchical structure of a 
group and the different roles in it. For example, members with a leadership position are seen 
as prototypical group members and thus are predestined as targets of displaced revenge (see 
Lickel et al., 2006). Revenge against leaders may be particularly effective in sending a strong 
message to other members as they exert strong influence over other their fellows (e.g., Hogg, 
2001). 
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Both studies presented here did not include the chance of further interactions and 
thereby eliminate the possibility of counter-revenge by the offender group. The possibility of 
counter-revenge, however, has been shown to decrease the likelihood of revenge against 
highly entitative groups (Newheiser & Dovidio, 2014). It would be interesting to investigate 
how the threat of counter-revenge impacts avengers’ satisfaction. Recent research highlights 
that the revenge message entails a prompt for the offender to change attitudes and behavior 
toward the victim (Funk et al., 2014; see also Boon, Deveau, & Alibhai, 2009). In turn, this 
change may also be supposed to minimize the actual chance of counter-revenge by each 
single member of the offender group. Thus, avengers may nevertheless experience satisfaction 
in situations in which counter-revenge is feasible if the offender group signals a change in 
moral attitudes toward the victim. Future work may take the possibility of counter-retaliation 
into account to further explore the boundary conditions of displaced revenge.  
Conclusion 
Vengeful desires lay at the core of almost all violent conflicts and victims of 
retaliation are often neither responsible for nor involved in the injustice that initially sparks 
these desires. The central question what avengers actually hope to achieve by taking displaced 
revenge has not been considered so far. To address this question, we asked what makes 
displaced revenge taste sweet. Our findings show that displaced revenge is satisfying 
(“sweet”) when it effectively sends a message to the target and to the original offender. With 
that in mind, we will return to the unspeakable act of savagery described in the introduction of 
this paper: the video that purportedly shows the execution of James Foley was released under 
the title “A message to America.” The empirical work presented here is in line with the notion 
that a central goal underlying displaced revenge is to deliver a message to the offender and his 
or her fellow group members. In this way, the present research serves as another mosaic stone 
adding to a more refined understanding of the nature and dynamics of violent group conflicts. 
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Footnotes 
1
The terms retribution, punishment, retaliation and revenge will be used interchangeably in 
this article. 
2
To improve data quality and ensure that manipulations worked properly we excluded these 
participants from our analyses. Long completion times in web experiments usually indicate 
that respondents were interrupted or concerned with something else while completing the 
questionnaire and, for example, did not properly attend to the instructions (cf. Malhotra, 
2008). 
3
 The pattern of results does not change, when these six participants were included in the 
analysis. 
4
 The other two factors were labeled remorse (8 items, α = .90) and anger (3 items, α = .78). 
Items of each scale are displayed in Appendix B. In order to investigate the impact of our 
group and revenge manipulation on these emotions, we calculated a 3 (group permanence)  2 
(revenge) ANOVA on these two indexes, respectively. In both cases, we only found a main 
effect of revenge. Participants in the displaced revenge condition experienced more remorse 
(M = 4.03, SD = 1.18), F(1, 271) = 110.25, p < .001, partial η2 = .30, and more anger (M = 
3.01, SD = 2.65), F(1, 271) = 6.38, p = .01, partial η2 = .02, compared to participants in the no 
revenge condition (M = 2.64, SD = 0.92).  
5
 The other five factors were labeled rumination, guilt, happiness, closure and anger. Items of 
each scale are displayed in Appendix B. Reliability of all scales was satisfying (Cronbach’s α 
≥ .75, rs ≥ .41). For exploratory purposes, we investigated the effect of our feedback 
manipulation on these variables by using the same contrasts as for the main analyses. 
Interestingly, we found that rumination was lower in the understanding offender-and-target 
condition and understanding offender condition compared to the understanding target 
condition, no understanding condition and no feedback condition, t(116) = 2.14, p = .04, d = 
0.4. In addition, we found that rumination in the understanding offender-and-target condition 
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was lower compared to the remaining four conditions, t(116) = 2.01, p = .047, d = 0.5. Thus, 
participants thought less about whether they should have reacted differently when the 
offender and the target together or solely the offender reflected understanding in their 
feedback. Taken together, results on rumination provide evidence for the offender 
understanding hypothesis as well as the offender-and-target understanding hypothesis. On the 
other scales we did not find any consistent pattern of results. At first sight, these findings 
might seem puzzling, however, because revenge reactions ultimately aim at re-establishing a 
sense of justice (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), feelings of justice-related satisfaction are 
perhaps the best indicator that a certain revenge goal has been reached.
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Table 1 
Manipulation Check for Study 2: Effect of Condition on Perceived Understanding Signaled by 
Offender and Other Group Members 
Condition 
Measure 
Perceived Understanding 
Offender  
Perceived Understanding 
Other Group Members  
(a) Understanding Offender-
and-Target 
2.78 (1.93) 2.78 (1.81) 
(b) Understanding 
Perpetrator 
2.43 (1.67) 2.04 (1.26) 
(c) Understanding Target 2.05 (1.47) 2.80 (1.82) 
(d) No Understanding 1.46 (1.04) 1.50 (1.10) 
(e) No Feedback 2.00 (1.02) 2.38 (0.98) 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Response scales range from 1 to 6. 
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Table 2 
Mean Values on Justice-Related Satisfaction by Condition (Study 2). 
Condition M(SD) Contrast T 
(a) Understanding Offender 
and Target 
2.57(1.17) 
Offender-and-Target 
Understanding Hypothesis: 
a vs. b, c, d, e 
2.27* 
(b) Understanding Offender 2.04(0.88) 
Offender Understanding 
Hypothesis: 
a, b vs. c, d, e 
1.47 
(c) Understanding Target 1.99(1.16) 
Vicarious Understanding 
Hypothesis: 
a, b, c vs. d, e 
0.77 
(d) No Understanding 1.94(0.91) d vs. e 0.83 
(e) No Feedback 2.17 (0.91)   
Total 2.14(1.01)   
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Response scales range from 1 to 6. 
* p < .05
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean values on satisfaction by group permanence and displaced revenge (Study 1). 
Capped vertical lines denote standard errors of means. 
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Appendix A 
Items used in Study 1 and 2. Items with an asterisk (*) were only used in Study 2. 
 Joy 
 Anger 
 Contentment 
 Fury 
 Guilt 
 Relief 
 Hate 
 Pride 
 Fear 
 Satisfaction  
 Shame 
 Dissatisfaction 
 Outrage* 
 I think that justice now has been restored. 
 I feel bad. 
 I think whether I should have reacted differently. 
 I wish it turned out differently. 
 I think now that I can close this chapter. 
 I think that I now can concentrate on other things. 
 I feel satisfied with how things worked out. 
 Justice has been served.* 
 I think that everybody got what they deserved.* 
 I feel satisfaction.* 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Rotated Factor Loading Matrix for Dependent Variables in Study 1. 
Item 
Factor 
Justice-Related 
Satisfaction 
Remorse Anger 
Contentment 0.80   
Joy  0.78   
Satisfaction 0.76   
Relief 0.70   
I feel satisfied with how things 
worked out. 
0.61 
  
I think that justice has now 
been restored. 
0.58 
  
Pride 0.52   
I think now that I can close 
this chapter. 
0.47 
  
Guilt  0.91  
Shame   0.91  
I feel bad.  0.89  
I think whether I should have 
reacted differently. 
 
0.72 
 
Fear  0.66  
I wish it turned out differently.  0.49  
Dissatisfaction  0.49 -.37 
I think that I now can 
concentrate on other things. 
 
-0.43 
 
Fury    -0.86 
Hate   -0.76 
Anger   -0.61 
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Note. Factor loadings ≤ .30 are not displayed. Pride was not included in the justice-related 
satisfaction scale due to theoretical considerations. 
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Table B2. Rotated Factor Loading Matrix for Dependent Variables in Study 2. 
Item 
Factor 
Justice-
Related 
Satisfact
ion 
Ruminat
ion 
Guilt Happine
ss 
Closure Anger 
Justice has been served. .95      
I think that everybody 
got what they deserved. 
.70      
Justice has been restored. .64      
I feel satisfaction. .64      
I think whether I should 
have reacted differently. 
 .76     
I wish it turned out 
differently. 
 .62    .31 
I feel bad.  .37 .37    
Shame   .78    
Guilt   .70    
Fear   .52    
Joy    .82   
Contentment    .72   
Relief    .53   
Satisfaction .31   .50   
I think that I now can 
concentrate on other 
things. 
    .69  
I think now that I can 
close this chapter. 
    .66  
Fury      .91 
Anger      .81 
Outrage      .76 
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Dissatisfaction      .53 
Hate   .34   .46 
I feel satisfied with how 
things worked out. 
 
    .33 -.40 
Pride       
Note. Factor loadings ≤ .30 are not displayed. The factor loading of “pride” was ≥ .30. 
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Appendix C 
Detailed Procedure of the Punishment-IAT (Study 2) 
Initial instructions of the punishment test read as follows: 
In recent years, the phenomenon of “punishment” received increasing attention from 
science. In cooperative situations, it might be the case, that participants felt unjustly 
treated. However, many people are not aware of their desire to punish, why they 
cannot provide valid information. Therefore a reliable and validated test was 
developed, which enables us to indirectly measure such punishment desires. Results of 
previous studies show that about 90% of our participants at least felt a latent desire 
for punishment, after being treated unfairly. 
Instructions further stated that the punishment test consisted of different sub-tasks in 
which participants have to identify as quickly as possible a particular word that would appear 
on their computer screen. Beforehand, participants were informed that depending on the 
results of the punishment test one of the other participants would receive an additional task. 
This task is to look at nine unpleasant images which were taken from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and to create a description 
for each of the images. Following this instruction, the actual test begins. 
In the first task of the test, participants were informed that that ten words would appear 
in random order on the computer screen, one of which were words related to “self” (e.g., I, 
SELF) or “others” (e.g., YOU, OTHERS). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly 
as possible by pushing a specified left-hand key (i.e., the “A”) when an “other”-related word 
appears and to respond as quickly as possible by pushing a specified right-hand key (i.e., the 
“6”) when a “self”-related word appears. In the second task, again 10 words appeared on the 
screen, 5 of which possessed a positive valence (e.g., reconciliation, forgive) and 5 of which 
have a negative valence (e.g., revenge, injustice). Instructions stated that the left-hand key 
should be pushed as quickly as possible when a positive word appeared on the screen, and the 
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right-hand key should be pushed as quickly as possible when a negative word appeared on the 
screen. The third task instructed participants to respond as quickly as possible by pushing the 
left-hand key when either a negative or “others” word appeared on the screen and by pushing 
the right-hand key when either a negative word or an “other” word appeared on the screen. 
Finally, the fourth task instructed participants to respond as quickly as possible by pushing the 
left-hand key when either a positive word or “other” appeared on the screen and by pushing 
the right-hand key when either a negative word or “self” word appeared on the screen.  
After participants completed this task, the rationale for the test was explained. They 
were told that it is an implicit test that measures “automatic associations” via reaction times 
and that the faster people react, the stronger the association is. Participants were informed that 
this measure has often been used and validated (i.e., exhibits correlations with several 
physiological, emotional and behavioral measures that also tend to be correlated with 
punishment desires). Following these information, participants received feedback on their 
alleged test results. They were led to believe that the test revealed that they had responded 
faster (567 ms on average) in the third task, in which they were asked to respond with the 
same key to negative words and others, than in the fourth task, in which they were asked to 
respond with the same key to positive words and others (734 ms on average).  
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5 FINAL DISCUSSION 
The present Dissertation integrates, both conceptually and empirically, research on 
direct revenge and research on group-based retribution in order to explore the dynamics 
underlying displaced revenge. For this endeavor, the contextual conditions under which 
displaced revenge may elicit justice-related satisfaction in avengers were examined across 
different samples and methodological approaches (viz. vignettes, retrospective reporting, and 
laboratory experiments). The five studies reported here provide novel evidence that revenge 
against innocent targets can lead to the experience of satisfaction and re-established justice. In 
summary, they show that displaced revenge is more satisfying for avengers when (a) the 
target and the original offender belong to a highly entitative group; more precisely a group 
whose members are interactive and similar in appearance, (b) the offender’s group continues 
to exist in its original form, and (c) when both, the original offender and the displaced target 
understand why revenge was taken. Taken together, the present work suggests that displaced 
revenge aims at sending a message to the offender and the target of revenge. 
The succeeding sections are devoted to a critical discussion of the present findings, 
covering the methodology (Section 5.1), reflections on conceptual issues (Section 5.2) as well 
as potential avenues for future research (Section 5.3). Finally, implications of this research for 
disparate domains will be outlined (Section 5.4). 
5.1 Methodological Discussion 
5.1.1 Manipulation of Revenge  
Four studies sought to manipulate “revenge” in an experimental fashion assigning 
participants randomly either to a direct, displaced, or no revenge-condition or, alternatively, 
held “revenge” constant (i.e., all participants were assigned to one displaced revenge group). 
In prior research on the hedonic benefits of revenge, participants were free to decide whether 
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they take revenge or not (e.g., Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009). In these 
studies, for example, the formation of the revenge- or no revenge-condition was based on 
participants’ own decision to take revenge or not. Freedom to take revenge, however, can 
raise great concerns about internal validity. Although findings of Study 3 (Manuscript #1) and 
Gollwitzer et al. (2011) suggest that certain justice-related personality traits did not influence 
the decision to take revenge, it cannot be fully ruled out that avengers and non-avengers 
systematically differ with regard to other characteristics that might explain differences in 
justice-related satisfaction scores. In addition, and more pragmatically, the free choice to take 
revenge or not, usually results in low revenge frequencies (see, e.g., Funk et al., 2014). The 
number of avengers is supposed to be even lower when revenge is directed against a target 
that is not the original harm-doer. To address these problems and manipulate revenge 
experimentally, two different strategies were employed: First, scenario studies were used in 
which participants were asked to assume the role of the protagonist and imagine taking 
revenge (Studies 1, 2, and 4). Second, a false feedback about participants’ desire to take 
revenge was provided, letting participants believe that they harbor vengeful desires (Study 5). 
These two methodological approaches shall be scrutinized in the following. 
Hypothetical scenarios (e.g., vignettes or retrospective reports) are frequently used to 
investigate potentially destructive and socially undesirable behaviors like revenge, in 
particular, due to lower ethical concerns (see, e.g., Gollwitzer, 2005; Cota-McKinley, Woody, 
& Bell, 2001; Stenstrom et al., 2008). The use of scenarios, moreover, enables the 
manipulation of discrete factors (e.g., type of revenge, degree of entitativity) while holding a 
body of information constant. However, results obtained from scenario studies need to be 
interpreted cautiously with regard to their generalizability to real-life situations. One 
prominent criticism levelled against scenario methodology is that it gives, if any, only a weak 
indication of how people would react if the situation actually occurred in real life. Thus, what 
people report to feel in a hypothetical scenario might be different from what they feel if the 
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depicted situation actually occurred. To relax these concerns and make it easier for 
participants to relate themselves to the respective scenario, situations were created which 
come close to participants’ everyday life. Before entering the study, respondents therefore 
could choose an area of personal relevance (e.g., university life) for the scenario (Studies 1 
and 4) or, alternatively, should recall and elaborate on a past personal experience which was 
complemented with further hypothetical information (Study 2). To what extent participants 
actually could immerse themselves into the situation is, of course, difficult to control. Results 
regarding a control item, however, suggest that they had no major difficulties in assuming the 
role of the protagonist as ratings were relatively high across these three studies (M = 3.65, 
response scale from 1 = very difficult to 5 = very easy) and above the theoretical scale’s-mid-
point of 3 (ts ≥ 7.00, ps < .001, ds ≥ 0.46). Importantly, the reported ability to adopt the role 
of the avenger did not depend on type (e.g., direct or displaced) of revenge (Fs ≤ 2.48, ps ≥ 
.12, partial η2 = .02). More specifically, with regard to the construct validity of the dependent 
variable, one might argue that justice-related satisfaction in such scenarios only reflects a 
rather vague intuition of how people would have felt after revenge. However, recent research 
suggests that people are quite able to make correct predictions about how satisfying revenge 
can be, if certain features (e.g., type of offender’s feedback) are highlighted (Funk et al., 
2014). Thus, people seem to take the influence of certain circumstances on affective and 
justice-related outcomes into account and hence are able to make quite valid judgments about 
how satisfying revenge may be (see also General Discussion in Manuscript #1). The present 
work sought to alleviate problems that are usually associated with the scenario methodology 
to yield a better indication of how participants would feel if the depicted situation actually 
occurred to them. Altogether, it seems that, by and large, participants were able to immerse 
themselves in the respective scenario. Nevertheless, to further strengthen our conclusions, we 
assessed participants’ experience of satisfaction in response to a real-world act of displaced 
revenge in a laboratory paradigm (Studies 3 and 5).  
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A second possibility to manipulate or assign all participants to one revenge-condition 
is the use of a false feedback on people’s desire to take revenge. In Study 5, participants were 
provided with such a false feedback on their vengeful desires after an unfair distribution of 
lottery tickets. They were asked to complete a bogus short-version of the Implicit Association 
Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which was introduced as an objective and 
reliable measure of vengeful desires. After completion of this “punishment IAT,” all 
participants received a fake feedback according to which they harbor vengeful desires (see 
Manuscript #2 for the detailed procedure). The false feedback procedure was taken and 
modified from the related research domain on forgiveness, which successfully used a similar 
technique to manipulate whether a person forgave an offender (see Karremans, Van Lange, 
Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003; Luchies, Finkel, Kashamiro, & McNulty, 2010; Orth, Berking, 
Walker, Meier, & Znoj, 2008). Unfortunately, participants seem to question the veracity of 
the punishment IAT feedback on their vengeful desires. Critically, if people did not actually 
believe that they unconsciously decided to take revenge, the act of displaced revenge actually 
would have been unrelated to the obtained effects (of offender/target understanding). Put 
differently, revenge would not have been a necessary prerequisite for the effects found in 
Study 5. However, participants’ low explicit agreement with the fake-results could likely be 
explained in terms of reactance (Brehm, 1966) or impression management (e.g., Jones & 
Pittman, 1982). Thus, participants might perhaps simply be reluctant to admit their vengeful 
desires. In order to minimize participants’ skepticism, it is therefore important that false 
feedback procedures are integrated into the research paradigm in a natural fashion. Moreover, 
to examine whether reactance or impression management-based responses obscured 
participants’ explicit ratings, actual vengeful desires following the feedback could perhaps be 
measured more indirectly.   
Altogether, the present set of studies employed different methodological approaches to 
study (displaced) revenge in an experimental fashion. Results largely correspond across these 
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different techniques, thereby providing converging evidence on the relationship of entitativity 
and satisfaction as well as the importance of offender and target feedback on satisfaction. 
5.1.2 Generalizability to Contexts Involving Larger Groups 
In all five studies small- to medium-sized offender groups were used, such as a group 
of friends, fellow students, or a company department. One might therefore question to what 
extent the present findings can actually be generalized to situations involving larger groups as 
targets and which role vengeful desires play in decision-making in these contexts. First, one 
might be concerned whether inferences about within-group interactions (and communication) 
and hence (a) beliefs about other members’ causal role in the offender’s action and (b) the 
perceived chance that a revenge message can be spread, also come into effect in acts of 
displaced revenge against large groups. In large groups like companies or global 
organizations, members usually have a rather distant relation to each other and less face-to-
face contact, which reduces the opportunities for actual personal interaction and 
communication. However, mutual interaction and communication in large, complex groups, 
nevertheless, takes place, but is typically mediated by formal communication networks or the 
media. More importantly, group size is not directly related to perceptions of entitativity 
(Lickel et al., 2000) and, thus, entitativity-related beliefs and inferences. In fact, observers 
tend to apply ideas of indirect causality even to social categories in which members did not 
know each other let alone interact directly with each other (Denson et al., 2006). Thus, in 
large groups the perceived extent to which members engage in interaction and communication 
as well as the inferences drawn from it may not differ per se from small- to medium-sized 
groups. The present findings might therefore—to a certain extent—be generalizable to 
displaced revenge against larger groups. 
Second, one might question which role displaced revenge actually plays in large-scale 
conflicts or wars. It is undeniable that decisions, for instance, in international conflicts are 
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guided and shaped by strategic and political concerns of the leaders and elites involved 
(consider, for example, the international relations approach to deterrence strategy; e.g., 
Schelling, 1980). Although leaders’ decisions to enforce punitive policies or wage war can be 
rooted in their own vengeful desires, they usually tend to limit the influence of these desires 
on their decision-making (Liberman, 2014). However, vengeful desires likely shape rank-and-
file members attitudes toward punitive actions (e.g., military actions, economic sanctions). 
For example, Americans’ public support for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was strongly linked 
to desires to avenge the 9/11 terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda terrorists (Liberman & Skitka, 
2008). Vengeful desires may therefore influence decisions for certain policies often rather 
indirectly. Since governments and political leaders—especially in democratic states—are 
highly dependent on the public’s support for their policies, they have strong incentives to 
avoid policies that are unpopular and support those who gain widespread support (Liberman, 
2006; 2014; see also Carlsmith & Sood, 2009). Thus, although large-scale conflicts are often 
guided by strategic decisions, vengeful desires may indirectly come into play.  
In summary, it seems reasonable to assume that the dynamics investigated here with 
small- to medium-sized groups are also at work in displaced revenge against larger groups. 
Future research should, nevertheless, explicitly consider group size and group structure to 
account for the situational forces that come into effect in more complex situations involving 
larger groups.  
5.1.3 Justice-Related Satisfaction as a Dependent Variable 
The central dependent variable in this Dissertation is justice-related satisfaction after 
displaced revenge. In the following it shall be scrutinized to what extent a self-reported 
measure can give us an insight into avengers’ underlying revenge goals. Relatedly, it will be 
discussed whether the present findings are specific to justice-related satisfaction.  
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5.1.3.1 Justice-Related Satisfaction as an Indicator of Goal Fulfillment 
Research on goal pursuit has shown that positive affect is an important indicator of 
conscious (e.g., Atkinson, 1957; Heckhausen, 1977) as well as unconscious goal fulfillment 
(e.g., Chartrand, 2002; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002). With regard to the present studies, this 
implies that as soon as the goal underlying displaced revenge (e.g., punishing a quasi-offender 
or sending a message) is fulfilled, avengers should experience feelings of relief and 
satisfaction. Importantly, avengers themselves do not need to be aware of or able to specify 
the “real” goal. Given that revenge actions ultimately aim at re-establishing a sense of 
subjective justice (e.g., Adams, 1965; McLean Parks, 1997; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), 
avengers’ satisfaction after revenge may therefore be interpreted as an indicator that a certain 
revenge goal has been achieved. In this way, the present thesis is strongly linked to previous 
research investigating the affective consequences of goal-attainment in revenge episodes 
(Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011).  
However, one should note that this measure only allows indirect inferences about 
avengers’ revenge goals and should therefore be cautiously interpreted. For example, 
explicitly asking for justice-related satisfaction entails the risk of post-hoc rationalization by 
participants. Since revenge is highly susceptible to impression concerns (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, 
& Bies, 2006), avengers may rationalize their vengeful behavior afterwards by agreeing with 
the item that “now justice is being restored” or “everybody got what they deserve” in order to 
justify that they are moral or acted the right way. In this case, participants’ responses would 
not indicate true feelings of justice-related satisfaction or goal fulfillment. The tendency to 
rationalize one’s own behavior post-hoc should be pronounced, when one was free to decide 
how to act (Study 3) or, at least, had the illusion to do so (Study 5). Rationalization 
tendencies, by contrast, should be less likely in situations in which people were not free to 
decide whether to take revenge. Without freedom of choice, participants do not necessarily 
have to rely on such strategies to see themselves as right or moral. Converging evidence 
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across different methodological approaches and paradigms in which participants could not 
freely chose to take revenge was provided by the present research. Therefore, such a 
rationalization explanation for the obtained results could, at least, be partially weakened.  
Nevertheless, in order to further rule out this alternative explanation one can resort to 
unobtrusive measures and examine the cognitive consequences of goal fulfillment. Social and 
cognitive psychological theories propose that goal attainment is characterized by a heightened 
accessibility of goal-related concepts, which is functional in a sense that it contributes to goal 
fulfillment (e.g., Liberman & Förster, 2005). As the heightened accessibility loses its 
functionality once a goal has been fulfilled, goal fulfillment is followed by an inhibition of 
goal-related constructs (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 
1998). For example, prior research on revenge operationalized goal-related constructs as 
aggression-related words. As illustrated above, this research demonstrates that the 
accessibility of aggression-related words in a lexical decision task decreased after successful 
enactment of revenge (Denzler et al., 2009; Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009). It is important to 
mention, however, that (1) the results found in studies with self-reports of satisfaction (e.g., 
Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011) converged with those using more unobtrusive 
measures of goal fulfillment, and (2) accessibility-based measures like the lexical decision 
task tend to produce high levels of noise (Diependaele, Brysbaert, & Neri, 2012). Thus, 
accessibility-based measures or, more generally, implicit measures enable an indirect 
measurement of goal fulfillment, but should be cautiously interpreted due to their rather low 
reliability. However, future work might benefit from using such a cognitive measure of goal 
fulfillment to more directly assess the motivational dynamics of displaced revenge. It would 
be moreover interesting to study the interplay of the cognitive and affective consequences of 
goal fulfillment. For example, to clarify the consequences of successful revenge on future 
revenge it may prove useful to consider the short- and long-term effects of revenge on both 
cognitive and affective measures. Heightened arousal as an immediate consequence of 
F I N A L  D I S C U S S I O N   95 
 
 
 
successful revenge may perhaps function as a cue for unresolved goal-attainment and, 
thereby, keep the wounds open and fuel the desire for further displaced revenge (cf. Denzler 
& Förster, 2012).  
5.1.3.2 Specificity of the Present Findings to Justice-Related Satisfaction 
The results reported in Manuscript #1 and #2 are conclusive with regard to justice-
related satisfaction, whereas no consistent evidence regarding other post-revenge outcomes, 
such as regret about revenge could be observed. Intuitively, this finding seems somewhat 
puzzling as one may assume that an increase in positive feelings (i.e., justice-related 
satisfaction) comes along with a decrease in negative feelings (e.g., regret). Does it mean that 
displaced revenge tastes sweet, but not less bitter? As one would expected, medium to high 
negative correlations between justice-related satisfaction and regret can be found across the 
three studies in Manuscript #1 and a comparable correlation pattern was found between 
satisfaction and our exploratory variables (e.g., rumination, happiness) in Manuscript #2. 
However, given that revenge is strongly related to victim’s subjective sense of justice (e.g., 
Bies & Tripp, 1996; Cropanzano et al., 2003), justice-related satisfaction is perhaps more 
sensitive to changes in factors that facilitate or signal the achievement of that goal and, 
therefore, may be the best indicator for successful revenge. In that sense, justice-related 
satisfaction could be seen as a specific emotional response to successful revenge, just like, for 
example, disgust is a specific emotional response to purity violations (Horberg, Oveis, 
Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). 
Furthermore, it might be particularly difficult for participants to report feelings of 
regret in response to vengeful actions involving innocent targets. Regret describes a complex 
emotional experience that stems from and produces higher order cognitive processes 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Given the basic norm not to harm innocent people, participants 
may therefore feel obliged to express regret after displaced revenge. Especially items like “I 
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wonder whether I should have reacted differently” or “I wish it all had turned out differently” 
might raise social desirability concerns which obfuscate the effects of the experimental 
manipulations. In this case, participants would report to feel regretful, even though they 
actually do not feel so. In addition, the reliability of the regret measure in Studies 2 and 3 was 
admittedly not satisfying (Study 2: α = .61; Study 3: α = .50), which may reduce the power to 
detect a potential effect.  
Taken together, it makes intuitive sense to assume that the effects on satisfaction 
observed here are diametrically opposed to negative outcomes (e.g., regret). The present 
empirical evidence, however, is not consistent with this assumption. At the moment it is 
therefore difficult to say, whether these results are indeed specific to justice-related 
satisfaction, that is, whether displaced revenge only has an effect on satisfaction, but not on 
other emotional outcomes. Future research should thoroughly conceptualize and implement 
different facets of post-revenge outcomes to get a better insight into the intra-psychic 
consequences of successful displaced revenge. For example, exploratory analyses in Study 5 
(see Appendix of Manuscript #2) suggest that our feedback manipulation affected the extent 
to which avengers ruminate about the incident. These results may indicate that perhaps certain 
factors such as offender or target feedback have distinct effects on different outcomes.  
5.2 Conceptual Discussion Points 
5.2.1 Entitativity as a Cause or Consequence of Displaced Revenge? 
In the present research, entitativity was considered as an independent variable, which 
was either varied (in Studies 1 to 3) or held constant (in Studies 4 and 5). One might 
justifiably argue that entitativity is not a true independent variable insofar as perceptions of 
entitativity themselves are subject to change in response to displaced revenge or, more 
generally, the presence and history of a conflict (Lickel, 2012). Undoubtedly, perceived 
entitativity is shaped by group-based conflicts, at least in two ways: First, seeing the opposing 
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group as tightly-knit serves as a strategic justification to cast a wider net around the offender 
and retaliate against the entire group (i.e., one tends to see what one wants to see). In 
particular, highly identified group members are prone to such motivated reasoning within 
conflicts to legitimize retaliation against individuals of the opposing group beyond actual 
offenders (Stenstrom et al., 2008). Second, attacks against members of the offender’s group 
may in fact mold group members into one cohesive unit (see Fisher, 2006). For example, 
individuals are more strongly attracted to their group and likely seek support from other group 
members in the face of threat (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998). Hence, displaced revenge against 
members of a group actually increases the target group’s cohesiveness.  
Altogether, it is undeniable that entitativity can and should also be considered as a 
dependent variable in group-based conflicts. To fully understand the emergence and 
perpetuation of conflicts, however, it is of major concern to study the effects of group 
entitativity on displaced revenge. As mentioned before, entitativity is not only the product of 
people’s perception of a group, but it is, of course, strongly based on the actual cohesiveness 
of a group (Hamilton, 2007; Zyphur & Islam, 2006; see Section 1.2.1.1). In rivalries or 
conflict situations members of opposing parties (e.g., sport teams, armies) frequently manifest 
cues that reflect their high level of cohesiveness. For example, military platoons display 
organization and coordination (e.g., marching in the same direction) as well as visual 
uniformity (e.g., wearing uniforms). Perceptions of entitativity are therefore inevitably rooted 
in actual features of a group, which, in turn, guide our behavior toward members of this 
group.  
In sum, it is quite reasonable that entitativity functions as both—a cause and a 
consequence of displaced revenge. Initial perceptions of entitativity may instigate negative 
responses toward targets beyond actual offenders. Subsequent counter-reactions from the 
offender group may then amplify the initial perceptions of entitativity and foster negative 
evaluations of the entire offender group, which, in turn, justifies and strengthens further 
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atrocities against all members of that group. Future research should consider both roles of 
entitativity in order to fully understand the development, perpetuation, and escalation of 
violent group conflicts.  
5.2.2 How do Similarity and Interaction Relate to Displaced Revenge? 
Similarities between individuals as well as interactions among individuals can evoke 
perceptions of entitativity (Ip et al., 2006). However, in this Dissertation it was reasoned that 
perceived interaction is probably more potent than perceived similarity in eliciting justice-
related satisfaction in avengers after displaced revenge (see Section 1.3.2). This reasoning is 
based on previous evidence that interaction is a stronger predictor of overall entitativity and 
the notion that a central goal underlying displaced revenge is to send a message to the 
offender and other members of the offender’s group, which is more likely when group 
members frequently interact with each other. Contrary to this assumption, Study 3 shows that 
the offender’s group has to be perceived as interactive and similar to elicit feelings of 
satisfaction.  
Thus, the question arises how similarity and interaction exactly relate to avenger’s 
post-revenge satisfaction. In light of the present results, it may be conceivable that only the 
interplay of both similarity and interaction actually increases the chances that a message 
embedded in displaced revenge can be delivered to and understood by other members. As 
argued above, perceptions of interaction may be more relevant as to whether a potential 
revenge message can be disseminated within the offender’s group and eventually delivered to 
the offender and other members. By contrast, superficial similarities may indicate how likely 
it is that the offender (or other group members) actually complies with this revenge message. 
Research on direct revenge highlights the aspect that the revenge message entails a prompt for 
the offender to change his attitudes and behavior toward the victim (Funk et al., 2014). 
Displaced revenge alike might aim at affecting such a change (see Section 5.3.1 for a more 
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detailed discussion of this idea). In this sense, fellow group members are perhaps seen as 
particularly effective in causing such a change, especially when they are perceived as similar 
to the original offender. Research on social influence, for example, has shown that receivers 
are more likely to be persuaded by a message, if this message is delivered by a source that is 
similar to themselves (e.g., Berscheid, 1966; Brock, 1965; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 
1990). Since group members who are perceived as superficially similar, are also believed to 
share similarities on other dimensions like characteristics and properties (e.g., Rothbart & 
Taylor, 1992), avengers may, indeed, believe that revenge is more effective if the message is 
delivered by a person that looks similar to the actual offender (i.e., the target). Thus, the 
combination of both perceived similarity and interaction would present the necessary 
condition whereby displaced revenge actually increases the chances that a message is 
effectively delivered to and understood by other members of the offender’s group.  
It should be noted that in real world contexts, groups do not always share perceptual 
similarities (e.g., uniforms or jerseys) and instead are quite heterogeneous in their appearance. 
In light of the above reasoning, one might therefore question whether displaced revenge 
against such groups can actually be satisfying. According to the findings by Ip et al. (2006), 
for example, interaction is also related to perceptions of psychological similarity, albeit 
weaker than superficial similarity. In addition, it seems likely that once individuals are 
categorized into one group (e.g., based on certain labels), observers may start to infer 
similarities among members (e.g., Foroni & Rothbart, 2011). Thus, in real-world group 
perception, offender groups perhaps do not necessarily have to display perceptual similarity to 
make displaced revenge a satisfying experience. 
The present findings only scratched the surface of the similarity-interaction 
distinction. Therefore, the precise role of similarity and interaction in displaced revenge 
remains largely subject to speculation at this stage. However, results suggest that a closer 
analysis of similarity and interaction can provide important insights into entitativity 
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perceptions and the complex dynamics underlying displaced revenge. Future research should 
assess the psychological implications and accompanying cognitions of perceived similarity 
and interaction to explore their distinct roles in displaced revenge.  
5.2.3 Entitativity versus Categorization 
A further point that deserves discussion is whether the present results actually reflect 
an effect of varying degrees of entitativity or whether they are rather an effect of mere 
categorization. With the manipulation of high and low entitativity in Studies 1 and 2, two 
points on the entitativity continuum were selected and operationalized. The operationalization 
of low entitativity, however, could perhaps also reflect single individuals rather than a real 
group. Accordingly, the manipulation of high and low entitativity would manipulate discrete 
categories (e.g., no-group vs. group) instead of varying degrees of entitativity. The 
differentiation between a dichotomous categorization-effect and a continuous entitativity-
effect is important with regard to the question whether justice-related satisfaction increases 
depending on different states of perceived entitativity. Alternatively, one could argue that 
once individuals are psychologically grouped into a category, any increase in entitativity is no 
longer relevant for feelings of satisfaction. Hence, the mere categorization of people into one 
group would suffice to make displaced revenge satisfying. This question is not explicitly 
addressed by our two-level entitativity manipulation in Study 1 and 2. Study 3, in which we 
manipulated different antecedents of entitativity (i.e., similarity and interaction), nevertheless, 
may provide a closer look at the nature of this effect. For example, one could expect that 
varying degrees of entitativity (e.g., low, moderate, high) were operationalized by the 
orthogonal manipulation of similarity and interaction. If different degrees of entitativity were 
operationalized, this could potentially allow for a test of these two assumptions (i.e., 
categorization vs. entitativity). However, manipulation checks revealed that similarity and 
interaction were not additive components that linearly add to perceptions of entitativity (see 
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entitativity manipulation check of Study 3, Manuscript #1). Thus, the independent 
manipulation of similarity and interaction does not translate into varying degrees of 
entitativity. By contrast, perceptual similarity should rather provide sufficient information to 
group individuals into one category even irrespective of mutual interaction, as categories can 
be defined as “psychological objects that are grouped together on the basis of their 
perceptual similarities” (Corneille & Judd, 1999; p. 927). Similarities among individuals 
indicated by shirt color in Study 3 thus should actually suffice to categorize those participants 
into one group (see also Wilder, 1986). Therefore, if it would be the mere effect of 
categorization, no differences in justice-related satisfaction should actually be observed 
between the three conditions in Study 3 in which, at least, superficial similarities between 
members or interaction were given (i.e., low similarity/strong interaction; high 
similarity/weak interaction; high similarity/strong interaction). However, the only difference 
in justice-related satisfaction was found between the high similarity/strong interaction 
condition and the remaining three conditions. 
 Additionally, this question can perhaps be indirectly addressed with the control data 
on entitativity perceptions. For example, in Study 2 in which we explicitly manipulated 
overall entitativity and demonstrated its effect on satisfaction, participants rated the extent to 
which they perceive the offender’s group to be entitative in the manipulation check. If 
satisfaction after displaced revenge gradually increases with perceptions of entitativity, this 
may suggest that satisfaction depends on the perceived level of entitativity. For this purpose, 
justice-related satisfaction was regressed on participants’ entitativity ratings. Results reveal 
that entitativity was positively linearly related to satisfaction in the displaced revenge 
conditions, β = .42, SE = .20, t(41) = 2.90, p < .01.  
In sum, there is tentative evidence that the present findings are not only the result of a 
mere categorization process into non-group vs. group. Categorization may be a prerequisite, 
but to make displaced revenge satisfying it seems to be necessary that the offender’s group is 
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also perceived as entitative (see also Lickel et al., 2006). Future research should address the 
nature of the present effect explicitly to differentiate the effects of entitativity above 
categorization more rigorously, for example, by using an additional no group-condition.  
5.2.4 Displaced Revenge as Just Deserts or Deterrence? 
The plethora of research in social psychology adopted the philosophical distinction 
between retributive (e.g., giving offenders their just deserts) and utilitarian (e.g., deterrence of 
further offenses) goals as the conceptual framework to study punishment goals (see, e.g., 
Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002). The retributivist approach (Kant, 1797/1990) 
primarily looks backward to the wrongfulness of the offense committed, whereas the 
utilitarian approach (Bentham, 1830/2008) looks forward to the potential outcomes of 
punishment. Given the significance of these two perspectives within the psychological 
literature on punishment goals, one might ask how the present results can be interpreted 
within this conceptual framework.  
As argued in Manuscript #2, the present results cannot solely be explained by a 
retributivist stance, according to which avengers would simply seek to impose just deserts 
upon the target (see Section 1.3.3). If displaced revenge was primarily about giving targets 
their just deserts, understanding from the offender or target should not matter once the 
specific goal (i.e., punishment of a quasi-offender) is achieved. Similarly, it should not be 
relevant whether the original offender left the group, as long as the quasi-offender receives his 
or her deserved punishment. However, Studies 4 and 5 speak against an a purely retributive 
motive by demonstrating that displaced revenge elicits more justice-related satisfaction when 
(a) the offender stays in his or her group and (b) the offender and the target link the act of 
revenge to the offender’s prior behavior. Of course, this analysis focusses on one particular 
aspect of the retributivist account (i.e., retrospective orientation), whereas others like the 
proportionality of punishment are not explicitly considered. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
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results obtained here makes an exclusive retributive motive underlying displaced revenge 
rather unlikely. 
According to a utilitarian perspective, displaced revenge should be satisfying because 
entitativity indicates that retaliating against any member of the offender’s group actually 
deters victimization by any other of them in the future (cf. McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 
2010; 2013). This notion was not explicitly addressed in the present research, but victims may 
perhaps infer from the understanding feedback used in Study 5 that the offender and the target 
are now less likely to commit similar offenses in the future. In that sense, it would be the 
implicit promise not to victimize the avenger again that made displaced revenge actually 
satisfying. To examine whether displaced revenge serves primarily to prevent further 
victimizations, it may perhaps prove informative to include opportunities for further 
interaction with the offender group in future research.  
Taken together, the present research on displaced revenge cannot clearly be mapped 
onto the retributive-utilitarian framework. Results rather speak against purely retributive 
motives and cannot provide conclusive evidence for utilitarian (e.g., deterrence) motives. In 
this vein, it is noteworthy that whereas utilitarian and retributive concerns are seen as 
conceptually distinct, they cannot be clearly empirically separated (cf. Oswald, Hupfeld, 
Klug, & Gabriel, 2002; Orth, 2003). However, if one alternatively conceives revenge as a 
message, the conceptual corset of the retributive-utilitarian dichotomy can perhaps be 
loosened and revenge can rather be interpreted as both (see Funk et al., 2014). The same may 
hold true for displaced revenge. In that sense, displaced revenge can be backward-looking and 
concerned with the wrongness of the behavior of the specific offender and perhaps the 
perceived complicity of other members in communicating how wrong their behavior was. At 
the same time it can also be forward-looking and communicate the extent to which the 
offender and the target actually have to change their attitudes and behavior toward the victim. 
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In the next section, it will be elaborated in more detail on the idea that displaced revenge 
might aim at affecting a change in the offender and other members of the target group. 
5.3 The Journey Continues: Directions for Future Research 
The present findings raise some important further questions, which open intriguing 
tracks for future research. Most importantly, it should be examined in more detail what it 
exactly is about the feedback in Study 5 that makes displaced revenge satisfying in order get a 
more precise understanding of what victims actually hope to achieve by taking displaced 
revenge (5.3.1). Another issue of considerable importance is what consequences displaced 
revenge may have in the course of a conflict. Therefore, the contextual factors that either lead 
to an escalation or perhaps de-escalation of conflict merit future research (5.3.2). 
5.3.1 Is Displaced Revenge more than Sending a Message? 
The present work builds on the idea that displaced revenge like direct revenge aims at 
sending a message (“don’t mess with me!”). In Study 5, understanding expressed by the 
offender and/or target was used as an indicator whether this revenge message has been 
successfully delivered. However, what else the understanding feedback of the offender and 
the target might have communicated to the victim cannot explicitly be answered with the 
present data. Consider, the feedback participants received only implied whether the offender 
and/or target realized that revenge was punishment for the offender’s prior behavior (e.g., 
“think you gave me the picture task because Alex distributed the tickets so unfairly earlier 
on.”). Thus, it is left to speculation whether it is solely the acknowledgment of the victim’s 
intent to take revenge or something more that brings satisfaction to victims. As mentioned 
above, recent research on revenge in interpersonal contexts gives rise to the notion that it is 
particularly a moral change in the offender’s attitudes that makes revenge eventually 
satisfying (Funk et al., 2014; see also Boon, Deveau, & Alibhai, 2009). This finding is in line 
with earlier psychological and philosophical accounts on punishment, according to which 
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punishment primarily serves to “educate” offenders (e.g., Heider, 1958; Morris, 1981). Thus, 
it seems not only to be the mere acknowledgement of the victim’s intent to punish, but the 
change that co-vibrates with the understanding feedback that makes revenge ultimately 
satisfying. By taking displaced revenge, victims may perhaps also want to affect a change in 
the offender’s/target’s attitudes and their subsequent behavior. In this vein, the expression of 
understanding by the offender and target in Study 5 may possibly be seen as a first step in 
initiating such a change. In this sense, Miller (2001) argued that “[…] retaliation will be 
satisfying only to the extent that perpetrator shows evidence of being educated; minimally, 
this objective will require that the perpetrator knows why he or she is being punished” (p. 
541; see also Durkheim, 1964; Vidmar, 2001). It is left to future research to examine in more 
detail, whether avengers actually aim at affecting a change in the offender and target when 
taking displaced revenge. This could be realized, for example, by modifying the feedback 
from Funk et al. (2014) or by manipulating the subsequent behavior of the offender and target 
in a game-paradigm including the allocation of resources. 
A further question that resonates with the discussion above is whether or how 
offenders can actually be prompted to change their attitudes without being directly punished 
by the victim. In an attempt to address this question, it is worth considering previous scholarly 
work on collective punishment. In this field, sociologists and legal scholars alike argue that 
fellow group members are in the position to monitor, control, and regulate their fellow group 
members’ behavior (Levinson, 2003; see also Heckathorn, 1988; 1990). In the same vein, 
Kahan (1997) states that “the perception that one’s peers will or will not disapprove exerts a 
much stronger influence than does the threat of a formal sanction on whether a person 
decides to engage in a range of common offenses …” (p. 354). Therefore, other members of 
the offender’s group (e.g., the target of displaced revenge) are likely seen as particularly 
suited to initiate a change in offenders and other members of their group. This should apply 
especially to groups which reflect a high degree of mutual influence, which is likely the case 
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in highly entitative groups. Displaced revenge may thus be more satisfying against a target of 
a highly entitative group, because members of these groups are perceived as more likely to 
influence each other and eventually re-educate their fellow members (e.g., the original 
offender; see also the discussion on the combined effect of similarity and interaction in 
Section 5.2.2). Thus, if avengers really hope to affect a change in the offender and other 
members, displaced revenge against targets who can exercise greater influence on other 
members might be perceived as more effective and hence more satisfying. One might 
speculate, for example, whether revenge against a target of a group with an egalitarian (or 
democratic) structure is generally more satisfying than revenge against a lower status target of 
a hierarchical (or non-democratic) group (cf. Levinson, 2003). This reasoning moreover 
provides an insight into whether and when displaced revenge can possibly be more effective 
and satisfying than direct revenge. Revenge taken against target persons who can monitor and 
exert great influence on other members of their group like, for example, group leaders (e.g., 
Hogg, 2001), may be perceived as more effective compared to revenge taken against rank-
and-file members.  
5.3.2 Displaced Revenge and the Escalation of Violence 
Whereas the present research focused on the question what avengers hope to achieve 
by revenge, it emerges to be a separate, albeit related issue, to what consequences displaced 
revenge may actually lead. Revenge taken against an innocent individual is probably seen as 
disproportionate and by no means justified, especially in the eyes of the offender’s group (cf. 
Stillwell et al., 2008). Thus, displaced revenge likely breeds counter-revenge fueling 
reciprocal cycles of violence. However, punishing those group members who are not directly 
responsible for an offense might also be an effective mean to exercise influence and control 
on those who are principally responsible for the harm (Heckathorn, 1988; Levinson, 2003; see 
also Section 5.3.1) and perhaps reduce further violence. Therefore, it is important to explore 
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the factors under which displaced revenge is likely to backfire or perhaps likely to be effective 
in diminishing conflict. In the following, I will discuss certain factors that might decisively 
influence the consequences of displaced revenge or, more generally, the course of group-
based conflicts. 
First, to what extent displaced revenge is seen as illegitimate by members of the 
offender’s group should strongly hinge on prevailing group norms. Norms serve as expected 
standards of behavior within a group or, more broadly, within social contexts. In particular, 
those who are highly identified with their group should be influenced by group norms (Terry 
& Hogg, 1996). If such norms are consonant with the offender’s action against the victim, 
displaced revenge may be seen as particularly illegitimate and thus may likely lead to feelings 
of moral outrage and anger which, in turn, provoke counter-revenge. However, if the 
offender’s action conflicts with the norms of the group, the offender’s action is seen as a 
threat to one’s social identity (i.e., part of one’s identity derived from group-membership; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In this case, group members may try to avert further damage and 
enforce normative control on the offender. For example, research on the black sheep effect 
demonstrates that highly identified group members derogate deviant in-group members 
particularly harshly when their behavior violated group norms (e.g., Marques, Yzerbyt, & 
Leyens, 1988). Thus, displaced revenge may perhaps not necessarily beget excessive counter-
revenge if the offender’s action is seen as a violation of group norms.  
Second, group leaders or authorities play a key role in group conflicts (e.g., Staub, 
1989). They exert strong influence over their members and are capable to control the 
information flow between members (e.g., Hogg, 2001; see also De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2002; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), especially in large groups in which members do 
not have face-to-face contact. Moreover, leaders are usually seen as prototypical for the group 
and as such embody the group identity (Hogg, 2001). These features let victims see leaders 
often as motivators behind attacks committed by other members. In fact, they are seen as 
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being more responsible than common group members for offenses committed by other 
members (Lickel et al., 2003). The reasoning of the preceding section moreover suggests that, 
if avengers indeed seek to re-educate the offender and perhaps other members, leaders could 
be perceived as particularly effective in promoting such a change in their followers. Thus, 
leaders may represent attractive targets of displaced revenge for several reasons. Critically, 
attacks on leaders, in turn, are experienced as extremely threatening to members and therefore 
likely elicit counter-responses by the target group (Lickel et al., 2006). Whether counter-
revenge is actually advocated by leaders, seems to strongly depend on the stability of their 
own position. For example, strong leaders tend to use cooperative strategies in conflicts 
whereas weak leaders use aggressive means in order to consolidate their own status (Bekkers, 
1977). Hence, weak leaders may likely mobilize counter-retaliation. Whereas, strong leaders 
perhaps seek more constructive solutions to resolve potential conflicts as they are not 
necessarily reliant on bolstering their own status within their group. 
Third, revenge against a powerful target is less likely due to the greater risk of 
effective counter-revenge (Newheiser & Dovidio, 2014). Thus, whether a vengeful action is 
chosen probably depends on power-asymmetries between opponents. If the risk of becoming a 
victim oneself again is high, members may experience fear and counter-responses are less 
likely. For example, if the target of displaced revenge (or his group) is in a weaker position 
than the avenger, counter-revenge should be less likely. Whether revenge is actually taken in 
the first place, of course, also depends on the relative power of the victim. If victims (or 
targets) perceive themselves as weaker than the offender, they may (a) refrain from further 
revenge, (b) target a weaker individual of the offender’s group, or (c) even displace their 
revenge toward related, albeit weaker target groups (see Ein-Dor & Hirschberger, 2012). Such 
a shift in revenge may quickly expand the conflict beyond the two initial opponent groups to 
other parties who were totally unrelated to the initial offense.  
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Fourth, research on interpersonal revenge has demonstrated that the presence of an 
audience (e.g., unrelated third-party) engenders vengeful behavior (Kim, Smith, & Brigham, 
1998), likely due to reputational concerns (e.g., Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Thus, third-parties 
seem to play a critical role in the escalation of conflicts. Whether the presence of an audience 
has an escalating effect or perhaps even lead to defuse a conflict, may depend on certain 
features of that audience, like their status or their relation to the opponents involved. For 
example, a high status group that has high justice-concerns or favors peaceful solutions may 
reduce the likelihood of displaced revenge and counter-revenge.  
Before concluding this section, another key feature of group conflicts shall be briefly 
mentioned, that is, vicarious revenge. In conflicts often not only the offender is a member of a 
social group, but also the victim. Thus, it is often not the actual victim who takes revenge, but 
other members of the victim’s group who “take up the reins” and avenge the harm on behalf 
of the victim. For an analysis of vicarious revenge it is indispensable to consider the 
interrelations within the victim’s group, the strength of bonding and identification of members 
(Lickel et al., 2006; Stenstrom et al., 2008). When the offense against the victim is seen as an 
offense against the entire group and its values, fellow group members likely engage in 
vicarious revenge (see, e.g., Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). However, it 
emerges to be a separate issue whether vicarious revenge is actually capable to bring justice to 
victims. For example, if the self-ingroup overlap is high (Tropp & Wright, 2001), victims may 
perhaps feel that vicarious revenge sends a message to the offender(s) on their behalf, thereby 
leading to genuine satisfaction. To fully understand the dynamics underlying violent and often 
intractable conflicts, both types of revenge should not only be examined in isolation, but also 
in their interplay.  
While not intended as an exhaustive list, this section presented different factors that 
seem to be of particular importance in better understanding conflict development, the effects 
of displaced revenge and counter-revenge. For the sake of conceptual clarification, these 
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processes were discussed in isolation. However, they are probably mutually supportive. For 
example, whether a strong leader prefers to advocate certain strategies is also influenced by 
normative pressures within the group. Therefore, it remains an important task for future 
research to examine the escalation and perpetuation of conflict as well as the affective and 
cognitive processes involved. Game-theoretic approaches seem to be particularly suited to 
elucidate the different stages in which conflicts may escalate. For instance, public good games 
in group environments with multiple punishment opportunities enable to investigate the 
consecutive escalation of conflicts (see, e.g., Fehl, Sommerfeld, Semmann, Krambeck, & 
Milinski, 2012). A further promising path is the use of immersive virtual reality 
environments. This technique could enable to model the complex dynamics of group-based 
retribution (i.e., displaced revenge and vicarious revenge) in a more realistic way combined 
with a high degree of experimental control.  
5.4 Practical Implications 
The following section delineates implications of the present findings on conceptual 
and empirical work in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism and, more broadly, on 
practical measures of conflict management and reconciliation. 
5.4.1 Displaced Revenge in the Context of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
The pervasiveness of terrorism is inarguably. Although, political and social conditions 
provide the breeding ground on which terrorism thrives, only a fraction of those people 
suffering certain conditions actually engage in terrorism (e.g., Friedland, 1988). Therefore, 
more needs to be known about when people get drawn into terrorism and, in particular, which 
social and psychological processes are involved (see Victoroff, 2005).  
Vengeful desires are a strong driving force behind acts of terrorism or other violent 
conflicts (Waldmann, 2001). Crucially, the displacement of one’s vengeful desires constitutes 
a central step on the path to terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005) and non-combatants are frequently 
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seen as viable targets of terrorist actions (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). For example, war 
victims in Chechnya began to believe that any member of the ethnic group whose members 
were responsible for the harm they suffered is a viable revenge target (Speckhard & 
Ahkmedova, 2006). These desires, in turn, made them susceptible to the recruitment in 
terrorist organizations which provide would-be-terrorists an outlet to channel their vengeful 
desires (e.g., McCullough, 2008). Despite the strong link between terrorism and revenge, 
social psychology has only recently started to consider direct and displaced revenge explicitly 
in the context of terrorism or counter-terrorism (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2014). Extending this 
line of research, the present work may diffuse into psychological research and theorizing on 
terrorism. For instance, although the displacement of one’s vengeful desires is considered to 
play a central role in terrorism, the forces driving displaced revenge have previously been 
largely neglected (see, e.g., Moghaddam, 2005). Conceptualizing displaced revenge as a goal-
directed behavior that aims at sending a message may therefore be fruitfully incorporated into 
previous work to obtain a broader conceptual framework explaining acts of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism. The present perspective on displaced revenge, for example, can help to 
render more precisely the conditions under which people suffering from injustice actually 
engage in terrorist actions, which targets are more likely to be attacked, and under which 
circumstances terrorists’ vengeful desires are perhaps satisfied.  
Furthermore, the present research can give us insights into how vengeful desires, in 
general, can be construed and exploited by leaders and elites to attract people for their own 
causes. Via media and propaganda, leaders can easily construe situations in a way that 
warrants them support for group-based retribution. For instance, portraying a rivaling group 
as highly entitative allows leaders to justify intergroup conflict and mobilize followers to 
support responses against entire groups. In this context, it is furthermore important to note 
that the “messages” intended to be conveyed by certain reprisals and the way they are 
perceived by others may diverge (Gray & Wilson, 2006). Thus, leaders and elites may not 
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only construe the initial event (e.g., the terror offense) to gather support for their policies, but 
may also frame their responses to this event (e.g., counter-terrorism) in a way that leads the 
public to actually believe that “justice can be served.” 
A comprehensive analysis of displaced revenge actions within the context terrorism or 
the “war on terrorism” would definitely fall beyond the scope of this Dissertation, however, it 
should be demonstrated that the dynamics investigated here can be fruitfully applied to this 
field. Not least, can a better understanding of displaced revenge reactions in the context of 
terrorism be helpful to eventually tailor effective policies and strategies to combat terrorism. 
5.4.2 Conflict Management and Reconciliation  
This work provides a further mosaic stone in understanding group-based retribution. 
Ultimately, research on the features and dynamics of this phenomenon should provide insights 
into possible strategies to eventually alleviate the devastating consequences associated with 
displaced revenge. Based on the present findings, therefore, some practical recommendations 
for conflict management and reconciliation shall be formulated.  
First, perceptions of entitativity do not only increase the likelihood of displaced 
revenge (e.g., Newheiser et al., 2012; Stenstrom et al., 2008), avengers are also more satisfied 
with revenge if the offender group is perceived to be entitative. Thus, it may prove 
particularly effective to educate against perceptions of high target group entitativity. For 
example, most, if not all, violent conflicts are characterized by a rhetoric which portrays the 
rivaling group as a strong, de-individuated, and cohesive unit (see Glover, 2001). Previous 
research suggests an interesting relation between the use of language and perceptions of 
entitativity (Rubini, Moscatelli, & Palmonari, 2007). In fact, using certain group labels will 
likely reinforce perceived entitativity of target groups (Smith, 2007). Thus, abandon or reduce 
a rhetoric portraying the offender’s group as “monolithic” and simultaneously promote 
perceptions of group variability may reduce the legitimization of displaced revenge, and 
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hence members’ support for military actions toward targets beyond offenders. Moreover, 
given that the initial offender still seems to have a central role for victims, members of the 
offender’s groups may distance themselves openly from the attitudes and behavior of the 
actual offender to prevent further harm. For example, anecdotal evidence for such a strategy 
could recently be observed after the Charlie Hebdo shooting on January 7, 2015. Immediately 
after the attacks, Muslims around the world sharply condemned the shooting and distanced 
themselves from the terrorists. Such actions may hopefully help to reduce the likelihood of 
attacks against inculpable Muslims. 
Second, understanding of what gives victims a sense of “justice being served” may 
also have a practical value in tailoring reconciliation procedures in the aftermath of group-
based offenses. In these contexts, effective reconciliation procedures can diminish the desire 
for revenge and are therefore essential to prevent renewed violence (Long & Brecke, 2003). 
To pave the way for reconciliation it appears central to address the psychological needs of the 
parties involved (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; 
Shnabel & Nadler, 2011). For example, from the victim’s perspective this can be achieved by 
initiating a dialogue with the offender in which course the offender acknowledge the wrong 
done to the victim (see, e.g., Strang et al., 2006). Such a procedure is increasingly used in 
restorative justice practices after individual harm-doings (e.g., Bazemore, 1998; Wenzel, 
Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). However, for group-based offenses, the present work 
emphasizes how important it is that the original offender and other members of the offender’s 
group express understanding of the harm suffered by the victim. Remember, only when the 
offender and the target understood why revenge was taken, victims actually experienced 
satisfaction. Thus, after offenses committed by a single member of a highly entitative group, it 
may not be sufficient if only this specific offender reacts to the injustice done to the victim in 
the course of the reconciliation procedure. Rather, it seems that other members of this group 
need to be involved, too, to effectively address the victim’s needs. Reconciliation procedures 
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should therefore create situations which enable such an exchange between victims, offenders, 
and other members (perhaps as representatives) of the offender’s group. Relatedly, these 
insights may also find application in victim-centered restorative practices within legal 
procedures (e.g., under law doctrines of conspiracy).  
Taken together, research on displaced revenge, or more generally, group-based 
retribution should ultimately guide the development of practical measures to prevent, combat, 
and solve conflicts between groups. Psychologists, in particular, have an important role in 
informing and implementing such procedures in the aftermath of group-based violence. In an 
exemplary manner, this section should therefore delineate the applicability of research on 
displaced revenge in different domains. It goes without saying that development of effective 
measures against group-based violence requires further research on the exact content of the 
message associated with displaced revenge (see Section 5.3.1). If we exactly know what 
victims hope to achieve with revenge (e.g., a change in the offender’s/target’s attitudes), 
practices can be better tailored to effectively address these needs before victims actually 
engage in displaced revenge.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Displaced revenge is a social phenomenon that—despite its pervasiveness—has long 
been neglected by psychological research. This Dissertation seeks to advance our 
understanding of this phenomenon, its motivational forces and emotional consequences. Five 
studies demonstrate that revenge taken against innocent targets is capable to bring justice to 
avengers. More specifically, results show that displaced revenge leads to more justice-related 
satisfaction when (a) the offender’s group is perceived as highly entitative or, more precisely, 
when its members are perceived as similar and interactive, (b) the offender’s group continues 
to exist in its original form, and (c) when both, the original offender and the target of revenge 
understand why revenge was taken. This Dissertation integrates theoretical and empirical 
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work in the field of justice psychology and research on group-based retribution. The current 
findings may therefore be insightful in several ways for both domains.  
With regard to psychological justice research, the present work extends findings of the 
dynamics and emotional consequences of revenge on an interpersonal level (i.e., direct 
revenge) to intergroup contexts. Results suggest that a purely retributive account is not 
sufficient to explain instances of displaced revenge. Instead, displaced revenge just like direct 
revenge appears to entail a message (“don’t mess with me!”). Only if this message is correctly 
understood by the offender and target, does displaced revenge lead to feelings of satisfaction 
and the experience of “justice achieved.” In this sense, displaced revenge can be conceived as 
an act of communication between the victim, target, and offender. As such, the present 
findings are in line with philosophical theories on punishment (e.g., Duff, 2001; Nozick, 
1981).  
Regarding scholarly work in the field of group-based retribution (or more broadly 
intergroup aggression), this Dissertation adds to the previous literature on displaced revenge 
by demonstrating that the entitativity of offender’s group does not only impact the likelihood 
of displaced revenge, but also avengers’ satisfaction after displaced revenge. More generally, 
the findings emphasize the pivotal role of entitativity within group-based conflicts. This is the 
first work that manipulates similarity (between individuals) and interaction (among 
individuals) independently from each other to examine their roles as determinants of 
displaced revenge. Contrary to prior theorizing, results show that both features are relevant to 
make displaced revenge satisfying. This finding therefore highlights the importance to 
account for similarity and interaction in future research. Additionally, and interestingly, for 
successful revenge after victimization of members of a highly entitative group, it is still 
important that the original offender does not disappear, but receives the message embedded in 
revenge. This is remarkable, given that previous work suggested that members of highly 
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entitative groups are psychologically interchangeable for perceivers (e.g., Crawford et al., 
2002; Waytz & Young, 2012).  
On a broader scale, this Dissertation advances our understanding of the nature of 
violent group-based conflicts, including terrorism and counter-terrorism. In examining the 
dynamics of displaced revenge we can moreover gain intriguing insights into how “displaced” 
vengeful desires can be construed, exploited, or manipulated by authorities and elites in a way 
that warrants them support for military interventions against entire groups.  
On a closing note, it shall be emphasized that psychology does not only play an 
important role in understanding the escalation of violence, but also in guiding the 
development and implementation of measures to eventually prevent violence. In this vein, the 
present insights may add a further piece to the puzzle about the nature of violent group 
conflicts and their prevention. As Mark Twain put it, “[revenge] is powerful sweet.” Indeed it 
is, and even so if it is not directed against the person who harmed us. 
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7 DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Zahlreiche Beispiele aus der Geschichte und dem aktuellen Weltgeschehen 
verdeutlichen, dass sich Rachereaktionen häufig nicht gegen den ursprünglichen Täter richten, 
sondern gegen dritte, unschuldige Personen. Die sogenannte 'verschobene Rache' ist ein 
zentraler Bestandteil intergruppaler Konflikte und kann verheerende Folgen nach sich ziehen. 
Gesellschaftlich wird die Rache an Unschuldigen häufig als unmoralisch sowie ungerecht 
wahrgenommen und trägt somit wesentlich zur Verschärfung von Konflikten bei. Die 
bisherige Forschung zu Vergeltungsaktionen im Gruppenkontext untersuchte primär die 
Faktoren, welche die Tendenz zu einer verschobenen Rache begünstigen. Ungeklärt ist 
hingegen noch, ob eine solche verschobene Rache mit dem Gefühl von Genugtuung und 
wiederhergestellter Gerechtigkeit einhergehen und unter welchen Umständen dies der Fall 
sein kann. Die vorliegende Dissertation widmet sich eben diesen Fragestellungen, indem 
Erkenntnisse über das Auftreten einer verschobenen Rache um eine 
gerechtigkeitspsychologische Perspektive erweitert werden. 
Die Forschung zu den sozialen und individuellen Funktionen von Rache im Kontext 
interpersoneller Verstöße beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, inwiefern ein Akt der Rache zu dem 
Gefühl der Genugtuung beitragen kann (Funk, McGeer, & Gollwitzer, 2014; Gollwitzer & 
Denzler, 2009; Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011). Dabei geht man von der Prämisse aus, 
dass Rache eine funktionale und zielgerichtete Reaktion auf subjektiv erlebte Ungerechtigkeit 
ist. Aus dieser Annahme lässt sich ableiten, dass die Genugtuung, die mit einer Rachereaktion 
einhergeht, indirekt Rückschlüsse auf die motivationalen Wurzeln zulässt, also dem, was sich 
Individuen von der Ausübung einer Rache erhoffen und was ihnen letztendlich das Gefühl 
vermittelt, dass die Gerechtigkeit wiederhergestellt wurde. Im Einklang mit theoretischen 
Überlegungen (z.B. French, 2001; Miller, 2001) lassen die empirischen Befunde insgesamt 
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den Schluss zu, dass Rache besonders zufriedenstellend ist, wenn sie dem Täter eine 
Botschaft übermittelt ('Mit mir darfst Du so etwas nicht machen!').  
Die bisherige sozialpsychologische Forschung zu Vergeltungsaktionen im 
Gruppenkontext konnte zeigen, dass eine solche verschobene Rache umso wahrscheinlicher 
ist, je entitativer die Tätergruppe vom Opfer wahrgenommen wird (Gaertner, Iuzzini, & 
O’Mara, 2008; Newheiser, Sakaowa, & Dovidio, 2012; Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 
2008). Entitativität bezeichnet dabei das Ausmaß, wonach eine Gruppe von Personen als eine 
miteinander verbundene kohärente Einheit wahrgenommen wird (Campbell, 1958). Neuere 
Betrachtungen legen darüber hinaus nahe, dass sich Entitativität sowohl aus der 
Wahrnehmung von sozialen Interaktionen als auch der Ähnlichkeit der Gruppenmitglieder 
speist (Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006). Die Entitativität hat zahlreiche Auswirkungen auf die 
Bewertung einer Gruppe und auf das Verhalten dieser gegenüber. So zeigt sich 
beispielsweise, dass Entitativität zu einer verstärkten Zuschreibung von kollektiver 
Verantwortlichkeit und Schuld führt. Anderen Mitgliedern der Tätergruppe wird demnach, 
auch ohne aktive Beteiligung, eine indirekte Rolle beim Zustandekommen der Handlung des 
Täters zugeschrieben. Entitativität kann somit eine Legitimation für die verschobene Rache 
bieten. Die bisherigen Befunde zu verschobener Rache resultieren hauptsächlich aus 
Erkenntnissen der Intergruppenforschung, vernachlässigen aber gerechtigkeitspsychologische 
Aspekte weitgehend. Diese Verbindung beider Forschungstraditionen trägt aber—an der 
Schwelle von interpersonalem zu intergruppalem Racheverhalten—entscheidend zum 
Verständnis des Gesamtphänomens 'Rache' und der Dynamik von Konflikten bei. An dieser 
Stelle setzt die vorliegende Dissertation an und untersucht, ob und unter welchen Umständen 
eine verschobene Rache mit dem Gefühl der Genugtuung und wiederhergestellten 
Gerechtigkeit einhergehen kann. Diesem Vorgehen liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass eine 
verschobene Rache die Funktion erfüllt, dem Täter und seiner Gruppe eine Botschaft zu 
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übermitteln. Demzufolge sollte eine verschobene Rache also zufriedenstellender sein, wenn 
ein stärkerer Zusammenhalt (beispielsweise in Form häufiger Interaktion und 
Kommunikation) zwischen den Mitgliedern dieser Gruppe wahrgenommen wird, und damit 
eine effektive Übermittlung der Botschaft gewährleistet werden kann. Zur Überprüfung dieser 
Annahmen wurden die Auswirkungen verschobener Rache auf die gerechtigkeitsbezogene 
Genugtuung in fünf Studien untersucht, die in zwei Manuskripten beschrieben werden. 
Die Hauptfragestellung des ersten Manuskripts ist, ob eine verschobene Rache zu dem 
Gefühl der Genugtuung und wiederhergestellten Gerechtigkeit führen kann. In drei Studien 
zeigt sich, dass Rächer mehr Genugtuung (aber nicht weniger Bedauern) empfinden, wenn die 
Gruppe des Täters als hoch entitativ wahrgenommen wird. Darüber hinaus legen die 
Ergebnisse der dritten Studie nahe, dass Gruppenmitglieder sowohl eine Ähnlichkeit in 
oberflächlichen Merkmalen als auch ein hohes Maß an sozialer Interaktion miteinander 
aufweisen müssen. 
Im Rahmen des zweiten Manuskriptes wurde untersucht, ob eine verschobenen Rache 
ausschließlich retributiv motiviert ist oder dem Täter und seiner Gruppe möglicherweise eine 
Botschaft übermittelt werden soll. In einem ersten Schritt wurde nachgewiesen, dass eine 
verschobene Rache zu einem größeren Empfinden von Genugtuung führt, wenn der 
ursprüngliche Täter—nach wie vor—Mitglied der Gruppe ist. Wenn der Täter die Gruppe 
hingegen verlassen oder sich die Gruppe aufgelöst hatte, führte eine verschobene Rache zu 
weniger Genugtuung. Dieses Ergebnis deutet darauf hin, dass eine verschobene Rache nicht 
zufriedenstellend ist, wenn dadurch lediglich ein anderes Gruppenmitglied bestraft wird. 
Vielmehr muss als eine entscheidende Voraussetzung, dass eine Botschaft gegebenenfalls an 
den Täter übermittelt werden kann, die Gruppe in ihrer ursprünglichen Form bestehen 
bleiben. In einem zweiten Schritt konnte die Annahme, dass verschobene Rache dazu dient, 
eine Botschaft zu übermitteln, bekräftigt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde gezeigt, 
D E U T S C H E  Z U S A M M E N F A S S U N G   142 
 
 
 
 
dass Rächer mehr Genugtuung empfinden, wenn der Täter und das Ziel der Rache zu 
verstehen geben, dass sie wissen, warum das Opfer verschobene Rache ausgeübt hat. 
Insgesamt legen die Befunde der vorliegenden Dissertation nahe, dass die verschobene 
Rache ein zielgerichtetes und funktionales Verhalten ist, welches dazu dient, dem Täter und 
dem 'Opfer' der Rache eine Botschaft zu übermitteln ('Mit mir dürft ihr so etwas nicht 
machen!'). 
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